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With conventional weapons nearing their peak capability, the need to identify alternative 
war fighting solutions suggests a look at Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The goal is 
to change the means by which warfare is conducted to improve operational efficiencies 
and overall effectiveness. The Naval Postgraduate School Systems Engineering and 
Analysis (SEA-19B) Capstone project team examined how existing directed energy 
technologies can provide performance across multiple warfare area domains and mission 
subsets for the U.S. Navy. The aim was to identify and characterize the capability gaps 
with conventional weapons systems, produce a coherent vision of naval missions that 
incorporate DEWs, and generate a roadmap for a DEW fleet. By conducting a thorough 
Analysis of Alternatives based on system performance, integration, schedule, and cost, 
the project team identified that the Tactical Laser System (with a laser beam power of 10 
kW) provided the best overall capability to defend surface combatants, although none of 
the analyzed DEWs have the capability to replace a current conventional weapon.   The 
Active Denial System (microwave) provided a niche capability in the Anti-
Terrorism/Force Protection mission set. 
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With conventional weapons nearing their peak capability, the need to identify alternative 
war fighting solutions suggests a look at Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The goal is 
to change the means by which warfare is conducted to improve operational efficiencies 
and overall effectiveness. DEW technologies have been paralyzed by runaway budgets 
and suboptimal performance without the emergence of an operational system.   It is the 
purpose of this project to examine how mature directed energy technologies can provide 
the U.S. Government with a “return on investment” and “added value” in the near term.  
The Naval Postgraduate School Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 19 
Team B (SEA-19B) Capstone project team examined how existing directed energy 
technologies can provide performance across multiple warfare area domains and mission 
sub-sets for the U.S. Navy. The aim was to identify and characterize the capability gaps 
with current conventional weapons systems, produce a coherent vision of naval missions 
that incorporate DEWs, and generate a roadmap for a DEW equipped fleet. To 
accomplish this task, SEA-19B developed a custom metamodel using the Global 
Information Network Architecture (GINA) environment, adapted the Map Aware Non-
uniform Automata (MANA) simulation tool to simulate DEWs, and conducted a Monte 
Carlo simulation of multiple combinations of weapons and threats to be simulated in a 
single sequence of engagements. 
GINA is a software metamodeling environment that allows users to describe 
system of systems behavior semantically in lieu of coding software. This ability is 
achieved through a reflexive modeling paradigm that is self-describing and incorporates 
predefined relationship constructs which exist in the environment of project data. The 
flexibility through relationships provides a significant advantage over the conventional 
object orientation paradigm of software development by predefining a finite set of 
relationship types between objects that can be extrapolated to represent any relationship 
between objects of all types and kinds. 
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The reflexive nature of the GINA semantic descriptions and the ability of GINA 
to leverage inherent relationship constructs in GINA allowed SEA-19B to build an 
engagement-centric model, that described relationships between engagements, threats, 
weapons, environments, weapon platforms, warfare areas, and missions. The GINA 
model (herein referred to as the “model”) was fully traceable, built on an iterative 
mapping method that linked the Navy’s Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) to Required 
Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Critical Capabilities Requirements (CCRs), and 
representative of SEA-19B’s tailored Systems Engineering process. The consequence of 
building the GINA model was that SEA-19B gained the ability to conduct cross-domain 
comparisons of weapon technologies in the context of engagements, missions, warfare 
areas, and environments in technology agnostic terms. The result was a means to 
construct and make a quantitatively and qualitatively objective comparison of DEWs and 
conventional weapons with a custom user interface to view and navigate the model data 
and results. External statistical analysis was then conducted using Minitab 16 to provide 
meaningful graphs of the raw data, modeled relationships, and complex object 
interactions in order to draw conclusions about DEW performance in various contexts. 
The GINA model was deterministic in nature, using physics-based equations 
implemented through external calculation software, written by SEA-19B with the 
Microsoft .NET Framework. Integration of these external software programs into GINA 
was straightforward via the custom GINA model content manager built by Big Kahuna 
Technologies, LLC (the developer of GINA). Because of the GINA model’s 
deterministic nature, two stochastic simulations were used to gain further insights about 
potential concepts of operations (CONOPS) for DEW employment, DEW effects on 
shipboard survivability, and weapon combinations in multithreat environments.  
SEA-19B developed a method of translating nominal average times for Type I 
Engagements (traditional ‘hard kill’ engagements) at static ranges for targets into 
probability of kill for a static range using MANA. MANA is an agent-based simulation 
tool developed by the New Zealand Defense Force originally for ground combat 
simulations. MANA has since been adapted to nearly every other type of conventional 
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warfare, but to the knowledge of SEA-19B and the NPS SEED Center not for DEW 
applications that need to accumulate energy to show damage effects as the DE beam 
tracks moving targets. MANA was then able to use that data to interpolate between a set 
of static ranges and probabilistic data to simulate DEW engagements, using a system of 
“life points” and “damage memory,” in which energy gets accumulated on the target in 
discrete packets based on a given range and the original time for a Type I Engagement at 
that range. Using this method of discrete packet damage accumulation on the target, we 
simulated a DEW engagement. These simulations provided insights into potential 
CONOPS for DEW employment on a surface combatant and illustrated the value of 
multiple platforms applying DE beams for defense against swarms and “hardened,” 
moving targets. 
SEA-19B built a Monte Carlo simulation in Excel to accommodate multiple 
weapons per agent in a straightforward manner. Whereas, MANA was not easily 
configured to handle multiple combinations of weapons and threats to be simulated in a 
single sequence of engagements based on the same physics principles behind the GINA 
model, the Monte Carlo simulation was used for the multiple combinations of weapons 
and threats. The Monte Carlo simulation allowed SEA-19B to gain insights into the 
interactions between multiple weapon systems and the effect of DEWs on shipboard 
survivability. 
In addition to modeling and simulation, SEA-19B conducted a cost analysis of the 
identified alternatives, as well as evaluated the shipboard integration aspects of each 
system type with respect to the DDG-51 class destroyer platform. Instead of conducting a 
total life cycle cost calculation, the objective was to determine and estimate the 
integration costs, as well as to ascertain the implementation cost of select directed energy 
technologies. After determining the baseline costs, the scope of the project cost estimate 
work was decomposed into smaller discrete components, whereby all required work 
breakdown structure (WBS) sub-elements were identified. For each system, the cost 
estimate was calculated by analogy (with like-kind systems), and based on a cost factors 
approach (a baseline costing figure is decomposed and reconciled with known aggregate 
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project data that is applicable to the task at hand). In terms of shipboard integration, the 
assessment examined primarily size, weight, and power (SWaP) considerations. Weapons 
coverage and the level of integration with current combat systems were also examined 
but played a smaller role than the SWaP considerations. 
By conducting a thorough Analysis of Alternatives based on multiple stakeholder 
perspectives with respect to system performance, integration, schedule, and cost, the 
project team identified that the Tactical LASER System (with a LASER beam power of 
10 kW operating at 1.6 micron wavelength) provided the best overall combination of (1) 
capability to defend surface combatants in the near term and (2) cost/schedule to 
purchase and integrate the system although none of the analyzed DEWs have the 
capability to replace a current conventional weapon.   Additionally, the Active Denial 
System (operating at 95 GHz radiation) was identified as the best option when looking at 
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV). The Active Denial System (100 kW 
microwave) provided a niche capability in the Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) 
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Even today the mere concept of directed energy weapons (DEW) seems cutting 
edge and carries with it a bit of a science fiction undertone. However, in reality the idea is 
not new and has been the subject of research for quite some time. Even before the time of 
Christ, Archimedes experimented with the premise of directed energy. Through an array 
of mirrors he concentrated sunlight in an attempt to set ablaze the ships of the invading 
Roman fleet. It is justifiable to credit him with constructing the first primitive “death ray” 
in 212 BC during the siege of Syracuse (MIT 2.009ers 2005). More recently, Nikola 
Tesla spent nearly 30 years working with charged particle beams, studying their 
characteristics of projection through open air. He first published his work on directed 
energy in 1934 (Tesla Invents Peace Ray 2011). Years later, during the height of the Cold 
War, the Soviet Union conducted experiments on the effects of high intensity 
electromagnetic (EM) radiation on people at least as early as 1973. The Soviets 
determined that a relatively small amount of power at microwave frequencies was 
required to make people physically ill by exposure to EM radiation (Mcree 1980). In the 
roughly 40 years since, countless research and development (R&D) efforts related to 
DEW have been conducted by various nations around the globe. As a whole, the 
combined efforts of various programs over a span of 30 years have resulted in U.S. 
government, as well as private, spending totaling in the billions. To date, no resulting 
“program of record” has been initiated in the United States. Many promising concepts 
have been evaluated and their respective prototypes built; however, the idea of applying 
directed energy to warfare seems to have achieved little traction in proportion to the 
money spent. 
It should be noted that throughout this report, the terms DE and DEW are both 
heavily utilized. For the sake of clarification, DE refers to the entire gamut of 
technologies that makeup Directed Energy from beams such as LASERs and plasma 
weapons to area effect technologies such as high-powered microwaves and 
electromagnetic pulse bombs, to technologies that appear more like conventional 
weapons like the rail gun. When DEW is used, it refers to a specific Directed Energy 
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Weapon system like the LASER Weapon System (LaWS) or Active Denial System 
(ADS). 
A. PROJECT TEAM 
The Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) Cohort 19 Team B (SEA-19B) project 
team was comprised of 23 officers and defense professionals from the United States, 
Taiwan, Israel, and Singapore. The varied backgrounds, cultures, and mindsets of our 
team were essential to the overall success of the project. The Surface Warfare Officers 
composed the majority of the SEA-19B members, all having similar professional 
experiences. The addition of personnel from Taiwan, Israel, and Singapore from different 
branches of the military and civilian professions incorporated viewpoints molded by 
unique differences in professional and cultural experiences. These individual viewpoints 
contributed an equally valued approach to achieving our objectives and goals throughout 
the project.   
The team was organized into various roles that included Project Leader, Lead 
Systems Engineer (SE), Speaker, Modeling Lead, Temasek Defence Systems Institute 
(TDSI) Lead, and Team Engineers. The Project Leader worked on the integration task 
and was responsible for the overall management of the team (which included scheduling 
team meetings, monitoring the progress of the project, serving as a liaison between the 
team and faculty advisors, and allocating assignments). The Lead SE was responsible for 
managing the overall SE process of the project and served as the chief editor of this thesis 
paper. The Speaker had the distinction of presenting all briefs in addition to being 
knowledgeable of all facets of the project and participating in all tasks spanning the SE 
portions to modeling. The Modeling Lead was responsible for managing the 
development, execution, and analysis of all computer models and simulations of the 
project, as well as heading the group of engineers who built the four models and two 
simulations. The TDSI Lead had duties that paralleled the Project Leader in terms of 
managing the TDSI students and their assignments for the various Team tasks. Team 
Engineers worked on all areas of the project from SE portions to Modeling. Team 
Engineer duties included research, writing, editing, conducting stakeholder interviews, 
and accomplishing tasks as assigned by the Project Leader, Lead SE, or TDSI Lead.  
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Table 1 contains a list of the team members, their roles on the project, and brief 
professional backgrounds with the number of years’ experience in that area: 
Table 1. Capstone Project Team 
 
Last First Rank Title Curriculum Community/Specialty
Shene Richard LT Project Leader SEA
Surface Warfare-Gunnery Officer (1 Year) Auxiliaries 
Officer (1 Year) Riverine Detachment Officer-in-
deLongpre Jeffrey LT Lead SE SEA
Surface Warfare-Main Propulsion Officer (3 Years), 
Training Officer (2 Years) Awesome (29 Years)
Ciullo Daniel LT Modeling Lead SEA Surface Warfare-First Lieutenat (2 Years) Navigator (2 
NowakowskiJakub LT Speaker SEA
Surface Warfare-Damage Control Assistant (2 Years), 
Training Officer (2 Years); Nuclear Machinist Mate / 
Engineering Laboratory Technician (7 Years)
Cheng Po-yu CPT Team Engineer SEA Simulator Maintenance Engineer (4 years)
White Rosevelt LT Team Engineer SEA
Surface Warfare -Gunnery Officer (1 Year), Electronic 
Warfare Officer (6 Months), Repair Division Officer (1 
Year) Training Officer (2 Years)
McArthur Sim LTC Team Engineer SEA
Army Officer Field Artillery (11 years), Operations 
Research Systems Analysis (5 years)
Taylor Earvin LT Team Engineer SEA
Surface Warfare-Electrical Officer (2 Years) N4 
Assistant (2 Years)




Senior Systems Engineer and CAPM (PMI) with 
experience in MALE UAV projects (4 years)
Heng Yinghui Team Engineer ECE Comms
Singapore (Defence Science and Technology Agency)
Communications Systems Engineering and Project 
Manager
Wong Chia Sern Team Engineer ECE Networks
Singapore (Defence Science and Technology Agency)
Networking Engineer and Project Manager
Neo Yong Shern ME5 Team Engineer
Guided 
Weapons
Republic of Singapore Airforce
Weapons Systems Engineer 




Guidance, Navigation, and Controls Engineer 
Wong Wai Keat CPT Team Engineer Info Assurance
Republic of Singapore Army
Signal Officer 
Phua Yee Ling Team Engineer Info Assurance
Singapore (Defense Industry)
Senior Software Engineer





Sheo Boon Chew Winson ME5 Team Engineer
Systems 
Engineering
Republic of Singapore Army
Logistics & Maintenance Support, Policy and  
Implementation
Soh Sze Shiang ME5 Team Engineer
Systems 
Engineering
Republic of Singapore Army
Artillery and personnel Trained
Personnel Training, Ops and Capability Development
Lim Zhifeng CPT Team Engineer
Systems 
Engineering
Republic of Singapore Army
Infantry Officer




Assistant Principal Engineer in design, commissioning, 
and testing of shipboard systems 




Asst Manager in design and development in land 
systems (3 years)
Chow Wen Chong Julian Team Engineer
Systems 
Engineering
Singapore (Defence Science and Technology Agency) 
Senior Engineer C4I-Development in Navy C2 Projects 
C2 S/W Developer and Project Manager





B. TASKING STATEMENT 
In recent conflicts, the United States military has relied on superior technology to 
compensate for superior numbers or other advantages of our enemies. The ability for 
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan to blend in with the noncombatant population is one 
example of an advantage. Technological advancement in offensive naval weapons has 
outpaced advancement in defensive naval systems, as shown by the great advances to 
strike capability in the form of Tomahawks and experimentation in the railgun and the 
extended range guided munition (ERGM), but with little traction on increasing armor, 
reducing radar cross section, or defensive weapons (some notable exceptions are standard 
missiles and the Close-In Weapons System (CIWS)). It would appear the U.S. Navy has 
long held onto the adage of “A sudden powerful transition to the offensive—the flashing 
sword of vengeance—is the greatest moment for the defense” (Clausewitz 1976, 370) or 
more commonly heard as ‘the best defense is a good offense.’  The criticality of offensive 
power has been characterized as well in the Hughes’ Salvo Equation (Equation 1) which 
relates the number of ships put out of action by their tactics, number, circumstances, and 
power (both offensive and defensive).  
   
      
  
 
Equation 1. Number of force B ships put out of action by force A 
Where    is the number of force B ships put out of action,   is the striking power 
of each force A ship, A is the number of force A ships firing,    is the defensive power of 
each force B ship, B is the number of force B ships present, and    is the staying power 
of each force B ship (Hughes 2000, 268). 
There is an analogous equation for the change in force A. Specifically for naval 
combat, the force which gets the first strike has a tremendous advantage as the opposing 
force will likely be damaged prior to its initial salvo in return. Using this equation, there 
are four interpretations that will result in a reduction in the number of casualties to 
friendly ships (force B). 
 Shoot first. If friendly forces fire first, the enemy likely would not be able 
to return fire, thereby reducing friendly casualties. 
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 Reduce  . Reducing the effectiveness of enemy weapons would reduce 
the number of casualties, but is not something which is realistically 
achievable. 
 Increase   . Increasing the survivability of friendly ships would reduce the 
number of casualties through means of increased armor or improved 
damage control systems. Armor although relatively inexpensive to 
implement, increases operational costs by dramatically increasing 
operational costs (specifically fuel). Improving damage control systems 
would help as well, but a missile could still strike a crucial point. 
 Increase   . Increasing the defensive power of friendly ships would reduce 
the number of missile hits, thereby reducing casualties. Defensive 
weapons like Standard Missiles (SM) or the Close-In Weapons System 
(CIWS) currently fulfill this task. 
In any conflict short of total war, U.S. commanders generally do not want to 
engage a ship which may or may not be hostile, so allowing the enemy to take the first 
shot has nearly become a necessity (or may be so depending on the Rules of Engagement 
(RoE) for a specific area or situation). The possibility of taking the first shot coupled with 
the lethality of modern anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), having an inexpensive, 
reliable, and effective defense against the ASCM threat would be a welcome addition by 
improving the survivability of ships. DE has the potential to provide this defense to U.S. 
forces by augmenting or potentially replacing current systems such as the SM family and 
CIWS, thereby increasing   . SEA-19B was tasked with exploring the feasibility of 
deploying an operational DEW on a U.S. Navy ship in the next four years and to 
determine if there is a comparative or augmentation advantage over current conventional 
systems. 
The tasking for the capstone project of SEA-19B was directed by OPNAV N9I, 
the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum sponsor, through Captain (Retired) Jim 
Eagle, the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum chairman, and Professor Gary 
Langford, the capstone project faculty advisor. The tasking for SEA-19B was to: 
Design a family of systems or a system of systems of Directed Energy 
Weapons (DEW) that can be integrated with manned and unmanned forces 
to address a broad spectrum of missions commensurate with the needs of 
the U.S. Navy. Consider current fleet structure and funded programs as the 
baseline system of systems to conduct current missions. Develop the 
concept(s) of operations for the range of current and future missions that 
incorporate DEW, then develop alternative fleet architectures for 
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platforms, ships, manning, command and control, communications, 
logistics, and operational procedures to advantage DEW capabilities. 
Consider the potential technology gaps for both DEW and integrating 
DEW into Naval forces; determine a more streamlined architecture for the 
combined DEW – Navy forces; and identify and characterize the “gap” 
fillers. Iterate the task, as approved by your primary faculty advisor. 
Produce a coherent vision of U.S. Navy missions that incorporate DEW; 
identify the requirements for support and collaboration with coalition 
forces; and discuss the interoperability issues with these collaborative 
efforts. Provide a roadmap of DEW to improve the effectiveness for future 
Navy ships. (Langford, SEA-19B Directed Energy Weapons 2012) 
The key points in this tasking statement are to: 
 Address a broad spectrum of missions commensurate with the needs of the 
U.S. Navy 
 Consider current fleet structure and funded programs 
 Develop the concept(s) of operations  
 Consider the potential technology gaps for both DEW and integrating 
DEW into current and future Naval forces 
 Identify and characterize the gap fillers 
 Produce a coherent vision of U.S. Navy missions that incorporate DEW 
 Provide a roadmap of DEW to improve the effectiveness for future Navy 
ships 
This statement was further refined by the project team with assistance from our 
project faculty advisor, Dr. Gary Langford. These refinements, incorporating external 
restraints and internal constraints, are further discussed in the next section. 
C. PROBLEM DEVELOPMENT 
The problem statement developed by SEA-19B to address the tasking statement 
was driven by two factors. The first is any potential solution must be fielded in the short 
term. While short term was not a defined period of time, the project team specified the 
period to four years. This timeframe capitalized on current DE technology while still 
allowing some time for improvements and modifications prior to deployment. The second 
factor supported the four year period in that only DEW technologies with operationally 
tested prototypes were considered. Testing was required in real-world environments 
against possible targets, vice a laboratory setting. A technology that has not advanced 
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beyond the laboratory stage would not be ready to be fielded in four years due to 
inevitable “improvements” coupled with the requirement for extensive operational test 
and evaluation. Additionally, the funding required for system and platform integration as 
part of the progression from a laboratory to an operational testing environment is 
considerable adding typically 60% of the total costs (National Institute of Standards & 
Technology 2002). The Airborne LASER (ABL) and Tactical High-Energy LASER 
(THEL) are two examples of the time and funding required to make an operational (or at 
least ready to be fielded for additional testing) DEW. The ABL program started in 1996, 
had the prototype fully constructed and ready to fly in 2003, with testing conducted from 
2008 to 2010 (FAS 2010). For seven aircraft, including all development and testing, the 
total cost was expected to be 1.6 billion dollars in fiscal year 2005 dollars (Lockridge 
2001). Similarly, the THEL program started in 1996, was ready for testing in 1998, with 
several tests conducted starting in 2002 (Pike 2011), at a cost of between 150 to 200 
million dollars (Sirak 1999). The two driving factors of conforming to a four year 
timeframe and using operationally tested prototypes shaped the problem statement for the 
SEA-19B Capstone Project. 
1. Problem Statement 
In order to focus the work of the project team, it was necessary to identify the 
problems facing the U.S. Navy with respect to DEW and produce a clear and concise 
problem statement to guide the team. Among the problems facing the Navy are that 
conventional weapons are nearing their peak technical capability, DEW technologies 
have been paralyzed by runaway budgets and sub optimal performance without the 
emergence of an operational system, as well as the fact that DEWs are currently being 
pursued by other countries throughout the world.   
Conventional gun systems have not changed significantly since World War II. 
They have become smaller with less range but have greater accuracy and a higher rate of 
fire. The largest guns on current U.S. ships are 5 inch guns with a range of 13 nautical 
miles (United States Navy 2012) compared to the 16 inch guns on the Iowa Class 
battleships with a range of nearly 21 nautical miles (Fischer, et al. 2006). Several 
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programs have attempted to improve conventional guns further, specifically the Extended 
Range Guided Munition (ERGM) but that program failed to field an operational round.  
Missile systems have similarly reached their pinnacle. Missiles can be made faster 
than bullets or more agile, but are still be limited by the laws of physics and properties of 
the materials used in the manufacture of the missile (not to mention engineering and 
manufacturing limitations). Eventually, using a missile will be a question of economics as 
it is not financially sustainable to engage a relatively inexpensive rocket propelled 
grenade (RPG) with a multimillion dollar missile (although the need to defend the 
potentially multi-billion dollar unit from the RPG does exist). The Standard Missile 
family continues to be modified and improved from the original SM-1MR put into 
service in 1967. These missiles have been the main air defense weapon on surface ships 
since their development and are now used for ballistic missile defense and anti-satellite 
missions in addition to the traditional air defense mission. The newest Standard Missile, 
SM-6, has a unit cost of 3.64 million dollars in fiscal year 2012 dollars (Oestergaard 
2012).  
DEWs offer advantages over conventional weapons by providing attack at the 
speed of light, precise targeting, rapid engagement of multiple targets, adjustable damage 
capacity, low operational cost, reduced logistic support, a nearly unlimited magazine, and 
wide area coverage for offensive and defensive purposes. DEW also seem to be at the 
forefront of the next revolution in military weapons (Deveci 2012). Unlike conventional 
kinetic energy weapons, DEWs are minimally affected by the effects of wind and gravity. 
Because the evolution of conventional weapons has essentially plateaued, there is the 
potential for our adversaries to close the capability gap and therefore pose a greater 
threat. The United States must pursue improved technologies to maintain the military 
edge that it has enjoyed and depended on over the years. 
Another problem with DEW is that they are expensive to research and develop. 
Sunk costs associated with current weapons and ways of thinking, bureaucratic 
inflexibility, and an inability to institutionally embrace disruptive change could stand in 
the way of the development and fielding of these highly promising weapons (McGrath, 
Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (Serial 1) 2012). While these DEW 
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technologies offer tremendous promise, funding spread across multiple programs may 
threaten the emergence of those that may provide a return on investment of these sunk 
costs. Navy leadership must make cohesive decisions to focus funding during these 
budgetary constrained times into only those areas that will provide the greatest benefit. 
The project will seek out these areas and make recommendations to funnel future funding 
into producing effective weapons that provided added capability to the warfighter.   
The United States is not the only country pursuing DEWs. China, Russia, India, 
Iran, South Korea, France, Israel, and Germany all have made commitments to and 
technical progress in DEWs research and development programs (McGrath, Directed 
Energy and Electric Weapon Systems (DEEWS) Serial 3: China 2012). With these 
countries actively pursuing DEW technology, the United States may be at risk of 
suffering technological surprise form the very technologies it originally developed 
(McGrath, Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (Serial 1) 2012). If the United 
States is going to continue their global military preeminence, it must continue to seek the 
military advantage offered by DEWs.  
A concise problem statement was formed considering the limitations for 
conventional weapon improvement, the military potential of DE, and the two 
aforementioned factors from the tasking statement. The problem is: 
Conventional weapons are nearing their peak technical capability. As a 
result, Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs) are the next logical step. In the 
past, DEW technologies have been paralyzed by runaway budgets and 
sub-optimal performance. Several countries are pursuing DEWs, therefore, 
it is important for the United States Navy to maintain the upper hand by 
continuing to research and develop these weapons. However, given the 
increasing budgetary restraints, U.S. Navy leadership must identify viable 
short-term DEW technologies that offer an immediate return on 
investment and the potential for continued development and improvement. 
DEWs offer the U.S. Navy an avenue to maintain a technological 
advantage to help defend maritime platforms. 
2. Scope 
For decades, research has been conducted on the feasibility of employing directed 
energy in the form of weaponry with hopes of achieving both the potential of “deep 
magazines,” as well as the prospect for enhanced “force continuum” options. However, 
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the challenges associated with weaponizing directed energy are numerous. They include 
overcoming atmospheric attenuation, power requirements beyond current shipboard 
generating and cooling limits, and R&D roadblocks such as beam director quality, energy 
storage materials (batteries), and cycle time. Since much of the DEW research is very 
broad in nature, and there are dozens of technologies with various maturity levels. It was 
necessary for the project team to limit the scope of the project to a manageable level. In 
the briefest of terms, the scope is to determine the requirements, the concept for 
operations, and characterize the fielding and operations of a DEW within the next four 
years. 
Like most aspects of the Systems Engineering (SE) Process, the project scope was 
molded through an iterative process that determined what aspects of DE would be 
included in the project, as well as those that would not be addressed. Based on initial 
tasking, we focused on the capability gap faced by unit commanders to address the fast 
paced nature of force protection scenarios that both limit the amount of time to make 
informed decisions, and determining the actual intent of a potential adversary. It was the 
intent of the project sponsor and the NPS faculty to provide an initial tasking that would 
focus on a specific warfare area that DEWs could potentially improve, thus reducing the 
overlap from the countless studies that have already been conducted of these weapons. 
The project team determined the scope of their research was too broad for the timeline of 
the project, and that Navy specific recommendations were not necessarily explored with 
adequate depth.  
Another feature common across much of the contemporary research is it focuses 
on what DE could be opposed to what it actually is. Therefore, we decided to focus on a 
short term perspective, and concentrate on only those technologies that have reached a 
relevant level of maturity. We achieve this short term perspective by closely examining 
only those systems that have a built and operationally tested prototype. Our goal is to 
offer added value to the warfare commander, as well as a return on investment by 
providing a net result for federal dollars already spent. By added value we mean that a 
chosen technology must offer a comparative advantage over what already exists, or that it 
can provide an additional capability to augment how current systems are employed. 
Instead of focusing on the potential capabilities of future DEWs, we were interested in 
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determining what, if anything, the existing DEW prototypes could accomplish in an 
operational environment in the near term. 
a. In Scope 
Since the project was scoped to fielding potential DEWs in the near term, 
it was necessary to define a notional timeline to guide the DEW from concept of 
operations to the validation of operational capability. Therefore, the following timeline 
was considered in selecting those technologies that would be selected for further analysis.   
 12 months to the development of concept of operations 
 Includes a platform specific integration plan, the co-uses, 
training, logistics, and support 
 24 months to the demonstration of operational utility 
 36 months to initial operational capability 
 48 months to validation of operational capability  
This compressed timeline was the driving force behind identifying only 
those technologies that could potentially be fielded relatively quickly. The project team 
conducted extensive background research through open source documents to identify the 
directed energy technologies that have achieved a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 
6 or higher, which represents a system or prototype that has been demonstrated in a 
relevant environment. A TRL of 7 represents a system that has been successfully tested in 
an operational environment. The minimum TRL 6 requirement was essential to ensure 
that the chosen technologies were able to meet the strict four year timeline. 
b. Out of Scope 
There are several limitations and constraints with respect to DEW that 
have influenced what has been scoped out of the project. The limitations of DEWs that 
were discovered during the background research assisted in further scoping the potential 
mission areas described. For example, DEWs were not assessed for their potential 
capability of supporting the Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) mission due to high 
attenuation of the electromagnetic spectrum in an underwater environment as shown in 




Figure 1. Attenuation of electromagnetic radiation in sea water (after Harney, 
Combat Systems Volume 1 2004) 
 
Figure 2. Molecular absorption of the atmosphere (after Harney, Combat Systems 
Volume 1 2004) 
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Unlike some conventional weapons, DEWs are limited to line of sight 
(LOS) operations, thus over-the-horizon firing scenarios were not considered. Due to the 
design power characteristics of currently fielded DEW prototypes, the technologies 
designed to provide a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability were excluded. 
Similarly, we excluded the evaluation of space-based weapons, in this case largely due to 
limitations associated with LASER system optics. Through discussions with the project 
sponsor, the project focus was placed on beams not bombs, and therefore we did not 
consider Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) bombs or any variant of this technology.   
There are also a number of constraints that have contributed to the scoping 
of the project. Since the project was a multi-national effort, the obtainment of classified 
or proprietary data for these systems fell outside the scope of the project. The project 
group found an acceptable level of open source data to carry out the project.  
From a political perspective, DEW technologies whose primary purpose is 
to blind, or were designed to cause suffering and/or superfluous injuries to enemy 
combatants were excluded to ensure compliance with Protocol IV of Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons of 1980 (International Committee of the Red Cross 
2012). In addition, our project assessment did not concern itself with the politics 
surrounding the use and/or employment of DEW in the field; however, due diligence will 
be given to ensure proposed solutions do not violate U.S. or international commitments 
and treaties. 
Due to the inherent size, power, cooling requirements, and limited 
implementation time of the DEW prototypes only surface combatants were considered 
with respect to systems integration. Since directed energy weapons operate LOS, all 
technologies were evaluated and assessed primarily on their ability to provide a defensive 
capability, and each technology’s offensive capability (as applicable) was not excluded 
from the analysis, but was given secondary consideration. 
We determined that several of the current ships in the fleet could 
potentially support directed energy weapons, however, by focusing on the mission areas 
of each platform we narrowed our focus to three platforms. We investigated Cruisers, 
Destroyers, and the Littoral Combat Ship. The Cruisers were scoped out of the project 
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because they are approaching the end of their life cycle amid talks to decommission those 
remaining in the fleet in the near term. The Littoral Combat Ship was scoped out of the 
project since we determined that any system which could operate on a DDG could also 
operate on a LCS. LCS has four 750 kW generators, two of which will be online at any 
given time for normal operations (Potts 2013). With 1500 kW of excess power generation 
capability, there is sufficient excess power to operate any of the potential DEW systems 
analyzed for this paper, and if required, the mission bay of the LCS could be configured 
to hold the DEW equipment. DDGs will still make up the bulk of the surface fleet in the 
next four years, so focusing on installing a DEW on a DDG would have a larger impact 
Navy wide. Once more LCS get introduced into the fleet and their CONOPS is tested, 
LCS would be a potential candidate in the future. Therefore, we focused our attention on 
the integration of these technologies on the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) Class Destroyer as 
this appears to be the most probable choice to implement these weapons in the fleet in the 
near term. 
3. Project Approach 
The burden of progress implies that new systems should provide either increased 
capability, or achieve it through more efficient means. Sometimes certain unique 
capabilities within a mission capability set are gapped. These gaps need to be identified 
and equipment or doctrine needs to be developed to fill the gap. This project addresses 
both completing mission areas currently fulfilled by conventional weapons as well as 
mission areas which do not have a current conventional solution and are therefore 
gapped. 
The lack of standoff non-lethal options within the use of force continuum, 
particularly applicable to the force protection mission, is one such gap. Current forces 
have numerous lethal weapons with long (greater than 100m) standoff range such as 
rifles and crew-served weapons, and several non-lethal options with either short (less 
than 30m) or no standoff range. Rubber bullets and beanbags fired from pistols and 
shotguns respectively are the non-lethal option with a short standoff range, while 
chemical sprays and batons have no appreciable standoff range. Fire hoses can be used in 
a force protection situation, but greatly lose effectiveness beyond the range of the rubber 
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bullets and beanbags. It should be noted that these weapons are usable against individuals 
or small groups of people while no non-lethal weapon is in the U.S. Navy arsenal 
effective against vehicles. 
In this non-lethal case, a “gap” exists in the proportional list of responses 
available to the combatant commander since there are no alternatives options between 
“warn” and “kill.”  Combatant commanders are forced to either do without, or improvise 
with respect to these gapped capabilities. As a result, the goal for our research project is 
mission oriented, and more specifically, to ensure that mission capability gaps are 
adequately evaluated.  
With respect to directed energy weapons procurement, Hollywood fiction has 
biased many individuals by ingraining in them unreasonable expectations. Iron Man is a 
recent example. Developing game-changing technologies would be ideal, but should 
never be expected in a short period of time. When game-changing technologies are 
evolutionary, they must be built upon from seemingly less significant technologies. 
Evolutionary development is the same approach many successful civilian corporations 
are taking with respect to product development. Staying competitive means not only 
having the foresight to anticipate trends, but also possessing the ability to evolve current 
technological capability over time (Burrus 2012). With regards to DE, it is important to 
remember that directed energy “is what it is,” and more importantly it “is not what it is 
not.” 
Through our research we have identified a short list of technologies with already 
constructed and operationally tested prototypes. This list was determined by broadly 
researching numerous DE technologies from chemical LASERs like ABL and THEL, to 
Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of Radiation (MASERs), to plasma 
beams and Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons. Using this large list, the team 
removed items that fell outside the scope of the project like EMP and sonic weapons. The 
team then further researched remaining technologies to determine what prototypes have 
been built and operationally tested at least to some extent. The four technologies which 
remained were Chemical LASERs (CL), Solid State LASERs (SSL), Free Electron 
LASERs (FEL), and High Powered Microwaves (HPM). Our objective is to analyze each 
  
16 
of the technologies on our short list to determine if they can provide the combatant 




A. STATE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
The concept of skilled aimed fire remains a treasured ability on the modern 
battlefield. Every new weapon when first introduced must be trained on to hone the skill 
needed to be employed in battle (Eshel 2012). Precision fire has long been the underlying 
principle to the exploitation of gunpowder. The Chinese standardized the formula for 
gunpowder in 1044 CE. However, many innovations were implemented before simple 
muskets could be used as the standard weapon for most armies. Over the course of six 
centuries, innovations such as tapered projectiles, advances in the gunpowder formula, 
and rifling made gunpowder a necessity in every armory (Needham 1986). 
Guns continued to advance in terms of accuracy, range, rate of fire, and 
destructive potential. Increasing the caliber generally increased both the range and 
destructive potential of a round, while more technological approaches were required for 
improving the accuracy and rate of fire. Cannons used on land and ships both had to 
develop before becoming weapons of choice and many of the same innovations that 
worked to forge muskets into rifles by rifling the barrels greatly improving accuracy and 
interrupted screw which dramatically improved rate of fire. These upgrades were 
integrated into their large projectile brethren and made artillery the focus of many land 
armies and dreadnaughts the prized ship in any fleet throughout most of the 20
th
 century. 
The pure destructive potential and ability to turn the tide of battle led many historians to 
regard artillery as the “King of Battle” (McKenney 2007).  
Missiles were the next major evolution in trying to create a more destructive 
weapon. Early missiles in development during World War II helped to add a new 
dimension to the battlefield (Zaloga 2003). The one major use of rockets was in 
bombarding London with V-1 and V-2 rockets with limited success. The rocket attacks 
killed 6,184 people compared to the bomber raids during ‘The Blitz’ which killed over 
43,000 (Cleary 2011). Due to the unreliability of the technology, both Axis and Allied 
forces continued the more dangerous (from the point of view of the attacker) practice of 
bombing from aircraft vice long range rocket attacks. Using aircraft risked not only 
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bombers, but fighter escorts and the crews for all the planes as well. At that time, aircraft 
were a much more dependable method compared to long range rocket attacks of 
delivering the massive amounts of ordnance needed (Corvisier 1994). Leveraging 
technology from the space program, missile technology greatly improved in terms of 
speed, payload, and accuracy, making missiles the preferred method of long distance 
ordnance delivery for current forces (North 2001). 
B. STATE OF DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 
There are numerous examples of functional DEW projects in that have been built 
and “operate as designed.”  Although some of the technologies have achieved significant 
milestones such as having prototypes built and achieving operational demonstrations such 
as the ABL and THEL, DE has never been able to attain priority status with respect to 
conventional weapons in their designated roles in military operations. It would appear 
decision makers do not want to invest in a system unless it replaces an existing system or 
fulfills a capability gap. ABL and THEL are examples of this of systems which had 
traction due to the ballistic missile defense (BMD) gap. From the perspective of plug and 
play, a lack of mission needs, misguided expectations, or conventional systems that just 
perform better have stood in the way of successful DE programs. For example in the 
1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, more commonly referred 
to as “Star Wars,” nearly brought directed energy technology to the forefront of 
weaponry research. Legal complications coupled with a diminishing Soviet threat caused 
the program to be canceled and resources diverted to other priorities (Correll 2012). 
Unfortunately, “Reagan did not understand the science of missile defense and the quality 
of advice he was getting as spotty” (Correll 2012). Concurrently, the U.S. Air Force had 
been working on a revolutionary ABL Laboratory project, putting a chemical type 
LASER aboard a wide-body airframe with the objective of shooting down enemy 
missiles.  “It had to face numerous operational challenges, such as the need to fly above 
hostile territory waiting for target missiles to be launched and to focus its LASER at a 
single point on a moving missile” (Collina and Davenport 2012). Appropriations 
shortfalls, poor test results, and significant doubts as to Star Wars’ operational viability 
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resulted in significant concerns over the program’s future. Eventually, the 16-year and $5 
Billion effort was cancelled (Collina and Davenport 2012). 
The lesson learned from numerous failed DEW programs is that both a clearly 
identified need and reasonable expectations based on credible scientific knowledge are 
necessary precursors required to generate momentum for DEW projects. In addition, 
technologies must be relevant to the current trends prevalent throughout the services, the 
Navy in the case of this project. After initial background research was conducted on 
various DE programs, four technologies were deemed as plausible for shipboard use by 
the project team. Solid State LASERs (SSL), Chemical LASERs (CL), High Powered 
Microwaves (HPM), and Free Electron LASERs (FEL) were identified as either having 
current prototypes in testing (several SSLs and HPM), programs which were successfully 
tested but canceled (several CL), or programs which are nearing the operational prototype 
phase (FEL). These four technologies and specific programs are detailed below. 
1. Solid State LASER (SSL) 
a. Technology History 
Solid state LASERs have evolved over the years and several uses have 
been found for military application. The first LASER was built in 1960 by T. Maiman 
and utilized a synthetic ruby rod with mirrors on both ends (one semitransparent) pumped 
with a helical xenon flash lamp surrounding the rod. The result was an intense pulse of 
coherent red light at 694nm. This early ruby LASER system output contained irregular 
spikes that stretched over the duration of the pump pulse. This problem was improved in 
1961 by R.W. Hellwarth with a method called Q-switching which concentrated the output 
of the ruby LASER into a single pulse. However, the Q-switch consisted of a cell filled 
with nitrobenzene and required very high voltages. The Q-switch was soon replaced by 
spinning one of the resonator mirrors, and a further refinement was the insertion of a 
spinning prism between the fixed mirrors of the resonator. One of the earliest applications 
was in LASER range finding, which operated by measuring the time-of-flight of LASER 
pulse reflected from a target and calculating the distance (Koechner and Bass 2003). 
  
20 
In 1964 the best choice of a host for neodymium ions (Nd), namely 
yttrium aluminum garnet (YAG), was discovered by J. Geusic. Nd:YAG has a low 
threshold of excitation which permits continuous operation, and the host crystal has good 
thermal, mechanical, and optical properties. High Purity Nd can be grown with relative 
ease (Koechner and Bass 2003). Since its discovery, Nd:YAG remains the most versatile 
and widely used active material for solid-state LASERs and immediately replaced the 
ruby in the military rangefinder application (Koechner and Bass 2003). 
During the 1970s, efforts were concentrated on engineering 
improvements, such as an increase in component and system lifetime and reliability. The 
early LASERs often worked poorly and had severe reliability problems. At the 
component level, damage resistant optical coatings and high-quality LASER crystals had 
to be developed; and the lifetime of flash lamps and arc lamps had to be drastically 
improved (Koechner and Bass 2003). On the system side, the problems requiring 
solutions were associated with water leaks, corrosion of metal parts by the cooling fluid, 
deterioration of seals and other parts in the pump cavity due to the ultraviolet radiation of 
the flashlamps, arcing within the high-voltage section of the LASER, and contamination 
of optical surfaces caused by the environment (Koechner and Bass 2003). Also during 
this time, improvements were made in the performance of diode LASERs. Solid State 
LASERs started moving out from being research tools in laboratory settings into 
industrial use as machining tools and medical instruments (Koechner and Bass 2003). 
During the 1980s with the discovery of alexandrite, titanium-doped 
sapphire, some solid state LASERs became tunable between 660 and 980 nm. 
Improvements to diode LASERs provided devices with longer lifetimes, lower threshold 
currents and higher output powers, and were capable of continuous operations at room 
temperatures. Since the early LASER diodes were very expensive, their use as pump 
sources could only be justified where diode pumping provided an enabling technology. 
Therefore, the first applications for diode-pumped Nd:YAG LASERs were for space and 
airborne platforms, where compactness and power consumption is of particular 
importance (Koechner and Bass 2003). The evolution of diode pumping solid state 
LASERs offers significant improvements in overall systems efficiency, reliability, and 
compactness (Koechner and Bass 2003). 
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The evolution of the solid state LASERs over the past several decades has 
resulted in the design and weaponization of these LASERs for military use. A SSL DEW 
contains four major components: a tracking subsystem, a LASER subsystem to contain 
the medium which generates the LASER beam, a beam director with stabilizer through 
which the LASER is fired, and a fire control computer interface. While some programs 
have been cancelled for various reasons, several still exist and possess the potential to 
change how the United States fights and wins our Nation’s wars. 
b. Programs 
(1) LASER Weapon System (LaWS). The LASER Weapon 
System (LaWS) was built by Raytheon and has reached a technology readiness level 
(TRL) of 6 and has been operationally tested (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for 
Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). A 33kW 
continuous wave (CW) operational prototype shown in Figure 3 is currently installed on 
the USS Dewey (DDG-105) and has achieved a near perfect record in shooting down 
UAV’s and stopping small boats. The Navy stated the following regarding tests of LaWS: 
In June 2009, LaWS successfully engaged five threat-
representative UAVs in five attempts in tests in combat-representative scenarios in a 
desert setting at the Naval Air Weapons Station at China Lake, in southern California 
(O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012). 
In May 2010, LaWS successfully engaged four threat-
representative UAVs in four attempts in combat-representative scenarios at a range of 
about one nautical mile in an over-the-water setting conducted from San Nicholas Island, 
off the coast of southern California. LaWS during these tests also demonstrated an ability 
to destroy materials used in rigid-hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) at a range of about half a 
nautical mile, and to reversibly jam and disrupt electro-optical/infrared sensors 
(O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 




Figure 3. Photograph of LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Prototype (from 
O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012) 
While there is discussion that the LASER may be capable of 
conducting ASCM, the capability has yet to be proven. The Navy has envisioned LaWS 
being used for operations such as disabling or reversibly jamming electro-optical (EO) 
sensors, countering Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and EO guided missiles, and 
augmenting radar tracking (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). The system’s unclassified 
operating characteristics are 5 sec on/5 sec off for 4 minutes followed by a 16 minute 
recharge down time and uses the ship’s electrical plant to charge in normal underway 
power configuration of two generators (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, 
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). The 33kW 
prototype currently utilizes lead acid batteries, although the goal is to go to lithium ion 
which will reduce the overall battery size by 2/3 making shipboard integration easier 
(Chernesky 2012).  
According to the Deputy Program Manager of the Naval Directed 
Energy Program Office PMS-405, this program has been given the green light by 
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NAVSEA 05 and a 125–150 KW LASER has been determined to be technically feasible 
to be fitted onto a DDG-51 class ship, and integrated into LCS-4 and LCS-5 classes 
(Chernesky 2012). All blueprints and technical drawings currently exist to facilitate this 
installation with both lead acid and lithium ion batteries. The system is comprised of 95% 
Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) technology (Chernesky 2012). 
(2) Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD). The Maritime 
LASER Demonstration (MLD) (Figure 4) is the marine variant of Northrop Grumman’s 
Joint High Power Solid State LASER (JHPSSL) the “Firestrike.”  The JHPSSL was 
funded in 2006 for Phase 3 of the project by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Office of the Secretary of Defense – 
High Energy LASER Joint Technology Office, Air Force Research Laboratory, and the 
Office of Naval Research. Program execution was conducted by the U.S. Army Space 
and Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command. The U.S. Navy 
awarded Northrop Grumman with a $98 million contract for the Maritime LASER 
Demonstration and it has reached a technology readiness level (TRL) of 7 (O'Rourke, 
Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues 
for Congress 2012). 
 
 





The MLD combines the electric LASER module technology from 
the JHPSSL with a purpose designed beam-control and fire-control system. The MLD 
module technology consists of stackable 15kW units that can be phase controlled and 
combined into a single beam to increase the output power. In 2009, Northrop Grumman 
became the first U.S. company to reach the 100kW power level threshold with this 
LASER, which measured at more than 105kW by stacking seven 15kW units. Although 
mission dependent, many consider power requirements of 100kW or greater to classify 
the LASER as weapons grade (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). There is no open source 
data detailing the maximum number of 15kW LASERs that can be stacked, but this could 
affect the scalability of the system. The following are the test and evaluation milestones 
of the Maritime LASER Demonstration. 
 In July 2010, the ability of MLD to track small boats in a marine 
environment was tested at NSWC Port Hueneme, CA (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012).  
 In late August and early September 2010, MLD was tested in an over-the-
water setting at the Navy’s Potomac River Test Range against stationary 
targets, including representative small boat sections (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012). 
 In November 2010, an at-sea test of the system against small boat targets 
reportedly was stopped midway because one of the system’s components 
needed to be replaced. The test was resumed in April 2011 (O'Rourke, 
Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress 2012). 
 On April 6, 2011, the system successfully engaged a small target vessel. 
According to the Navy, this was the first time that a LASER of that energy 
level had been put on a Navy ship, powered from that ship, and used to 
counter a target at range in a maritime environment (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012). 
 In May 2011, Northrop stated that it could build the first unit of a full-
power engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) version of the 
weapon within four years, if the Navy could find the resources to fund the 
effort (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). 
  
25 
The MLD test platform for the April, 2011 testing was 
accomplished from the former USS PAUL FOSTER, a decommissioned Spruance Class 
Destroyer where it was integrated into the ship’s radar and navigation systems, as well as 
the ship’s electrical system. The MLD demonstrated the ability the disable a small boat in 
actual maritime conditions of 8 ft. waves, 25kt winds in both rain and fog (Northrop 
Grumman 2012). 
(3) Tactical LASER System (TLS). The Tactical LASER 
System (TLS) has a beam power of 10kW and is designed to be added to the Mk 38 25 
mm machine guns installed on the decks of many Navy surface ships. A rendering of the 
TLS mounted system is shown in Figure 5. TLS would augment the Mk 38 machine gun 
in countering targets such as small boats and could also assist in providing precise 
tracking of targets (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). The TLS program is a collaborative 
effort between Boeing and BAE where full system testing was expected to take place in 
the summer of 2012. This test was intended to target surface and air targets but 
permission was not granted in time for the targeting of UAVs. The test resulted in 
successful engagements of the surface targets at “several thousands of meters” but was 
not tested against air targets (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). 
 
 
Figure 5. Rendering of Tactical LASER System (TLS) Integrated on Mk 38 
Machine Gun Mount (from O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012) 
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2. Chemical LASER (CL) 
a. Technology History 
Chemical LASERs were first conceived over fifty years ago. Canadian 
chemist J.C. Polanyi (Superstars of Science 2011) first proposed the idea of chemical 
based LASERs in 1961 (Lin 1983). The hypothesis was that a chemical reaction of 
excited elements would create an infrared LASER. The chemicals could be excited by 
light, heat, or electricity. A reaction of hydrogen atoms with ozone or chlorine could be 
used to create an infrared LASER. Then that LASER could be amplified to create a 
useable beam (Lin 1983).     
The first chemical LASER demonstration would come 3 years later in 
1964. Jerome Kasper and George Pimentel were able to optically pump Hydrogen 
Chloride (HCl) to create a suitable LASER. Pimentel and others continued their 
experiments throughout the 1960s to expand the chemicals that could produce a LASER. 
Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) and Deuterium Fluoride (DF) were quickly demonstrated as 
viable as well (Pimentel 1965).  
Through continued experimentation other elements were found to be able 
to produce LASERs such as the Chemical Oxide Iodine LASER (COIL). The following 
chemicals also produced LASER: Cyanide (CN), Nitric Oxide (NO), Carbon Monoxide 
(CO), and Hydrogen Bromide [Deuterium Bromide] (HBr [DBr]) (Lin 1983). The most 
reliable forms for chemical LASERs are HF, DF and COIL (Kopp 2008). There are three 
types of initiation for a chemical LASER: 
 Vibrational:  The oldest and most established method of making a 
LASER. Mixing the elements in a cavity to create a reaction. Sometimes 
using a pump to vibrate the elements. Then focusing that reaction to create 
the LASER (Lin 1983).  
 Rotational:  Here the elements are in a chamber that rotates to mix them. 
Just like with vibrational, the mixing creates a reaction. And the reaction is 
focused to make a LASER (Cohen, et al. 1986).  
 Electronic:  The newest method of creating a LASER. Elements are 
bombarded by electrical impulses. The product of the electrical reaction 
creates the LASER (Basov, et al. 1989). 
  
27 
Chemical LASERs currently have the capability to deliver kilowatts of 
power over long ranges. There is potential for delivering megawatts, but is unrealized at 
this time. The weapons focus has been achieving kilowatts of power that will destroy 
targets at a distance. The one major difference between a SSL and a CL DEW is the 
medium in which the beam is generated, the other major components remain the same. 
b. Programs 
(1) Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical LASER (MIRACL). 
Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical LASER (MIRACL) is a DF LASER that was 
developed by the U.S. Navy and has been operational since 1980. It was cancelled by the 
Navy in 1983, but since 1990, U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command has 
maintained the MIRACL (Sherman 1998).  
The MIRACL has a very strong beam quality to be used against 
target in flight. It operates at a wavelength of 3.8 microns and can lase for 70 seconds 
continuous on a single target. It has been tested against both flying drones including the 
BQM34 and missiles such as the VANDAL missile (Sherman 1998). 
(2) Airborne LASER (ABL). Airborne LASER (ABL) is a 
COIL in a 747 developed for the Air Force by Boeing in 1996. The first flights were 
conducted in 2003 with the entire systems configured. From 2008 to 2010; Boeing 
conducted testing using the system (FAS 2010).  
The ABL was created to be used against missiles. It operates at 
1.315 microns wavelength (FAS 2010). It can lase its target for three to five seconds on 
the target after a solid state LASER acquires the target. The COIL has been tested against 
an NC-135E (Grill 2007). It has also been tested against missiles with great success 
(Cadena and Selinger 2009) (MDANews 2010). 
(3) Airborne Tactical LASER (ATL). Advanced Tactical 
LASER (ATL) is a COIL in an AC-130 aircraft developed for the Air Force by Boeing in 
1996. The first flight testing was conducted in 2005. In 2009, it was adapted to fit into a 




 The ATL was created to attack ground targets. It operates at 1.315 
microns wavelength (Alexander 2003). The ATL can generate between 100–300 kW for 
five seconds (Global Security 2011). When there is not excessive attenuation, the range 
can increase to 20 kilometers (Hambling, New Scientist 2008). ATL has been used to 
defeat ground targets (Wallace 2009). 
(4) Tactical High Energy LASER (THEL). Tactical High 
Energy LASER (THEL) is a truck and trailer based weapon developed for the U.S. and 
Israel by TRW (now part of Northrop Grumman) in 1996. The THEL was ready for use 
in 1998. It was tested in 2002 (Pike 2011).  
The THEL was created to defend against missiles, rockets, artillery 
shells, and aircraft. The THEL operates at 3.8 microns wavelength. The THEL has lased 
long enough to destroy Katyusha rockets, artillery shells, and mortar shells (Kopp 2008). 
3. High-Power Microwave (HPM) 
a. Technology History 
Research into the use of microwaves began with studies of radio 
frequency technology, specifically for communication purposes (Morrison 2008). 
Microwaves were artificially created by Heinrich Hertz in 1888. The invention of gridded 
tubes brought about the use of radios in the early twentieth century. Using resonant 
cavities connected to electrical circuits, researchers discovered how to create higher 
frequencies (Benford, Swegle and Schamliglu 2007). Higher frequencies were sought 
after once it was discovered that they are more advantageous in terms of the amount of 
information they could carry (T. Williams 2011). Assuming amplitude modulation to 
carry the data, the bandwidth (amount of data able to be carried) is increases at twice the 
rate of the frequency (Harney, Combat Systems Volume 1 2004). 
Early physicists believed that electromagnetic waves could be powerful 
sources used to take down aircraft. Research in this field led to the creation of radar 
systems in the 1930s (Guoqi, Benqing and Lu 2005). During World War II, several 
developments such as extrapolation of the magnetron, invention of the traveling wave 
tube, and invention of the backward wave oscillator (BWO) spurred growth in the field. 
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Moreover, significant developments in regards to High-Powered Microwaves (HPM) 
occurred from the investigation of nuclear power effects, specifically in regards to the 
interaction of waves and particles.   
Part of the future generation of abundant nuclear power involves 
controlling the nuclear fusion (as opposed to fission) process. Research into how 
electromagnetic wave stimulation could support the fusion process fostered a better 
understanding of how waves and particles interact in the production of thermonuclear 
power (Benford, Swegle and Schamliglu 2007). This fusion research coincided with 
developments of pulse power technology with focus on generating and emitting strong 
electronic beams (Guoqi, Benqing and Lu 2005).    
In terms of weaponry, HPM roots are traced back to the technology race 
between the Soviet Union and the West. Development has gone from first 
electromagnetic bomb testing in 1962 to more recent developments in crowd control 
technology (Weinberger, High-Power Microwave Weapon Systems Start to Look Like 
Deadend 2012). 
HPM weapons are designed to exploit parts of the electromagnetic 
spectrum in order to neutralize targets. Through concentrated radio waves, HPM weapons 
transmit high amounts of energy which can be used to disrupt electronic equipment or 
produce devastating biological effects. HPM weapons consist of three main components. 
These components are a pulse power source, a high power microwave source, and an 
antenna (Benford, Swegle and Schamliglu 2007).   
The pulse power source drives the HPM weapon by generating a highly 
amplified electronic pulse. There is a variety of pulsed power types which include 
modulators, Marx-generators, pulse forming lines (PFL), pulse forming networks (PFN), 
and inductive energy storage in combination with opening switches. Normally, the pulse 
components are connected in series with other pulse components, i.e., a Marx-generator 
in series with a PFL (Benford, Swegle and Schamliglu 2007).   
The HPM source acts as the heart of the weapon converting the energy of 
the electronic pulse into electromagnetic form, specifically into microwaves. The 
interface between the pulse power source and the HPM is extremely important because if 
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the impedances of the pulse source and HPM are not properly matched then power losses 
could occur. As a result, this interface determines the size and mass of the overall system 
(Benford, Swegle and Schamliglu 2007). The HPM source has other components 
designed for support, such as vacuum pump, magnet, a collector for capturing the beam, 
and cooling system. Finally, the antenna is the physical interface between the atmosphere 
and the microwaves. The antenna directs the beam at targets. Source parameters influence 
the connection to the antenna, most notably the waveguide mode (Benford, Swegle and 
Schamliglu 2007).   The waveguide mode is responsible for transmitting the 
electromagnetic waves. Characteristics of the antenna such as frequency, power, 
directivity, and gain influence the output beam propagation. These characteristics 
determine the bandwidth, signal strength, power efficiency, and the amount of beam 
spreading (antenna-theory.com 2011).  
 These components come together to produce a system that uses 
directed energy to produce weaponry capable of engaging targets in a non-lethal manner. 
Traditional non-lethal weapons use kinetic energy (rubber rounds or bean bags for 
example) which still have chance to kill or permanently injure the target if hit in specific 
areas (eyes or throat for example). HPM poses a lower risk of accidental lethal exposure 
compared to kinetic non-lethal weapons. However, HPM weapons affect personnel in the 
same manner and have a greater range than most small arms which can be useful in open 
areas (DOD Non-lethal Weapons Program 2007). 
b. Programs 
The Active Denial System (ADS) is designed as a nonlethal crowd 
dispersal weapon. The system works by focusing wave energy in the form of a beam. 
This beam produces a powerful heat sensation when directed at targets causing them to 
move away instinctively. The beam is composed of millimeter waves at a frequency of 
95GHz. These waves are able to penetrate human skin up to 1/64 of an inch which is 
roughly about three sheets of paper. Due to this shallow penetration, there is minimal risk 
of severe permanent injury (although lasting minor injuries to nerves, fat cells, and ducts 
are possible). In addition, the effects of the weapon cease when a target moves out of the 
way of the beam (Air Force Research Laboratory 2006). 
  
31 
Operational testing of ADS involved a series of Joint Military Utility 
Assessments (JMUA) conducted over an 8 month period beginning in 2005 (LeVine 
2009). The first JMUA tested the system 1 version of the technology which is composed 
of the HPM weapon system attached to a Humvee. Personnel from the Marines, Air 
Force, Coast Guard, Army, and Border Patrol operated the system in a series of urban 
terrain and entry control point scenarios in order to evaluate its performance  (LeVine 
2009). The first test was conducted at Creech Air Force Base in August 2005 and resulted 
in the ADS system achieving 914 hits off of 657 shots due to the use of beams.   
The second JMUA test was conducted in Fort Benning, GA and included 
testing the system in search and rescue, entry control point, and perimeter security 
scenarios. This JMUA test resulted in 1473 hits off of 979 shots  (LeVine 2009). And, the 
third JMUA conducted tests of the system in port and harbor environments. JMUA 3 was 
conducted in 2006 at Santa Rosa Island, Eglin AFB FL and focused on force protection 
missions in port. Scenarios included boat-on-water iterations and pier side security 
demonstrations. JMUA 3 was the first time the ADS system carried out live fire scenarios 
over water. JMUA 3 resulted in 474 hits off of 305 shots. 
In all three assessments, the consensus by operators and test evaluators 
was ADS has military utility and is highly effective as a non-lethal counter personnel 
weapon  (LeVine 2009). Following these assessments the ADS system was certified for 
deployment with hopes of it being used against insurgents in Iraq. Eventually, it was 
deployed to Afghanistan in 2010; however, the weapon was not used due to potential 
public scrutiny issues (Fortin 2012). 
4. Free Electron LASER (FEL) 
a. Technology History 
In 1971, John Madey invented and developed the Free Electron LASER (FEL) 
that generates a relativistic electron beam in an open optical cavity resonator. Madey, at 
Stanford University, measured gain from an FEL configured as an amplifier at 10-µm 
wavelength, which was an important step in FEL development. This experiment, and the 
successful operation of the same FEL configured as an oscillator in 1977 at 3-µm 
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wavelength, created a large interest in FEL research. Two important FEL attributes, 
tunability and design flexibility, were demonstrated by these two experiments at 
significantly different wavelengths using the same apparatus (National Research Council 
1994). FEL’s differ from conventional LASERs in that they use an electron beam as the 
lasing medium rather than a gas or a solid. The FELs are usually based on the 
combination of a linear electron accelerator followed by a high-precision insertion 
device, which may also be placed in an optical cavity formed by mirrors. Under certain 
circumstances, the accelerated electrons in the insertion device bunch together more 
tightly than usual (also known as microbunching). Over the length of the insertion device 
or during multiple passes back and forth through the optical cavity, the electrons in the 
microbunches begin to oscillate in step, thereby giving rise to light with properties 
characteristic of conventional LASERs. Because the microbunches are so spatially small, 
the light generated presents as in ultrashort pulses that can be used for strobe-like 
investigations of extremely rapid processes. Current FEL’s cover wavelengths from 
millimeter through infrared and are nudging into the visible (Jefferson Lab 2005). 
b. Programs 
FEL currently has a technology readiness level (TRL) of 4 which is 
defined as component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
(O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2012). There are numerous FEL facilities across the U.S., with 
the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility having the most advanced FEL 
technology. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) is currently overseeing the 
development of FEL technology. 
C. DIRECTED ENERGY AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPON COMPARISON 
Dating back to the 1950s, science fiction films captivated audiences with tales of 
futuristic weapons that had unlimited capability. These weapons could project beams of 
light capable of disintegrating intended targets as in 1951’s The Day the Earth Stood Still. 
Soon after when Charles Townes and Arthur Schawlow published designs for a LASER 
in 1957 with the first one built three years later, this Hollywood fantasy became real, 
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although unweaponized (Salisbury 1999). Past fantasies of futuristic weapons are soon 
becoming reality due to advancements in DE technology namely increased power levels, 
tracking abilities, and miniaturization. These advancements along with advantageous 
aspects of DEWs make them attractive alternatives to current conventional weapon 
systems.   
DEWs can provide multiple benefits to the warfighter. Speed of light 
engagements and deep magazines are the two most eye catching capabilities of DEWs. 
DEWs have the potential to equip the U.S. military with the ability to have a high depth-
of-fire with speed of light delivery, allowing a more powerful means of self-defense. 
Moreover, the variability of the energy level provides graduated lethality with minimum 
collateral damage and a low cost-per-engagement when compared to the projectile and 
logistics support costs of conventional explosive or kinetic munitions. Against specific 
low-value, light-armored targets (UAVs or small boats for example) DEWs have the 
potential to be an effective alternative to the use of expensive missile systems. 
Ultimately, DE weapons can provide speed-of-light and precision engagements against 
high speed vessels, complex ASCMs, swarm attacks, and slow speed aircraft.  
Despite the benefits of DE weapons, there are some drawbacks to their 
employment. Due to the technology being relatively new, there are still concerns over the 
reliability of DE weapons in an operational environment. Conventional gunpowder 
weapons have been reliable since the advent of percussion caps in the mid-1800s. For this 
reason, many military decision makers are hesitant to replace current conventional 
systems with unproven DEWs. In addition, conventional weapons currently have a 
greater range than directed energy weapons due to not being constrained by line-of-sight 
and do not require nearly the power levels of DEWs. Due to atmospheric attenuation, the 
range of directed energy weapons can be considerably degraded, especially in poor 
weather conditions. Although weather affects current radar and targeting systems, kinetic 
rounds are not hampered by rain. As a result of atmospheric attenuation, there is no 
guarantee that the DE impinging on the target will be of sufficient intensity to cause 
expected damage despite being projected at the speed of light. Furthermore, many DEW  
must be charged prior to use (SSL or the cooling requirement of HPM for example) 
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which requires a significant power source compared to conventional weapons which must 
be loaded but then can generally remain ready to fire for extended periods of time.  
Despite the aforementioned drawbacks to DEWs, it is worthwhile to the U.S. 
military to achieve DEW superiority on the battlefield. The capability of having a near 
limitless magazine and the ability to conduct speed of light engagements are very 
enticing. Additionally, since DEWs are still in their infancy, there are considerable 
opportunities for improvement. On the other hand, conventional weapons have reached 
their peak capability and any major performance breakthroughs are not expected. 
Table 2 shows many of the advantages and disadvantages of the various LASER 
technologies considered for this project. Additionally, power efficiency can be a problem 
with large scale DEWs. SSLs have power efficiencies between 20–30% with LaWS at ~ 
25. For LaWS to achieve the current output of 33kW, 130kW would have to be provided. 
Table 2. Comparison of LASER Types (from Deveci 2012) 
Type of Laser Wavelength Advantages Disadvantages 
HF 
2.7 - 3.3 
µm 
Most Developed                            
Megawatt level 
Size and Weight         
Safety requirements            
Sophisticated logistics DF 
3.3 - 4.2 
µm 
COIL 1.3 µm 
SSL 1.06 µm 
Less complex                                                         
Compact                                                            
Less sensitive to shock                      
Low electric energy 
requirements                                                
High efficiency 
Cooling problem                                                  
Kilowatt level 
FEL Tunable Selectable wavelength 
Most complex                         






III. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
A. APPROACH 
The approach to solving the problem of defending maritime platforms with DEW 
previously identified in Chapter I started with identifying what the U.S. Navy is required 
to do. We used the Universal Naval Task List (UNTL) as a way to identify key needs at a 
general level for the Navy. The UNTL is a functional decomposition of warfare areas, 
which can be mapped back to the Department of Defense-wide Universal Joint Task List 
(UJTL). In order to determine the Naval Tasks that might be applicable to DEWs, the 
assumption was made that the only limiting factors for DEWs at this phase was the laws 
of physics (restricting the missions by available prototypes came later and were being 
researched concurrently). By only considering the theoretical physical limitations of 
DEWs, a list was made of the UNTL mission area requirements where DEWs could have 
some role (even if that role was very small or better fulfilled by conventional weapons). 
B. METHOD 
Specific mission requirements that rolled up into the warfare area requirements 
also had to be determined. For example: the UNTL lists “attack air targets” as a 
requirement, which includes shooting down missiles and aircraft. This UNTL 
requirement is the Navy’s Air Warfare area under which many specific missions reside. 
To determine the specific mission requirements, an evaluation similar to that of the 
UNTL was made of the Navy’s Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and Projected 
Operating Environments (POE) document as well as the Surface Force Training Manual 
(SFTM) for Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Critical Capability Requirements 
(CCRs), where the ROC/POE was silent in that regard. Like was done with the UNTL, a 
determination of which missions had potential DEW applicability (only based on the laws 
of physics, the specific abilities of current DEW prototypes would come later) was made 
and then those specific missions were mapped back to the UNTL requirements.  
 Figure 6 describes the process of mapping needs to tasks to missions. This 
process was an iterative process due to revisions to the continued scoping of the problem 
statement, continued project team research on available DEW prototypes, and the 
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eventual selection of specific prototypes to be analyzed. These iterations in scoping the 
project required several re-evaluations of the described mapping process in order to 
ensure that the mapping process continued to match the problem statement and project 
goals.   
 
 
Figure 6. Navy Needs to Weapon Mapping Concept  
Following our mapping process, the mission areas where DEW can have a 
theoretical impact (based on the laws of physics) is shown in the following mapping: 
 NTA 3: Employ Firepower 
o NTA 3.2.1 Attack Enemy Maritime Target 
 NTA 3.2.1.1 Attack Surface Targets 
 SUW 1.6 Engage surface ships with DEW 
 SUW 1.10 Conduct close–in surface self-defense using 
crew operated DEW 
 SUW 2.2 Conduct SUW to support surface forces 
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 SUW 2.3 Engage surface targets with assigned anti-surface 
sector 
o NTA 3.2.2 Attack Enemy Land Targets 
 AMW 14.3 Conduct direct fire 
o NTA 3.2.3 Attack Enemy Aircraft and Missiles 
 AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group 
 AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using DEW 
 AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
 AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious forces in transit and 
in the amphibious objective area 
 AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action group 
 AW 1.7 Engage air targets during joint/group operations 
 AW 1.10 Provide sea-based theater BMD for Navy area 
 AW 1.12 Provide air defense for non-combatant evacuations 
operations 
 AW 1.13 Provide air defense for naval/joint/combined TF 
operations 
 AW 2.1 Provide air defense of a geographic area (zone) 
 AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, high-speed airborne threats 
with DEW 
 AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with DEW 
 AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne threats with DEW 
 AW 9.5 Engage airborne threats using installed anti-air weapons 
 AW 9.6 Engage airborne threats utilizing soft-kill weapons 
systems (e.g., chaff/decoys) 
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o NTA 3.2.4 Suppress Enemy Air Defenses 
 AMW 14.3 Conduct direct fire 
 IO 2.2 Conduct electronic jamming of target acquisition/target 
tracking/fire control/missile seeker radars 
 IO 2.3 Conduct electronic jamming of communications/data link/ 
identification systems 
o NTA 3.2.5 Conduct Electronic Attack 
 NTA 3.2.5.1 Conduct C2 Attack 
 IO 2.2 Conduct electronic jamming of target 
acquisition/target tracking/fire control/missile seeker radars 
 IO 2.3 Conduct electronic jamming of 
communications/data link/ identification systems  
o NTA 3.2.9 Conduct Non-Lethal Engagement 
 ATFP CCR 12 Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest Exercise 
 NCO 19.6 Conduct seizure of noncombatant vessels 
 NCO 19.9 Conduct drug traffic suppression and interdiction 
operations 
 NCO 19.13 Support enforcement of fisheries law and treaties 
 NCO 19.15 Support drug traffic suppression and interdiction 
operations 
 NCO 19.16 Support illegal entry suppression operations 
 NCO 33.1 Operate as chokepoint patrol unit 
 NTA 6: Protect The Force 
o NTA 6.1 Enhance Survivability 
 NTA 6.1.1 Protect against combat area hazards 
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 NTA 6.1.1.1 Protect Individuals and Systems 
 NTA 6.1.1.2 Remove Hazards 
o NTA 6.1.1.2.1 Conduct Explosive Ordinance 
Disposal 
o NTA 6.2 Rescue and Recover 
 NTA 6.2.2 Conduct Personnel Recovery 
 NTA 6.2.2.2 Perform Combat Search and Rescue 
o FSO 6.1 Support/conduct combat/noncombat SAR 
operations by fixed or rotary wing aircraft 
o FSO 6.2 Conduct combat/noncombat SAR 
operations by surface ships 
 NTA 6.2.2.3 Conduct Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and 
Personnel 
o FSO 6.1 Support/conduct combat/noncombat SAR 
operations by fixed or rotary wing aircraft 
o FSO 6.2 Conduct combat/noncombat SAR 
operations by surface ships 
o NTA 6.3 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means 
 NTA 6.3.1 Protect and Secure Area of Operations 
 NTA 6.3.1.1 Establish and Maintain Rear Area Security 
 NTA 6.3.1.2 Protect/Secure Installations, Facilities and 
Personnel 
 NTA 6.3.1.3 Provide Harbor Defense and Port Security 
o NCO 33.1 Operate as chokepoint patrol unit 
 NTA 6.3.1.4 Protect Lines of Communication 
 NTA 6.3.1.5 Establish and Enforce Protection Perimeter 
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 NTA 6.3.1.6 Conduct Surveillance Detection Operations 
o NCO 45.8 Conduct surveillance and interdiction 
operations of swimmers/swimmer delivery vehicles 
 NTA 6.3.2 Conduct Military Law Enforcement Support (Afloat 
and Ashore) 
 NTA 6.3.2.2 Maintain Law and Order 
o NCO 19.6 Conduct seizure of noncombatant vessels 
o NCO 19.9 Conduct drug traffic suppression and 
interdiction operations 
o NCO 19.13 Support enforcement of fisheries law 
and treaties 
o NCO 19.15 Support drug traffic suppression and 
interdiction operations 
o NCO 19.16 Support illegal entry suppression 
operations 
o NCO 33.1 Operate as chokepoint patrol unit 
 NTA 6.3.3 Combat Terrorism  
o ATFP CCR 2 Deter, detect, defend against, and 
mitigate Terrorist Activities 
o ATFP CCR 4 Entry Control Point (ECP)Threat  
o ATFP CCR 8 Pier side Small Boat Attack Exercise 
o ATFP CCR 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise 
o ATFP CCR 12 Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest 
Exercise 
o ATFP CCR 14 Swimmer Attack 
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o ATFP CCR 15 Nighttime Small Boat Attack at 
Anchor 
A second mapping of potential mission areas appropriate for a DEW was 
conducted after the problem statement had been refined. This revision of the missions 
appropriate for a DEW was based on what was thought to be implementable within four 
years. This revision also incorporated technologies which had been operationally tested 
and were still funded: 
 NTA 3: Employ Firepower 
o NTA 3.2.1 Attack Enemy Maritime Target 
 NTA 3.2.1.1 Attack Surface Targets 
 SUW 1.6 Engage surface ships with SUW weapons 
 SUW 1.10 Conduct close–in surface self-defense using 
crew operated weapons 
 SUW 2.3 Engage surface targets with assigned anti-surface 
sector 
o NTA 3.2.3 Attack Enemy Aircraft and Missiles 
 AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group 
 AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using DEW 
 AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
 AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious forces in transit and 
in the amphibious objective area 
 AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action group 
 AW 1.12 Provide air defense for non-combatant evacuations 
operations 




 AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, high-speed airborne threats 
with DEW 
 AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with DEW 
 AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne threats with DEW 
o NTA 3.2.9 Conduct Non-Lethal Engagement 
 ATFP CCR 12 Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest Exercise 
 NCO 19.6 Conduct seizure of noncombatant vessels 
 NCO 19.9 Conduct drug traffic suppression and interdiction 
operations 
 NTA 6: Protect The Force 
o NTA 6.3 Provide Security for Operational Forces and Means 
 NTA 6.3.3 Combat Terrorism  
 ATFP CCR 4 Entry Control Point (ECP)Threat  
 ATFP CCR 8 Pier side Small Boat Attack Exercise 
 ATFP CCR 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise 
 ATFP CCR 12 Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest Exercise 
 ATFP CCR 15 Nighttime Small Boat Attack at Anchor 
 This second evaluation of the needs to mission mapping also scoped out anything 
that was not shipboard. Although the tasking statement directed the project team to 
“integrat[e] DEW into Naval forces” (Langford, SEA-19B Directed Energy Weapons 
2012), the team further scoped the project to strictly naval ships (and eventually solely 
the DDG-51 class) for several reasons, chief among them being that at the time that this 
mapping had been done, the prototypes to be evaluated had been selected and none of the 
selected prototypes were deemed able to fit on existing ship-borne aircraft. Shipboard 
platforms seemed to be the only suitable platform for short term fleet integration. This 
was determined due to the current space and excess power available on many classes of 
ships in the fleet. Analyzing the integration of DEW onto other naval platforms (LCS and 
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CVN for example) would provide additional insights to an appropriate fleet wide 
procurement strategy (in terms of systems purchased), but would not change the 
effectiveness of DEW systems in a maritime environment (if a given DEW is effective 
onboard a DDG-51, it will be effective onboard another class assuming the other ship can 
support the DEW logistical requirements in terms of power, space, and cooling). 
Additionally, further background research by the project team and preliminary analysis of 
the selected DEW prototypes revealed that missions related to theater-wide missile 
defense or ballistic missile defense (BMD) was unrealistic for the systems available for 
analysis. The only system to have successfully engaged a ballistic missile was ABL was 
not selected as a potential shipborne prototype as discussed in the technology selection 
section of this chapter. Finally, several missions that were similar or duplicates were 
eliminated (an example being SUW 1.6-Engage surface ships with SUW Weapons and 
SUW 2.2-Conduct SUW to support surface forces). SUW 2.2 was eliminate as the core 
task of engaging a surface ship is covered under SUW 1.6. With the final list of missions 
applicable for the use of DEW determined, it was possible to map missions to threats and 
weapons (see Appendix A). 
C. TAILORED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
We evaluated the relative net worth of a DEW by developing a unique systems 
engineering (SE) process with emphasis on needs, mission, weapon, performance, cost, 
and integration mapping. This tailored SE process was created to provide context to the 
analysis comparing potential DEW to current conventional weapons. A context driven 
approach is critically important to avoid the failures of the ABL program. The ABL 
program, which had a hefty price tag and spent a long time in development, was changed 
from an acquisition program to a research and development (R&D) program and the 
second aircraft cancelled in 2009. Then Defense Secretary Robert Gates made this 
change to the ABL program due to “significant affordability and technology problems, 
and the program’s proposed operational role is highly questionable” (Gates 2009) before 
it was ultimately canceled in 2012. According to the operational concept for the ABL, the 
aircraft would have to loiter in or near enemy airspace waiting for a ballistic missile to be 
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fired and then attempt an intercept. Although the ABL was effective at shooting down 
missiles throughout several tests, the operational concept was not viable. 
Conversely, our process required that in order for a weapon to be effective, it 
must fill some mission gap or improve upon current capabilities using an appropriate 
concept of operations. The utilization of the UNTL to map weapons to missions was 
extended as shown in Figure 7. The larger systems engineering process for the project 
evolved out of the approach of ensuring a need was being fulfilled while using the 
method of mapping needs to missions to weapons and threats described above. A strongly 
iterative waterfall process with feedback loops was tailored to accommodate the mission 
mapping process, the extrapolation from various sources of data for DEWs, and the 
consolidated analysis using several modeling and simulation tools. 
 
 





D. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
With this project carried out at the unclassified level and with the inclusion of 
foreign nationals, many potential stakeholders chose not to be involved, specifically those 
companies developing the prototypes that we analyzed. The decisions by these companies 
to acknowledge our work but not participate limited the stakeholders of this project to a 
select few as shown in Table 3. This table represents the different stakeholders along with 
their needs, goals, and concerns. Stakeholders are those individuals or entities that have a 
vital interest in the outcome of the project. Primitive needs are the basic necessities 
expressed by the stakeholders while effective needs are the needs of the stakeholder in 
the context of DE and this project. Concerns are issues the stakeholders view as being 
critical to their needs. Goals are the outcomes stakeholders desire pertaining to the DE. 
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Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is a higher learning institution responsible for 
educating graduate-level personnel across not just DoD, other U.S. governmental 
agencies and defense industry professionals, but members of Allied nations’ 
corresponding agencies as well. Part of providing an education is fostering the 
intellectual growth of students and faculty through research. This research is invaluable 
to the increase of combat effectiveness throughout the Armed Forces. As a stakeholder of 
this project, NPS desires to advance the combat effectiveness of the Navy through 
supporting the study of DEW and its integration onto a naval vessel. Concerns of NPS 
include any potential roadblocks that may impede this study.   
N9I is the Warfare Integration Division of the Navy and the sponsor of the 
project. The purpose of the division is to integrate warfare goals and objectives with force 
requirements, resulting in enhanced warfare capability. N9I is therefore concerned with 
the successful integration of DEWs on naval platforms and that this integration fulfills 
battle force requirements. 
Operators are the individuals (Sailors) who will utilize the system. Users have 
requirements to meet and employ the system in order to fulfill a given mission. For this 
reason, it’s important that the system performs as intended or the mission could be 
jeopardized.   
  Although interests in the outcome of this project involve many other agencies 
and businesses, the unclassified nature of the project has led to little acceptance among 
those entities as previously discussed. The project team has spent a considerable amount 
of time formulating workarounds to this reluctance to cooperate. This workaround led to 
a gap in the amount of data received which the project team augmented by utilizing open 
source information, applying the physics based solutions to the characteristics of the 
weapons, and using analogist information in cost and integration issues where possible. 
No classified or distribution limited data is included in this analysis, but the process could 
be used with such data if it were to become available. 
E. SELECTED SOURCES OF INFORMATION (SSOI) 
DEWs are produced and studied by a host of businesses, agencies, and research 
facilities all of which could have served as potential sources of information. However, 
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due scoping the project to those systems which could feasibly be integrated onto naval 
platforms within a four year timeframe, sources of information were narrowed to those 
entities that supplied DEW technologies at TRL 6 or above. 
The SSOI Distribution shown in Figure 8 represents the various selected sources 
of information (SSOIs) that are associated with the project. SSOIs are those individuals 
and entities that can provide information that pertains to the project. The SSOIs are 
mainly contractors that supplied DEW prototypes for testing. Raytheon supplied the 
LASER Weapon System (LaWS) and the Active Denial System (ADS). Northrop 
Grumman supplied the Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD). Boeing and BAE 
developed the Tactical LASER System (TLS). Some other SSOIs include PMS-405, the 
Navy’s Directed Energy Program Office, 129th Rescue Wing who has used GINA in 
several search and rescue exercises, and the USS DEWEY which currently is being used 
as the test bed for LaWS. 
  
 
Figure 8. Selected Sources of Information (SSOI) Distribution 
As with the stakeholders previously, the SSOI as potential stakeholders have the 
same categorical needs, concerns, and goals. These needs, concerns, and goals are 
fundamentally different than the stakeholders as any public company is responsible to be 
profitable for their respective stockholders. Also, as these SSOIs are all contractors, their 
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needs (both primitive and effective), concerns, and goals are all similar and apply to them 
all. The SSOIs are detailed in Table 4. 
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Contractors are businesses, and businesses need to make revenues and profits. In order to 
gain a substantial portion of the market, the above contractors desire to sell their 
respective DEW to the government or any other entity which desires them and can legally 
buy the DEW. Gaining market share is accomplished through gaining contracts, having 
their brand recognized by potential users, and having a high quality workforce that will 
allow them to manufacture, supply, and potentially maintain units. In general, contractors 
are focused on providing systems that meet the requirements of their customers, with the 
expectation that the customer provides clear requirements (which accurately address the 
needs of the customer preventing requirement creep during development) and then 
purchases the system assuming the requirements are met. 
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F. TECHNOLOGY SELECTION PROCESS 
There are numerous challenges to developing directed energy technology 
including R&D roadblocks, high power requirements, and mission effectiveness. As 
might be expected, the potential benefits are significant as well. The possibility of “deep 
magazines” and expanded “use of force continuum” opportunities has long been sought 
out by military commanders; literally dozens of potential technologies and permutations 
exist. Our tasking called for a thorough analysis of issues that address a broad spectrum 
of missions commensurate with the needs of the U.S. Navy. We then factored in current 
fleet structures, as well as currently funded programs. Next we developed the associated 
concepts of operation. From here we were able to evaluate the potential technology gaps 
for not only directed energy weapons, but also for their integration into U.S. Naval 
forces. This process for formulating a technology gap resulted in our conclusion to only 
consider DEW technologies that currently have an operationally tested prototype. The 
technology must be both feasible and applicable to the current U.S. Navy mission. In 
addition, deployment of a DEW must have the ability to comply with the four year 
timeline previously discussed. 
In determining which of the four technologies identified in the background 
section (Solid State LASERs (SSL), High-Powered Microwaves (HPM), Free-Electron 
LASERs (FEL), and Chemical LASERs (CL)) deserve further analysis, each technology 
was measured against three criteria. The technology has to be capable of working 
successfully in the established four-year timeframe, has to improve the mission 
effectiveness of the ship, and has the ability to be integrated onto a ship. Based on these 
criteria, FEL and CL were removed from further consideration in the project. 
Although a FEL has tremendous potential as a DEW with the ability to modify the 
wavelength as required and the high power output, the drawbacks of the technology are 
prohibitive of a shipboard environment and do not have the potential to be implemented 
in four years. These drawbacks include large size, radiation hazard, high power 
requirement, and large weight. CL were also eliminated from further consideration. 
Although CL are the most technologically mature of any of the potential DEWs as shown 
with the ABL and THEL programs, the requirement of a logistics train providing (and 
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removing after firing) toxic chemicals does not reduce (and would likely increase) the 
reliance on the logistics train. This elimination of FEL and CL from further consideration 
constrains the project to two technologies, HPM and SSL. Each of the remaining two 
technologies provides a different capability and will be analyzed separately. 
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IV. MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. MODELING METHODOLOGY AND BACKGROUND 
In order to accomplish our goal of evaluating each weapon in a specific 
engagement, in the context of a mission, we built a meta-model and two simulations. The 
meta-model aggregated different engagements into a single, searchable database and 
provided an interactive mapping of that engagement to weapons, threats, missions, 
warfare areas, environments, and weapon platforms. The simulations would help to gain 
insights in what combination of weapons would be best, how DEWs could affect ship 
survivability, and what the CONOPS of a potential DEW employment might look like. 
With the mission requirements evaluated for applicability and mapped from the 
top down, starting with the UNLT and ending with a ROC/POE or CCR defined mission, 
the next step was to define the context for evaluation within a model to evaluate each 
weapon’s effectiveness within those mission contexts. We chose an engagement centric 
view around which to construct the model. A visual representation of the model of the 
model parameters for an engagement between a ship and its target are depicted in Figure 
9. An engagement centric view was chosen because a directed energy weapon is not 
equally effective against all threats and in all environments. Therefore, we needed to 
place a weapon into a specific context, evaluate its performance in that context and 
environment, and then aggregate all of the weapon’s engagements. Weapon performance 
would be aggregated in a database, with meta-tags embedded in the engagement file to 
link that engagement to all of the objects that are represented in that specific 
engagement’s context. The aggregated engagement results for all weapons can then be 
compared on a one-to-one basis, comparing conventional, LASER, and microwave 
weapons in equivalent, quantifiable terms, to determine the exact advantages and niches 
for each weapon.  
The model is based on the following assumptions. For each engagement we 
assumed that the earth was flat, that the weapon platform was the center of the universe, 
that all threat motion was relative and direct towards the weapon platform, and that 
weapon and threat speeds remained constant (no acceleration, no drag). Assuming a flat 
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world negated the need to know the exact weapon height and all engagements were 
entered such that the slant range to the threat was within a line of sight to the weapon 
(assumed to be at an altitude of 0 meters relative to mean sea level). Assuming no drag or 
acceleration was necessary because unclassified weapon and threat cross-sectional areas 
were unavailable and provided a counter weight for conventional weapons against DEWs 
being able to instantaneously move to the next target without delay. Upon the intercept of 
a threat by a weapon, we then accounted for some weapon effect delay, during which the 
threat is not killed until the end of that delay (i.e., no instantaneous kill or damage). We 
also assumed an infinite number of successive threats that can only be engaged one at a 
time, which allows us to get a rough order of magnitude of how many kills a weapon can 
achieve against a specific threat type in each specific context. Finally, we assumed that 
the vital area radius was mission specific and that the threat detection slant range was 
engagement specific. Each vital area radius represents that distance by which a threat 
must be successfully engaged or the model assumes that the engagement is a failure. This 
was based on the expertise of the team members to account for situations such as an 
inbound ASCM, where if it is engaged at less than a certain distance, it will still impact 
the ship, causing high amounts of damage regardless of a successful intercept. Also, this 
was done because even very low powered DEWs can produce a very high power density 
on a target if it is extremely close (i.e,, within a few meters) and allowing threats to get 





Figure 9. Model Engagement Diagram 
B. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK ARCHITECTURE (GINA) 
In order to realize the true potential of the output of the Systems Engineering 
Process for this project, it was determined that Global Information Network Architecture 
(GINA) was the best tool available for complex meta-modeling. Team members 
interviewed the Chief Technology Officer of Big Kahuna Technologies, LLC,   Mr. 
Frank Busalacchi, who developed GINA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) liaison officer (LNO) to TRAC 
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Monterey, Dr. Thomas Anderson who has multi-domain experience working with the 
architecture including the network certification of the architecture for the U.S. Army. In 
addition, the project team researched several official reports and articles about GINA 
modeling to help make the decision to use GINA. We determined that the GINA 
environment allow both integration and interoperation behavior of system components to 
be specified, not programmed (Dolk, et al. 2012) (Anderson, Dolk and Busalacchi 2012). 
GINA is a natural extension of object oriented software engineering that 
recognizes that a finite number of relationship types (in GINA called vectors) exist 
between data objects (X-Types) in the enterprise architecture, and that a great majority of 
object oriented coding is spent defining these relationships in brittle code. In GINA the 
relationships, or vectors, are objects themselves. Additionally, GINA is implemented 
with the ethos that to build a model of the software’s functionality is superior in time 
savings and errors over physically coding and compiling traditional software (Dolk, et al. 
2012). GINA also allows variables (called elements), X-Types, and vectors to be 
assigned a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), which means that a GINA model and all 
of its components can be globally accessible and identifiable, and version control (such as 
with a spreadsheet) is effectively mitigated against. 
Inherently defined vectors are the key difference in programing with GINA’s 
Vector Relational Data Modeling (VRDM) compared to an object oriented language like 
Java or C++. Inherently defined means that the constructs for the different relationship 
types are pre-configured in GINA, whereas in the C++ or Java APLs, there are no pre-
configured or pre-defined relationship keywords, objects, or methods: they must be 
created by the programmer. VRDM is the “language” of GINA in software engineering 
terms and it is the building blocks and connections of and between objects in modeling 
terms. VRDM is the GINA mode or engine that GINA applications are built with 
underneath the user interface. When building an object model using conventional object 
oriented software engineering techniques, a programmer or engineer will spend a 
significant amount of time writing code to define relationships between objects, whereas 
in GINA those relationship constructs have already been defined and are immediately 
available to be implemented within the model, allowing the model design team to focus 
their efforts on the model’s functions and characteristics rather than its mechanics (Dolk, 
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et al. 2012, 4). In GINA a vector is a relationship object and there are four base types of 
relationships: collection, derivation, declaration, and union. In our project, these vector 
relationships represent the results of our tailored Systems Engineering process. A 
collection is a relationship based on proximity. This proximity could be based on time, 
distance, or association. For example, two students at NPS have a proximity relationship 
based on attending NPS. A derivation is a second-order relationship which means that for 
example: two people have a relationship due to a third person they know in common. A 
declaration is a relationship that exists because a party says it does. For example, a man 
and woman could have a relationship that is declared by an official marriage license. A 
union is a collection of relationships all treated in the same manner. These four 
relationship types are configured into GINA allowing the user to apply them without 
doing any traditional programming. These relationships are implemented as vectors in 
GINA. 
Figure 10 shows the composition of GINA objects. It should be noted that the 
diamond indicates that the item is (or can be) made up of several of the objects that the 
arrow is pointing to (an X-Type consists of several elements and services but a vector 
consists of only one X-Type). As shown in Figure 10, a Service (such as “Save”) is 
invoked by an Event (such as “User clicks save button”). The “Save” Service is invoked 
by a Directive that (such as “On user form x, give the user the option to ‘Save’ form 
inputs”), which is then part of a larger collection of Directives housed in a Content 
Manger. A Content manager might then also contain Directives, for example to download 
new data, update user forms, or perform arithmetic operations on data (Busalacchi, 
Tinsley, et al. 2010). Using a Content Manager, Elements perform their various functions 




Figure 10.  Global Information Network Architecture (GINA) Information Object 
Structure (from Busalacchi, Tinsley, et al. 2010) 
There are two basic object types in GINA, X-Types and Vectors. X-Types are the 
objects in traditional programming languages. Vectors are the relationships between X-
Types. As the relationship has data associated with it, the vector is also an X-Type. The 
fact that a Vector is a specialized X-Type allows for the relationship to be easily 
implemented because of the supermetadata tagging attributes inherent in an X-Type 
provide the necessary constructs to hold relationship specific and unique identifying data 
tags necessary to implement a relationship between two objects. At its most basic level of 
coding, in the GINA bootstrapped process that compiles and runs GINA, an X-Type is 
comprised of three primitives, an element, an X-Type, and a directive. The element 
contains the information. The element can store the information and output the 
information when queried. A directive allows for changing the information stored in the 
element (such as user entered data or data from an online database via an external 
connection). A vector is made up of a single primitive defining what object or objects it is 




Figure 11. Universal Modeling Language (UML) Model of Global Information 
Network Architecture (GINA) 
These levels are interpreted in the terms of written language. The third level 
(which is actually a subset of the second level) can be thought of as a collection of 
several documents. The second level would be an individual document. The document is 
made up of a collection of ideas all expressed in words. The first level represents these 
words that describe the ideas. Each word contains a little bit of information, but when the 
words are combined, the document as a whole represents the interaction between the 
defined objects and vectors. The words are made up of a finite selection of letters, these 
letters are the primitives.   Each letter serves a specific purpose, as does each primitive. 
This recursive form of building allows for describing GINA as a GINA model a key 
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aspect of GINA. The recursive nature and simple yet well-defined building blocks allows 
for straightforward implementation of a GINA model. 
In Java, an object is a subroutine that would be called by another program. There 
are some that are programed into Java, but these libraries must be imported to give 
access. One example is the math functions library. There is not an innate way to do a 
square root in Java, but the math library has one. Once everything is coded, the program 
must be compiled in order to become an executable. Assuming there are no syntax errors, 
this compiled code can be run and tested. This debugging takes the majority of time for 
any program, especially if compiling time is counted as well. Once the code is as correct 
as possible, it is compiled to be used. The compiled code cannot be altered in any way 
and there is not an easy way to go from the compiled code to the source code again if 
anything must be changed. This reliance on compiling is perhaps the greatest drawback 
of object oriented languages. 
GINA gets around this major issue as the compiled code never needs to be 
changed. GINA consists of the relationships and the workings of the X-Types and 
vectors, but the actual X-Types and relationships are defined with the compiled code. 
Each entity is given a globally unique identifier (GUID) allowing for easy traceability. 
GINA is accessible through a web browser to the GINA database, facilitated by the 
correct permissions and the Internet. The user interface, referred to as “Task Oriented,” 
and outputs can also be customized to fit the needs of the users. The linked databases can 
be changed readily and the vector X-Types only need to be updated to reflect the units of 
the new database. For example, if linking a new database to the existing model, you 
might need to add additional elements with the target X-Type to store data types from the 
new database that were not present in the previous databases that were linked to the 
model. Unlike the need for applying traditional programming to customize the user 
interface, GINA allows unskilled programmers to implement complicated models with 
minimal training. The benefit of GINA is these modifications and customizations can be 
accomplished without having knowledge of the details of the model (Busalacchi, Chief 
Technology Officer, Big Kahuna Technologies, LLC 2012). 
  
59 
The ability to build a complex metamodel without intensive software coding, the 
ability to define a project specific language and framework within which to evaluate and 
visualize model data from multiple disjoined sources, and the ability to easily extend and 
upgrade the model with new or more accurate data at a later date provided the basis for 
determining GINA’s appropriateness for SEA-19B’s project. Additionally, since GINA is 
a software modeling language, its outputs are 100% traceable to their source X-Types, 
Directives, and data. In other words, the GINA model is not a black box (where the user 
has no knowledge of  and no ability to discover the processes or functions that translate 
data from input to output), and any validation of the model’s results can be easily and 
visually explained and can be shown to map back to a logical systems engineering 
process. From an analytical perspective, a GINA model provides a means of comparison 
between weapons in the context of various missions. A most important aspect of GINA is 
that we were able to make a direct comparison of seemingly unrelated data and systems. 
An example of this ability to make direct comparisons is shown in Figure 12 below. 
Many different data inputs (such as Threat Parameters or Weapon Parameters) are pulled 
from unrelated sources (such as SQL database tables) and are read into objects (Threat X-
Type or Weapon X-Type). Then those objects, based on their relationships with all of the 
other objects in the model (including X-Types such as Environment and Weapon 
Platform) are able to be analyzed in a multidimensional fashion, meaning the data can be 
explored through the paradigm of a specific X-Type or a collection of X-Types via a 
user-defined GINA form or set of hyperlinked forms for a web interface, allowing for a 
model of the system to be built. Before knowing exactly what questions are to be 
answered, the allowable relationships are characterized in GINA and made available for 
exploration and evaluation with minimal to no rework required to modify the model. 
Consequently, the GINA model can be structured around a problem domain and context 
and reused with higher levels of fidelity without reword. However, the same cannot be 
said for spreadsheet analysis. One way to think about a GINA model is like a building 
with many doors. Each door represents an X-Type and each hallway represents a vector. 
The same building is expressed and described, no matter which door you enter through, 
but depending on the chosen door, your perspective of the building will look different 
and provide a unique view that may not be available from any other entrance. This 
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changing of perspective without changing the model is the GINA advantage over typical 
model representations. The object intersection, created by hyper planes of metadata in 
Figure 12 illustrates this concept. 
 
 
Figure 12. Inputs to Objects to Model to Analysis in Global Information Network 
Architecture (GINA) 
While GINA excels at meta meta modeling, it is not a practical method for 
explicit advanced mathematical operations beyond basic arithmetic operations. In order 
to provide for this capability, Big Kahuna Technologies, LLC (the GINA inventor) has 
developed a custom content manager to take variable data and perform complex 
mathematical operations on them. Through the content manager, SEA-19B was able to 
carry out our analysis of weapon effectiveness with respect to a threat, mission, and 
environment. The content manager code is shown in Appendix B. 
SEA-19B’s GINA model is depicted in Universal Modeling Language syntax in 
Figure 13. Each box with text that is underlined represents an X-Type object. By tracing 
each X-Type’s relationship to the other X-Types, the tailored systems engineering 
process described in Chapter 3 is apparent. For ease of implementation, each X-Type was 
built initially using MySQLServer Manager which defined a database for each X-Type, 
listing all of the columns in each X-Type. Once completed, the database was exported to 
the GINA server to build vectors and populate the column elements. The two X-Types 
surrounded with red-dashed lines were part of the original model design, but were not 
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used in the final implementation. These two X-Types originally intended functions were 
absorbed by the Engagement X-Type because an attenuation would need to be 
recalculated for each engagement based on that engagement’s slant range to the threat 
and the value added by saving those attenuation calculations for global reuse later was 
jointly assessed by the project team and Mr. Frank Busalacchi as being greatly 
outweighed by the additional time and complexity associated with implementing that 
feature into the model. The enumeration X-Type can be used to add more complexity to 
environmental variables and the attenuation X-Type can be used to save previous 




Figure 13. SEA-19B Global Information Network Architecture (GINA) Model 
Universal Modeling Language (UML) Diagram 
The GINA model allows the user to complete many engagements, and then query 
the whole model for results, meaning that each Engagement instance pulls data from 
every X-Type in the model and that combined Engagement data, for all engagements, can 





X-Types stand alone in the sense that they are independent of engagements in the real 
world: Platform (such as DDG-51), Environment (such as marine with 2 mm/hr rainfall), 
Atmospheric Attenuation (such as 0.8 dB/km), and DEW Enumeration (such as 
Environment Characteristic). Each naval combatant has differences such as combat 
systems, maneuvering ability, and damage control features, from other combatants that 
allow it to accomplish certain missions. However, because the Navy must be able to 
respond on short notice and with the time to reconfigure ships and platforms while 
forward deployed, most combatants cover the same missions (at least to some extent). 
When called to respond to a crisis, the nearest ships (regardless of class) will be capable 
of responding. Therefore, this analysis presumes that platforms are independent from 
engagements and are only related to engagements and missions by installed weaponry. 
That presumption is why there is a derived relationship from Engagement to Platform via 
Weapon. Similarly, the Environment is not dictated by the objects that find themselves in 
a specific environment; rather, objects exist in an environment that is variable (i.e., 
changes). Therefore, Environment is linked to Engagement by characterizing 
Engagements as a collection of N Environments—whether those Engagements are 
successful or not. Related to Environment is Atmospheric Attenuation. For each 
Environment, there is an infinite number of Atmospheric Attenuations: one for each 
specific wavelength and propagation path. DEW Enumeration is an X-Type that allows 
multiple environmental variables to be selected easily. Originally, DEW Enumeration 
would have allowed the project team to have multivariate environments available; 
however, due to time constraints and complexity only rain rate was used to differentiate 
environments since the largest source of scattering is water particles in the atmosphere 
(Harney, Combat Systems Volume 1 2004) and DEW Enumeration was not used. DEW 
Enumeration is available and accessible in the model should a future project wish to 
expand the number of Environments available for modeling. 
The remaining X-Types in the GINA model are directly related to Missions and 





Mission Threats and a collection of Mission Weapons. Each Mission Threat has a 
collection of Threats. Each Mission Weapon has a collection of Weapons. Therefore, 
each Mission has a finite set of Threats and Weapons that change based on the Mission 
selected. This configuration of X-Types makes sense because a threat defines a mission, 
which necessitates a weapon. Each Mission then has a collection of Engagements 
consisting of a specified Threat, Weapon, and Environment. From our analysis of the 
UNTL, each Warfare Area has a collection of Missions. The Xreferences in the model 
allow each X-Type to “know” its uniquely identifiable instance of an X-Type. For 
example, an Engagement has some Mission and the Xreference specifies that this 
Engagement’s Mission is AW 1.1. The referencing system in GINA, based on Global 
Unique Identifiers ensures that regardless of the number of objects that are instantiated in 
the model, each object will be identifiable and uniquely traceable1. A full listing of X-
Types, Vectors, and Elements can be found in Appendix C. 
C. MODELING DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON (DEW) PERFORMANCE 
GINA is well suited for modeling the complex contextual relationships between 
weapons, missions, warfare areas, environments, platforms, and atmospheric attenuation. 
Using the content manager, GINA facilitates sophisticated mathematical tools to apply 
principles of fundamental physics to drive DEWs. In addition, GINA incorporates some 
innovative ways to address what a DEW means in a tactical sense by qualifying the data 
and relationships in GINA and quantifying a weapon’s full range of performance with 
math. 
To develop our model, we considered the current state of the art in weapons 
modeling. Currently, weapons effectiveness models consider effectiveness in binary 
terms: hit or miss. More specifically, a hit equals kill. In a 2012 report by Naval Surface 
Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA, the Navy concluded that “conventional air-to-air warfare 
                                                 
1 The project GINA model is hosted at p4ie.nps.edu. For access, contact NPS Information Technology 





(AAW) models…are not well suited for showcasing current or near-term laser-weapon 
capabilities” (Staton and Pawlak 2012). When evaluating DEWs, degraded performance 
(after “hit”) must take into account the accumulation of energy required for a “kill” over 
a period of time. This deposit of energy on the target over time is especially relevant 
when evaluating the current continuous wave operations of the latest prototypes. The 
prototypes have been operationally tested at relatively low output power levels whose 
effects are observed to be cumulative over time. 
Separate mathematical models were developed to model LASER and microwave 
weapon effectiveness. Separate models were chosen because the ADS is used against 
human targets (Ackerman 2012) and the LaWS, MLD, and TLS LASER weapons are 
primarily intended to be used against non-human targets (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard 
LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 
2013). Good analytical models exist for calculating the effects of electromagnetic 
radiation against non-human materials (Harney, Combat Systems Volume 3 2004); 
however, due to ethical implications of intentionally subjecting humans to 
electromagnetic radiation, our research did not result in finding any analytical models for 
human radiation effects. Therefore, empirically derived data was used to develop a 
human effects model for microwave radiation. 
In order to make a one-to-one comparison between the LASER and the 
Microwave devices to conventional weapons, it was necessary to define exactly what the 
outcome of an engagement was, which may not necessarily be lethal. Therefore, we 
assumed all engagement end states were be broadly categorized as either a Type I 






Table 5. Engagement End State Definitions 
Weapon/Engagement 
End State 
Type I Engagement Type II Engagement 
LASER Burn though threat armor 
before the threat breaches 
the vital area 
Threat armor failure under 
stress due to structural 
weakening 
Microwave Probability of death from 
exposure > 1% before the 
threat breaches the vital area 
Exposure causes the pain 
threshold to be reached 
before the threat breaches 
the vital area 
Conventional Ability to intercept a threat 
before the threat breaches 
the vital area 
Not applicable 
 
1. LASER Model Development 
In developing a mathematical model for LASER performance the textbook 
Combat Systems, Volumes 1–6 by Dr. Robert C. Harney, Senior Lecturer, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Systems Engineering Department, was predominately used. 
Additionally, subject matter expert input was received from Dr. Gary O. Langford, 
capstone advisor. 
Two methods were considered as defeating a threat using a LASER: burn through 
and structural weakening. Burn through involves transmitting enough radiant energy such 
to melt and/or vaporize the target. The damage mechanism is to cause the threat material 
properties to degrade through erosion, evaporation, or melting. Structural weakening 
involves the buildup of energy on a target such that when the target is placed under 
dynamic stress (e.g., from moving very fast as in a missile or withstanding waves/wake 
as in a speedboat) the target structure fails before the point of melting or vaporization has 
been met. The process of calculating what it means to “kill” a threat with a LASER is 
outlined in Chapter 17 of Combat Systems Volume 3. It involves calculating the amount 
of fluence, measured in Joules per square-centimeter, required to melt a threat material, 





centimeter) that can be applied to a target via a LASER. A method of calculating that 
fluence is given in Combat Systems Volume 3, equation 17.8. 
       (   (              )          )  (
 
    
) 
Equation 2. Target LASER Fluence for Type I Engagement 
In order to calculate fluence, the threat’s density (g/cm3) ρ, thickness (cm) h, 
specific heat (J/g-K) Cp, melting temperature (K), ambient temperature (K), reflectivity 
(%) Rf, and heat of fusion (J/g) ∆H are determined. For all analysis, ambient temperature 
was assumed to be 15° C. The fluence for a Type II Engagement was estimated by 
dividing by 6. This factor of one-sixth is an estimate for all LASER between 0.6 to 10.6 
microns (based on an interview with Dr. Gary Langford, citing empirical data from 
gasdynamic and chemical laser fluences on military hardened targets in the marine 
environment). The effects of the atmospheric absorption, thermal blooming, turbulence 
fostered beam wander, beam jitter, and beam divergence, and beam width and quality 
factors (profile and astigmatism) contributed to this factor of 6 reduction in fluence. 
In order to simplify the GINA model inputs and make use of the data available for 
evaluation, the following assumptions were made for LASER analysis. In order to 
combine multiple beams into a single beam, we assumed that the adaptive optics in the 
beam director perform as advertised and that the individual beams are combined in phase 
to form a single coherent beam, spherical, Gaussian beam. The radiation was assumed to 
be continuous wave, not pulsed. Aerodynamic induce erosion of the surface material of 
the threat was incorporated into the factor of one-sixth use to calculate fluence. The 
ambient temperature of the threat material was assumed equal to the ambient temperature 
of the environment. And, atmospheric attenuation included scattering and absorption, but 






The minimum LASER inputs for engagement modeling were determined to be 
peak output power (Watts), aperture/lens diameter (meters), wavelength (meters), and the 
Gaussian beam matching factor (unitless). Additionally, the total atmospheric attenuation 
(dB/km) (scattering + absorption) and the target range (meters) are necessary model 
inputs. Using these inputs, the following parameters can be calculated: Gaussian beam 
waist, Rayleigh range, beam half angle, beam divergence, spot size at range, peak 
intensity at range, and average intensity at range. These parameters can describe a 
Gaussian beam as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 14. Gaussian Beam Profile Characteristics (from Harney, Combat Systems 
Volume 2 2004, 1004) 
From Combat Systems Volume 2, equation 3.7, the beam waist is calculated as: 




Equation 3. Beam Waist 
D is the aperture diameter and M is the Gaussian beam matching factor. The 





diameter. M is typically between 5 and 8” (Harney, Combat Systems Volume 2 2004, 
1026). Unless provided by the manufacturer, our model assumed M = 6.5. 
 
From Combat Systems Volume 2, equation 3.37, the Rayleigh range is calculated 
as: 
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Equation 4. Rayleigh Range 
From Combat Systems Volume 2, equation G.69, the beam half angle divergence 
is calculated as: 
 
   
 
    
 
Equation 5. Half Angle Beam Divergence 
From Combat Systems Volume 6, equation M.6, the beam full angle divergence at 
the 1/e power points is calculated as: 
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Equation 6. Full Angle Beam Divergence (1/e power point) 
With these values, you can then calculate the peak intensity on the target at range 
R (meters) from Combat Systems Volume 6, equation M.5. 
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Equation 7. Peak Intensity at Range 
α is the total atmospheric attenuation coefficient in km-1 and P is power in Watts. 
Intensity is given in Watts per square meter. To convert to Watts per square centimeter, 
you must divide by 10,000. As part of the GINA model, in order to calculate atmospheric 
attenuation, a MODTRAN 5 integration program was written. The output from 
MODTRAN 5 is transmittance through the slant range, which replaces the e
-α(R/1000)
 term 
with T, which is the percentage of total Intensity output from the LASER that is received 
on the threat. Due to the factor of one-sixth used to calculate fluence, this is a very 
conservative estimate for intensity received by the target. 
Peak intensity is at the very center of the LASER beam and falls off with a 
Gaussian profile. This profile is shown in Figure 16 from Combat Systems Volume 6, 
Appendix M. Jitter, which is the random movement of the LASER beam in space, 
normally measured in micro-radians per second, will slew and break up the point of peak 
intensity on the target, sometimes creating “hotspots” that are displaced from the 
geometric center of the beam. A nominal value for jitter is about 10 µRad/s (Harney, 
Combat Systems Volume 3 2004). Over several kilometers jitter has the potential to 
reduce significantly the ability to focus the LASER beam at the target. Therefore, jitter 
must be accounted for in some manner.  Figure 15 shows a sample error analysis for 
factors affecting total energy on target. In this example the total intensity is reduced by 
about 30% due to jitter. However, the project team did not have access to weapon control 
metrics, jitter values, or beam quality definitions (which vary widely across the LASER 






Figure 15. Sample LASER Beam Error Budget (from Merritt 2011) 
Since the project team did not have access to the data required for a full LASER 
beam quality analysis, it was the recommendation of Dr. Robert Harney and Dr. Gary 
Langford to include jitter in the fluence calculation, by assuming that suitable control 
systems have been developed, as evidenced by the fact that each of these systems has 
successfully engaged targets in operational testing. Therefore, we accounted for jitter by 
using average intensity over the beam spot size. That being said, without confirmation of 
the specific beam control parameters associated with each system, it is possible that the 
intensity predicted using this method was overestimated by as much as 30%. However, 





actual tests results that have been reported in open sources. We recommend that further 
analysis be done with the actual data to confirm these results. 
 
 
Figure 16. Gaussian Beam Intensity Profile (from Harney, Combat Systems Volume 
6 2011) 
To account for the fact that jitter reduces the peak intensity and will move the 
beam such that point of peak intensity will not necessarily be held on the same point on 
the threat body throughout the engagement, we first assumed that instead of the 3-
dimensional Gaussian profile, that the beam intensity profile is conical (Figure 17), which 
is much simpler to calculate as a triangular distribution rather than a truncated normal 
distribution. If the peak intensity is the height of the cone and the jitter-expanded beam 
spot size is the base of the cone, then the volume of the cone is the total intensity at range 
R in the LASER beam. This triangular geometry makes analysis fast and less error prone 
by eliminating the integral and truncating the intensity to the relevant area around the 
target. To calculate spot size, accounting for jitter with a triangular geometry, we used the 





the range to the target, the wavelength and the sine of the angle of jitter multiplied by the 
range to the target as shown in Figure 17. 






   
 
Equation 8. Gaussian Beam Spot Size at Range (from Svelto 2010, 153-155) 
Using the spot size WR as a baseline, we then expanded that spot size to account 
for jitter by using the sine of the jitter angle multiplied by the range to the target and 
added that value to the original spot size to calculate an expanded spot size as shown in 
Figure 17.  
 
 
Figure 17. Conical Intensity Profile Approximation of Gaussian Profile 
The total intensity in the beam at the range of the target distance was computed as 
volume of the cone (integrate over the jitter expanded spot size). Dividing the total 
intensity by the area of the spot size gives the average intensity in the beam in the spot on 
the target. Then we take the average power in the beam spot at any range to be one-third 
of the peak intensity at that range. The average intensity is a good, conservative estimate 
and it does not rely on testing to get the actual jitter value. The factor of one-third 
accounts for targeting/slewing system contributions to jitter and eliminates the need for 
detailing the beam intensity fluctuating over the target.  
𝐽𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 











Calculating the average intensity at a given range, facilitates the summing up of 
the beam the intensity over time (e.g., per second, in units of Joules per square-centimeter 
on target in 1 second) over the entire engagement range. This formulation of beam 
intensity on target can then be used to solve for the number of Type I and Type II 
Engagements possible against a given threat over a specific range. Fluence for a Type I 
Engagement is calculated using Equation 2. 
                             
                       
                             
 
Equation 9. Number of LASER Type I Engagements Possible 
                              
                       
                             
 
 
                       
                             
 
Equation 10. Number of LASER Type II Engagements Possible 
This method of calculating kills by a LASER weapon is superior to the 
conventional models of evaluating kills when applied to LASERs because it allows for 
the gradual deposit of energy onto a target over time in an engagement unlike current 
combat models that would evaluate a LASER kill as instantaneous (just like an exploding 
bomb would be modeled) which is more comparable to predicted Mega Watt class 
LASER weapon performance (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2012). In order to incorporate this 
method of calculating kills, an analysis class was written in Visual Basic .NET to be 
integrated with the GINA model, enabling on-the-fly calculations. The code is available 






Figure 18. Sample Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) Intensity Profile over 
20km Against a Mach 1.8 Threat 
A simple spreadsheet analysis of this method of integrating intensity over range 
was performed in order to verify the project code used with GINA. The intensity received 
versus range was calculated and summed over all range increments during the 
engagement.  Figure 18 shows intensity per range based on the 105 kW MLD LASER 
and a threat closing at 800 m/s. We chose to use an integral approximation of the total 
intensity on the threat by using a 1 second time increment for the numerical summation. 
By evaluating the Rayleigh Range of the LASER and the amount of intensity at the target 
range, it was clear that the Rayleigh Range represents a maximum tactical range because 
the intensity level at the Rayleigh Range, as a percentage of the total fluence required for 
a Type I or II Engagement, is so miniscule that to attempt to engage a target at or beyond 
that range would be a waste of power for the weapon platform as it would not produce 
any relevant damage effects against a non-human target at that range. Therefore, it is 
necessary to evaluate what the actual maximum effective range of the weapon is against 
military equipment, hardware, and structures. By inspection of sample LASER data 



















































Threat Range (km) 
Summation of Incident LASER Intensity 











LASER weapon is the range at which the total intensity of the LASER accumulated on 
the target equals 1% of that required for a Type I Engagement. The threshold of 1% was 
an arbitrary choice, but it is justified because the range at which 1% of the fluence 
necessary for a Type I Engagement is accumulated can be thought of as the “trigger 
range,” at which the weapon can begin to effectively (having measurable and noticeable 
damage effects) engage a given threat which is shown by the knee in the curve in Figure 
18. This calculated maximum effective range will be unique to different threat 
types/materials and speeds for the same LASER weapon. Another way to think of this 
definition of maximum effective range is that any potential engagements attempted 
beyond this range are wasting power and cooling resources on the weapon platform due 
to a miniscule amount of intensity being received at the target due to normal range loss as 
well as atmospheric attenuation. As the range to the target increases beyond the Rayleigh 
Range, the triangular factor of one-third is insufficient to account for the effects of jitter 
(due to larger spot size and lower peak power) and a factor of one-sixth is more 
appropriate (at 2 to 3 times the Rayleigh Range) (Langford, Senior Lecturer, SE 
Department, Naval Postgraduate School 2013). Therefore, the GINA model specified all 
detection ranges to be less than or equal to the Rayleigh Range for LASER weapon 
engagements. 
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Equation 11. Threat Kill Fluence Integral Approximation 
2. Microwave Model Development 
When considering what it means to have a Type I Engagement and Type II 
Engagement with a microwave weapon, it becomes difficult to define clear metrics. 





humans to microwave radiation and then measuring the damage effects. Safety limits 
provide some insight, but most limits are orders of magnitude away from actual 
lethal/weapon’s grade limits of exposure and are difficult to apply to weapon metrics.  
Damage can be caused by a microwave weapon in two ways: thermal heating and 
electrical inductance. Electrical inductance was scoped out of the project because 
background research showed that microwave weapon interest was primarily as a non-
lethal weapon against humans (Department of Defense Unkown). Thermal heating, as 
with a LASER, involves the accumulation of Joules over the threat surface area and some 
capacity for energy absorption leading to an increase in temperature. Unlike LASER 
weapons, microwave weapons, such as ADS, have been designed primarily as anti-
personnel weapons with purposely less-than-lethal effects. One source that our research 
uncovered is a collection of empirical data published by the Institution of Chemical 
Engineers called Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects. This 
reference provides detailed analysis of thermal burns caused by radiation, explosions, and 
laboratory experiments over the past several decades. The empirical data shown allowed 
a relationship between intensity and time to reach the threshold of pain in addition to an 
average time to achieve a lethal dose. 
To determine the intensity on target produced by a microwave weapon, peak 
output power, frequency, attenuation, threat range and antenna area were considered. 
  
    
    
 
Equation 12. Microwave Weapon Antenna Gain (Payne 2012, 35) 
Microwave antenna gain is dependent on: antenna efficiency (%) ρ, antenna 
physical area (m
2
) A, antenna constant of proportionality (assumed to be 4/π) k (Payne 
2012, 33), and microwave wavelength (m) λ. The antenna proportionality constant 
assumption is based on “an intermediate or typical pattern” because although the project 





unavailable (Payne 2012, 33). The antenna gain is then used to calculate intensity 
(normally referred to as irradiance for microwaves, but we used intensity to keep the 
same terms throughout the project as the units are the same). The equation used to 
calculate microwave intensity is a combination of a simplified microwave propagation 
equation from the text book Principles of Naval Weapon Systems 2
nd
 Ed. and an 
atmospheric transmittance term from Combat Systems Volume 3. Although simplified, in 
that the propagation equation’s gain component does not include detailed terms that 
might take into account factors such as electronics temperature during operations, and a 
more specific mathematical description of the antenna array’s properties, the other terms 
remain the same with the addition of the attenuation term to the equation. Therefore, the 
intensity equation used is a valid way of calculating the intensity that can be adjusted in 
future studies with the simple addition of correction factors to account for more specific 
information that might then be available to study. To account for atmospheric attenuation, 
the intensity equation is multiplied by percent atmospheric transmittance (T) to calculate 
the actual intensity at the target. 
  
         
      
 
 






Table 6. Irradiance and Pain Threshold for Microwave Radiation on Humans (from 
Hymes, Boydell and Prescott, Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 
1996, Table 4.3 & 4.4) 
Irradiance 











Table 6 shows various amounts of irradiance (intensity) incident on humans and 
the average time in seconds to reach their threshold for pain. Using power regression, a 
relationship between intensity and pain can be constructed as shown in Figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19. Time to Pain Threshold Regression 
y = 99.896x-1.336 




























Additionally, Thermal Radiation provides a method of calculating radiation dose 
units, based on the intensity and the exposure time. This method provides a unitless and 
relative measure of radiation based on empirical data. 
           
 
       
Equation 14. Microwave Dose Calculation (from Hymes, Boydell and Prescott, 
Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 21) 
 Time (t) is in seconds and intensity (I) is in kW/m
2
. When the radiation doses are 
calculated for pain thresholds, the average dose is approximately unitless 92 ( (Hymes, 
Boydell and Prescott, Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 
21).   
To reach a lethal exposure limit, the dose must exceed unitless 1050, which 
corresponds to a 1% chance of death from exposure. It is important to note for the 
purpose of interpreting this analysis that a 1% chance of death essentially corresponds to 
the beginning of 2
rd
 degree burns (which can be fatal depending on the percentage of the 
body that has been burned) (Hymes, Boydell and Prescott, Thermal Radiation: 
Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 2). This lower limit was chosen because 
microwave weapons, specifically ADS, have been sought out as a less-than-lethal options 
(LeVine, The Active Denial System: A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for Today’s 
Battlefield 2009), and it is important to understand when to turn off the weapon, how 
long to radiate for, or whether some variable power option is needed. At unitless 2300, 
the probability of death increases to 50% (Hymes, Boydell and Prescott, Thermal 
Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 2). The dose level for a lethal 
dose is approximately one order of magnitude greater than required to reach the pain 
threshold. This lethal dose corresponds to the rule of thumb that safety exposure limits 
for electromagnetic radiation are about one order of magnitude less than the actual lethal 
limit (Harney, Associate Professor, NPS Systems Engineering Department 2013). For 





was derived from many sources of burns, not just radio-frequency burns, and can (and 
should) be adjusted to correspond to actual test data. 
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 Equation 15. Lethality Probability from Radiation Exposure (from Hymes, Boydell and 
Prescott, Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 36) 
 We constructed a spreadsheet model of the source data to confirm (that by 
dividing the intensity by 10 (1 order of magnitude), and substituting that value into the 
regression equation for pain) the resultant time to reach the lethal limit. This lethal limit 
was confirmed by using the original intensity, and the calculated lethal exposure time 
back into the radiation dose formula, which consistently produced a radiation dose 
between the 1% and 50% probability of death limits. Therefore, an accurate method of 
calculating microwave weapon Type I and Type II Engagements was derived and 
validated. 
                              
              
                     
 
Equation 16. Microwave Type II Engagements Possible 
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Equation 17. Microwave Type I Engagements Possible 
For both LASERs and microwaves, the total engagement time is equal to the 
detection range of the threat divided by the threat speed. The equations for calculating 
microwave Type I and II Engagements were translated into Visual Basic .NET code and 






Figure 20. Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Analyzer Software Screen Shot 
For testing the model during development (to ensure the equations were 
calculating properly) and in order to provide a quick analysis tool, a simple user interface 
was built into a DEW Analyzer application (Figure 20). This application allows the user 
to input the weapon and threat characteristics and export to text file (with an optional 
CSV file for easy import into Excel) the engagement effectiveness in terms of Type I and 
Type II Engagements possible. 
3. Conventional Weapon Comparison 
In order to make a usable comparison of DEWs to existing weapons, a method of 
calculating the effectiveness of conventional weapons must be made in the same terms as 
DEWs. For the purposes of the GINA model, and in accordance with the current 





and do not account for a gradual accumulation of damage to a target (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for 
Congress 2012), we assumed that conventional weapons were not capable of Type II 
Engagements. Therefore, in order to calculate the number of Type I Engagements 
possible, a linear engagement model was used with a designated boundary between Type 
I and Type II engagements. The GINA model assumes that if a conventional weapon can 
reach the threat before the threat has breached the vital area, then the weapon will achieve 
a Type I Engagement. We consider conventional weapons and DEWs on the same terms 
in order to attempt to achieve an accurate comparison. 
This type of engagement analysis is based on missile engagement analysis in 




Figure 21. Simple Missile Engagement Analysis (from Harney, Combat Systems 





The number of Type I Engagements possible is based on the threat detection 
range, threat speed, weapon launch delay, and weapon speed. The assumption is made 
that the engagement will not begin beyond the weapon’s maximum range. By launch 
delay, we mean the total time between successive launches or firings (as we are 
extending this analysis to bursts of bullets, such as from the CIWS). This delay includes 
tracking, firing solution, launch preparation, and possibly re-targeting. Threat and 
weapon data used for this portion of the model is shown in Appendix E. 
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Equation 18. Number of Conventional Type I Engagements Possible 
4. Modeling Atmospheric Attenuation 
For this project, MODTRAN 5 was chosen to model atmospheric attenuation for 
ship-based DEWs. While other radiative transfer programs have been written that give 
more precise results for the LASER region, MODTRAN 5 was acceptable and readily 
available for use by the project team. Also, there existed a wealth of knowledge in 
operating MODTRAN in the form of faculty at NPS. Finally, MODTRAN 5 is an 
“extensively validated…narrow band model” for use by the U.S. Department of Defense 
to calculate atmospheric attenuation over both the microwave and LASER wavelength 
regions of the electromagnetic spectrum (Spectral Sciences, Inc. 2012). 
In setting up MODTRAN for use by the project team it was necessary to make 
several input assumptions for MODTRAN. The default Tape 5 input file format used is 





the U.S. Navy.  Table 7 outlines the specific assumptions that were made. All model 
values used were picked from the default MODTRAN 5 options, both of which (values 
and options) have been validated. 
Table 7. MODTRAN Default Variable Options Selections (LASER Spectral 
Region) (from Berk, et al. 2011) 
MODTRAN Model Variable SEA 19B Model Set Assumption 
Base Tape 5 File NavyMaritime.tp5 (U.S. Navy base 
MODTRAN model) 
Slant Path Option Between 2 Altitudes, of which the weapon 
(H1) is always at 0 
Model 1976 U.S. Standard Atmosphere 
Season Spring-Summer 
Extinction Maritime Extinction (23 km visibility) 
Clouds None 
Rain Rate Variable based on GINA Model: 0, 2, 5, or 10 
mm/hr 
Wind 7.2 m/s (from NavyMaritime option) 
Wavelength DV 0.005 micrometers 
Full Width Half Maximum (for slit 
function) 
0.01 micrometers 
Slit Function Rectangular 
Output NavyMaritime.tp6: Average transmittance 
percent over center wavelength +/- 0.005 
microns 
 
For calculating microwave attenuation in MODTRAN 5, several adjustments 
were made to the input from the standard form used for the LASER spectrum. 
MODTRAN only accepts lower wavelength inputs in the form of wavenumbers in units 
of cm
-1
. Therefore, prior to being executed the following conversion was made: 
               (     ) 
Equation 19. Wavelength to Wavenumber for Microwave in MODTRAN5 (from 





 Then in Card4, Flags1 and Flags2 must both be set to null (a blank space) and 
FWHM must be set to 0.1. This allowed MODTRAN to compute microwave attenuation 
accurately. 
5. Atmospheric Model Global Information Network Architecture 
(GINA) Integration 
In order to make an application accessible to GINA, it must have a well-defined 
application programing interface (API). MODTRAN is a fully compiled program with no 
such API available. Therefore, a “class wrapper” was needed to access MODTRAN 
through GINA. A class wrapper is used to “[marshal] data between managed and 
unmanaged code, on behalf of the wrapped object” (Microsoft 2013). In this case with 
our GINA model, the object is MODTRAN and we need to be able to define variables 
corresponding to the values that make up the input Tape 5 file that MODTRAN reads in 
order to compute atmospheric attenuation. The Tape 5 file would normally be edited in a 
text editor by the user. By defining variables for each file parameter, GINA can be used 
to pass the relevant data to the class wrapper, which then translates that data into the 
MODTRAN file format, executes the MODTRAN console application, reads the 
MODTRAN Tape 6 output file, translates that output value into a model relevant format, 
and then passes that value back to GINA for use in the GINA model. The process of data 
flow from user input to, to MODTRAN, and back to an output that the user can interpret 






Figure 22. MODTRAN Class Wrapper Gateway for Global Information Network 
Architecture (GINA) Integration 
The benefit of writing this class wrapper and placing it in the GINA context is 
that future variations of the model can take advantage of the class wrapper and context, 
and then incorporate any of the variables that have been hardcoded as predefined values 
and make them model inputs. Additionally, the class wrapper can be used by anyone else 
who needs to more easily access the input-output parameters of MODTRAN. A detailed 
software development process for the MODTRAN5 class wrapper can be found in 
Appendix H. 
D. DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPON (DEW) MODEL VALIDATION AND 
ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS 
1. Model Data Collection 
The only data available for analysis was unclassified, open-source data. If a 
parameter was missing that was necessary for carrying out analysis, we based our GINA 
model inputs on reference material and subject matter expert advice as shown in Table 8 
(values in red italics).  Table 8 represents the consolidated data available to the project 
team for DEW analysis. The model was built around the figures shown in Table 8. 





Table 8. Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Model Data Assumptions 
























































































































                                                 
2 Assuming a perfectly square array 
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4 1ft*2ft = A = π*(D/2)^2,  ∴ D≈0.49m 





Table 9. Conventional Model Data Assumptions 
Weapon 
Designator 







MK 15 Close-In Weapon 
System 
1113 1490 CONV 
MK 38 Mod 2 25mm Bushmaster 1100 2460 CONV 
MK 54 5 Inch/54 Cal. Deck 
Gun 
808 15000 CONV 
RIM-116 Rolling Airframe 
Missile 
681 9000 CONV 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III 
Medium Range 
1191 166680 CONV 
 
Threat material data used to represent the armor that a DEW would affect to 
produce damage and thereby measure success in the GINA model also needed to be 
collected and input into the GINA model. Aluminum, Stainless Steel, Titanium, and 
Wood stood out in our research as those that would encompass most threats to be 
evaluated. Since melting temperature is not applicable for wood, the ignition temperature 
was substituted. During an engagement, the reflectivity of the threat will change due to 
oxidation, carbonization, and other thermal induced processes. Also, specific threat 
reflectivity values were not available (if known at all). Therefore, for all targets, 
reflectivity was assumed to be 86% (Langford, Senior Lecturer, SE Department, Naval 







Table 10. Threat Material Thermal Properties Assumptions (after Stanmech 













2.71264 1.00416 916.4833 393.094 
Stainless 
Steel 430 
































38 (Lux 2000)11 
 
Prior to integration in the GINA model, the selected mathematical equations were 
validated using sample data that was assumed before the complete GINA model threat 
list had been finalized and actual GINA model threat data collected. The threat data used 
for validation (Table 11) was generated based on the project team’s experience to 
represent some different, generic threats that might be representative of actual threats. 
                                                 
6 Unless otherwise notated in the table 
7 Approximated using ASTM A514 Steel, grade P 
8 Approximated as hard wood 
9 Ignition temperature 
10 R-15 blown fiberglass 





The purpose of validating the model was to provide a range of generalized threat data to 
get an estimate of DEW performance, test the model assumptions, equations, and 
software, and draw some inferences about the DEWs selected for analysis. 
Table 11. Validation Threat Data 




Low Slow Flyer 
(LSF) 
Aluminum 0.5  77.17 (150 kts) 
Fast Attack Craft/Fast 
Inshore Attack Craft 
(FAC/FIAC) 
Aluminum 2.0 23.15 (45 kts) 
Anti-ship Cruise 
Missile (ASCM) 
Titanium 0.1 600 (Mach 1.8) 
Hostile Person Human Skin N/A 4.5 (10 MPH) 
 
2. Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) Model Validation 
As part of the GINA model equation validation process, an analysis of the 
relevant atmospheric windows was conducted. An early concern was that ADS would be 
rendered completely ineffective by attenuation in the marine environment caused by 
scattering from aerosols such as sea spray and evaporation. Following an analysis of the 
atmospheric attenuation and by substituting realistic attenuation values into the GINA 
model equations for validation, it was determined that the attenuation effects on 
microwave radiation out to the maximum effective range of the ADS (about 700 yards as 
reported by the Air Force) did not result in a significant degradation in performance in 






Figure 23. Microwave and LASER Attenuation (after Harney, Combat Systems 
Volume 1 2004) 
Figure 23 above shows the effects of weather on wave propagation in the 
electromagnetic regions from microwaves to visible light, based on MODTRAN data. On 
the graph, the ADS and the approximate LASER frequencies/wavelengths are shown. 
When compared to RADAR systems which typically operate below 10 GHz, the 95 GHz 
ADS incurs significantly more attenuation, which only increases as humidity and other 
particulate matter is introduced. Comparing the ADS to a surface search RADAR, which 
can experience significant clutter in the maritime environment, lead to the early 
assumption by the project team that the ADS would not be an effective naval weapon. 
3. Microwave Model Validation 
In order to make an initial assessment of ADS’s relevance in the marine 
environment prior to full GINA model implementation, we chose to evaluate the ADS 







Heavy Rain (10 dB/km). The threat selected was a human approaching at 10 mph, 
presumably in a boat moving toward a pierside ship. The threat would begin approaching 
at 1,000 meters and close to 0 meters from the ADS on a completely horizontal path. The 
three weather conditions were evaluated to determine the relationship between the time to 
achieve a Type II Engagement and the type of weather. Surprisingly, the ADS performed 
much better than expected as seen in Figure 24. Even in heavy rain, the ADS performed 
well out to 350 meters. 
 
 
Figure 24. Active Denial System (ADS) Performance in Weather 
The red line at 1 second in the ADS weather performance graph shows where the 
weapon is most effective. Any longer than 1 second to achieve a Type II Engagement 
means that the threat is not being heated quickly enough to cause the type of near-
instantaneous pain necessary to force the threat to stop. Under heavy rain that range is 
about 250 meters and under light rain and clear conditions that range is about 450 meters. 




























Threat Range (meters): Human approaching at 10 mph 








Therefore, based on this limited analysis, the offers added benefits to offer the Navy. 
During testing, most subjects were able to tolerate the microwave radiation for a few 
seconds at 700 yards (640 meters) (Ackerman 2012). If you look at the clear weather line, 
at 650 meters, it shows time to pain as about 2 seconds. Also, at 700 yards it has been 
reported that the ADS transmits 12 J/cm
2
 (Ackerman 2012). The predicted intensity for a 
threat at 600 meters (656 yards) is approximately 16 J/cm
2
, which is very close to the 
expected value based on Ackerman’s data. Therefore, this analysis supports the use of the 
microwave mathematical model within the GINA model for predicting the real-world 
effects of high power microwave weapons. 
 
 
Figure 25. Active Denial System (ADS) Pain vs. Lethal Time Thresholds 
In Figure 25, a slightly different interpretation of the same data used to evaluate 
weather effects can be compared to the threshold for lethality. Upon first inspection of 
this graph it may seem as though, unlike the actual field tests of the ADS, we are 




















Threat Detection Range (m) 








lethality definition must be fully understood. As previously discussed, the time thresholds 
predicted by the mathematical model will calculate the time in seconds to at least a 1% 
chance of death (actual percentages vary based on intensity and time between 1% and 
50% based on the empirical data used to derive the mathematical model. The probability 
of death corresponds to the level of burn that can be expected, with the lethal threshold 
set at about a 2
nd
 degree burn (which occurs at a radiation dose of unitless 1200) (Hymes, 
Boydell and Prescott, Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects 1996, 
2). In actual tests, at least 2 subjects were hospitalized due to excessive exposure caused 
by a safety setting being bypassed in the ADS allowing a longer than intended burst of 
radiation to be emitted from the ADS (Tressler 2010). Since then, the ADS has been 
outfitted with a LASER range finder and radiation time controls (Weinberger, Pain Ray 
Test Subjects Exposed to ‘Unconscionable Risks’ 2008). Therefore, considering that the 
mathematical model assumes a continuous exposure at full power without a safety 
limitation (as in the actual system), then the results for lethal effects limits are valid. 
Further, should other systems, such as shipboard RADARs like the SPY-1D(V), with its 
dual beam capability, be modified to be used as an ADS type system then these lethality 
predictions are crucial to the evaluation of tactics for employing such a weapon if range 
safety controls are limited due hardware or software upgrade limitations stemming from 
the fact that a RADAR was not initially designed to be a DEW used to engage humans. 
4. Microwave Model Sensitivity 
In order to determine the effect of assumptions on the model results and to 
determine what differences in performance could be realized with changes to weapon 
technical parameters, a sensitivity analysis of the microwave model was conducted. The 
baseline case for this analysis was a 100kW microwave, operating at 95GHz, with a 4 m
2
 
antenna (4/π constant), engaging a person running towards it at 4 m/s starting from a 






Table 12. Microwave Sensitivity Factor Values 
Parameter Lower Limit Upper Limit 
Antenna Area (m
2
) 1 10 
Antenna Efficiency (%) 0.1 0.95 
Antenna Proportionality Constant (unitless) 0.5 2.0 
Power (W) 10,000 1,000,000 
  
For each parameter, the values were varied from low to high while all other 
parameters were held constant. Minitab was then used to analyze the data (the full data 
set is available in Appendix I).  Figure 26 shows how varying each parameter affects the 
microwave’s ability to inflict pain on the threat. From a rough order analysis, after about 
70 kW, diminishing returns decreases the improvement in time for pain per kW increase. 
Also, as long as a system’s antenna is at least 50% efficient, the system will have 
tactically relevant performance. Both of these break points in performance are important 
to note when considering future investments into HPM technology or possible 
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Main Effects Plot for Seconds to Pain
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Figure 26. Main Effects Plot for Seconds to Pain (Microwave Model Sensitivity) 
 Figure 27 shows the same parameter variance effects, but with respect to 
the time required to have lethal effects. Since the ADS was not developed to have lethal 
effects, the performance is not very impressive, but if the goal was lethal effects, at the 
system should output at least 150 kW. Also, antenna efficiency must be higher in order to 
have lethal effects with reasonable power levels. As in the non-lethal analysis, after 4 m
2
 






















































































Antenna Constant K Power (W)
Main Effects Plot for Seconds to Lethal
Data Means
 
Figure 27. Main Effects Plot for Seconds to Lethality (Microwave Model Sensitivity) 
In performing this sensitivity analysis, we also wanted to determine what design 
features would have the best return in terms of tactical performance.  Figure 28 depicts 
the power level requirements to result in successful Type I and Type II engagements at 
desired times against a target moving 4 m/s at a distance of 700 yards and atmospheric 






Figure 28. High Power Microwave (HPM) Type Effects  
In order to obtain a Type II engagement where the target experiences near-
instantaneous pain that leads to disengagement, we have assumed that target heating time 
has to be no more than 1 second. At 150kW, the effect is produced after an average time 
of 1.05 seconds which is on the cusp of the allotted timeframe. Therefore, power levels 
greater than 150kW will meet the 1 second timeframe. For Type I engagements, we have 
assumed that the heating time that produces a lethal effect has to be no more than 5 
seconds. At 500kW and above, a lethal effect occurs prior to 5 seconds.   
The ADS can operate at power levels up to 100kW.  Figure 29 shows the times 
for the type effects of a target moving at 4 m/s at 700 yards when the power level is 
100kW and atmospheric attenuation is 0.5 dB/km. At 100kW, the Type I and Type II 
effects are produced in 39s and 1.8s respectively. Although the Type I time is well over 
the 5 second time to lethality benchmark, it’s not alarming considering the underlying 
purpose of ADS is to perform non-lethal engagements. However, 1.8s is over the desired 
time to pain benchmark (less than 1 second). The extra 0.8s comes when the power is 
30% less (100kW vice 150 kW) than the power requirement to reach the desired time to 






Figure 29. 100kW Type Effects 
5. LASER Model Validation 
A side-by-side analysis of the LASER weapons was also conducted. Additionally, 
since the value for the Gaussian Beam Matching Factor was assumed to be 6.5 for all 
LASER weapon systems, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to see what effect the 
Gaussian Beam Matching Factor has on results predicted by the mathematical model. The 
analysis of the LASERs was conducted assuming a clear day in a marine environment, 
with an equal attenuation for all systems of 0.8 dB/km, and reflectance of 89% from the 
target. Even though the TLS wavelength is different from the other LASER systems, the 
atmospheric attenuation analysis of the LASER region concluded that the difference was 
not significant enough to warrant a separate calculation of attenuation for the 
mathematical model validation. In all three validation analysis runs, the threats were 
assumed to be detected at 10km and were tracked inbound to 0km. Because of the 
logarithmic increase in intensity that is experience by the target as it closes the few 
hundred meters to the LASER weapon, this analysis evaluated the associated 
performance ranges, Maximum Effective Range, Range of First Type I Engagement, and 
Range of First Type II Engagement. The analysis did not account for the number of 






Figure 30. LASER Weapons vs. Aluminum Boat, Clear Day 
The results of analyzing the aluminum boat test (Figure 30), indicated that the 
TLS outperformed the 33kW variant of the LaWS, and the 105kW MLD. This result was 
surprising due to the low power of the TLS at only 10kW. The reason for this notable 
performance lies with the wavelength of the TLS, which allows more power to be 
transmitted to the target than the other weapons. This fact is substantiated by a U.S. 
Government report, which indicated that the TLS, despite being low power, is on par 
with all of the other weapons being evaluated (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for 
Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). A 
conservative view of a LASER system defending itself (and the ship on which the 
LASER is installed) pits the LASER fluence against a pure aluminum boat hull (2cm). 
While the thickness maybe overestimated, the fluence required to “kill” a boat requires 
more than simply penetrating the hull. The technical realism in this view point posits a 
“hard” target against the LASER weapon as a more realistic engagement. Unlike the 
ADS that targets a fast moving inbound threat, LASER system test data is not available in 
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of miles not yards against a static threat (Brisbane Times 2011). Therefore, this single test 
cannot by itself be used to validate the model. 
 
 
Figure 31. LASERs vs. Aluminum Low Slow Flyer (LSF), Clear Day 
The next test against a representative low slow flyer (LSF) shows the effect of 
material thickness on weapon effectiveness, especially since this threat was moving at 
nearly 3 times the speed of the boat in the previous example (Figure 30). In this case the 
MLD performs effectively out to a nautical mile. Again, the TLS is on par with the 
LaWS. The MLD range modeled in this scenario is closer to the article’s assertions of the 
weapon’s effectiveness and points toward the model’s validity, assuming that the article 
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Figure 32. LASER Weapons vs. Titanium Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), Clear 
Day 
The anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) preliminary analysis (Figure 32), like the 
ADS lethality analysis must be taken in context. At first glance, the graph appears to 
show that LASERs which have not been able to destroy missiles can in fact kill an 
inbound missile. However, the LaWS+ 150kW variant achieves a Type I Engagement at 
about 1,000 meters. This range and fluence is very close to the defending platform noting 
that the missile in this example is moving at Mach 1.8. Increasing the current 33kW 
LaWS to the 150kW LaWS+ may result in a system that can be used against missiles, a 
realistic target engagement. With regards to the Type II Engagement predictions, is the 
caveat suggests that a theoretical value determined by this analysis, assumes some 
amount of a titanium sheet will fail under dynamic stress (which certainly pertains to the 
ASCM scenario). However, this scenario does not include the structural components 
behind the skin or that the missile may be made of multiple materials. Actual field testing 
would seem appropriate to quantify that interaction. Although not substantiated in this 
report, the possible combining of a “lower” powered LASER may weaken an inbound 
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used in conjunction. Finally, looking at the predicted maximum effective range for MLD 
in this scenario (nearly 3500 meters), the amount of intensity is  indeed effective at the 
“miles” criterion as touted by the Brisbane Times article. Therefore, in lieu of classified 
test data and considering all 3 preliminary results in context, it is reasonable to assume 
that the LASER model is valid. Additionally, a review of the data by Dr. Gary Langford 
concluded that the model was producing realistic values based on his previous LASER 
weapon test experience. 
6. LASER Model Sensitivity 
LASER model sensitivity analysis examined the following factors: wavelength, 
lens/aperture diameter, output power, Gaussian beam matching factor (m), and target 
material reflectivity. Therefore, it was necessary to see what effect varying each 
parameter between high and low values (Figure 33) had. The upper and lower limits of 
the values used in the sensitivity analysis for each factor can be found below in Table 13  
As a baseline, the 33kW variant of the LaWS was used against a titanium ASCM 
(Harney, Combat Systems Volume 3 2004) traveling toward the DEW at 100 m/s from a 
starting range of 10km. The unreasonably slow speed was chosen to provide ample time 
for energy accumulation on the target even at low performance settings in order to collect 
data for the analysis. This threat profile may realistically resemble a hardened military 
UAV. 
Table 13.  LASER Sensitivity Analysis Parameter Ranges 
Parameter Low Value High Value 
Wavelength 1.064 um 1.6 um 
Lens Diameter 0.1 m 1.0 m 
Gaussian Beam Matching 
Factor 
5.0 8.0 
Power 10 kW 500 kW 




























































Lens Diameter (m) Gaussian Factor M
Power (kW) Target Reflectance (%)
Main Effects Plot for Max. Effective Range (m)
Data Means
 
Figure 33. LASER Model Sensitivity Analysis 
The results are summarized in Figure 33, which shows the main effect of each 
parameter on the calculated maximum effective range, measured in meters. Wavelength 
was shown to have a negligible effect on the maximum effective range as illustrated in 
the first graph from the left in the top row. One of the most significant factors of the 
mathematical model was the assumed aperture diameter size, which indicated the optimal 
size is about 0.2 meters. Power has the largest effect on performance from 10 to about 40 
kW, after which there are diminishing returns. The Gaussian Beam Matching Factor 
affects the performance by about +/- 10% of the maximum effective range from the 
assumed value of 6.5. Target material reflectance from about 80% to 90% has an 
indistinguishable effect on performance; however, target reflectance values between 95% 





variability based on the high and low settings for parameter in the sensitivity analysis. 



















Histogram of Max. Effective Range (m)
 
Figure 34. LASER Model Maximum Effective Range Variability 
 Additionally, an analysis of the variance of each parameter looked at in the 
sensitivity analysis was done. The results in Table 14 show that the most significant 
factor is output power, followed by aperture diameter, and then target reflectance. In 
order to more fully explore the interaction of each parameter on the weapon’s 
effectiveness, a full factorial 2
k
 experimental design was developed to vary each factor 
between a low and a high value, which represents the range of parameters between the 









Table 14. LASER Component Variance Analysis 
Variance Components 
 
                                     % of 
Source                  Var Comp.   Total   StDev 
Wavelength (um)           -33.416*   0.00   0.000 
Lens Diameter (m)          31.050   25.82   5.572 
Gaussian Factor M         -35.815*   0.00   0.000 
Power (kW)                 86.903   72.28   9.322 
Target Reflectance (%)      2.282    1.90   1.511 
Total                     120.235          10.965 
 
* Value is negative, and is estimated by zero. 
 
  
From the interaction plot (Figure 35), the most significant factor in determining 
the range of the first Type I Engagement are the material properties of the threat 
(represented by the reflectance). Of the controllable parameters, the combination of 
wavelength, Gaussian Beam Matching Factor, and aperture diameter are the most 
significant in terms of interactions, while the overall output power is the most significant 
across all factor combinations. However, the interaction of power and reflectance plays a 
large role as well. Even with maximum power on the target, if the target is highly 







Figure 35. LASER Sensitivity 2
k
 Interaction Plot for Range of First Type I 
Engagement 
When the effect of each factor is averaged (Figure 36), the two factors which 
impact the range of the range of the first Type I Engagement the most are aperture 
diameter and power. A small diameter aperture with a least 100 kW power will yield the 







































































































































Lens Diameter (m) Gaussian Factor M
Power (kW) Target Reflectance (%)
Main Effects Plot for Range 1st T1E
Data Means
 
Figure 36. LASER Sensitivity Main Effects on Range of First Type I Engagement 
For TYPE II Engagement, the results are different. There is a much larger effect 
on both range and power at which the LASER can be effective. From Figure 37, we can 
see that even at the lowest power levels, LASERs can effectively produce Type II 





























































































Lens Diameter (m) Gaussian Factor M
Power (kW) Target Reflectance (%)
Main Effects Plot for Range 1st T2E
Data Means
 
Figure 37. LASER Sensitivity Effects on Range of First Type II Engagement 
As power increases, there is an increase in effectiveness. However, we see that for 
Type II Engagements, that effectiveness seems to be a diminishing return for power 
levels over about 70 or 80 kW. Therefore, if you consider the damage effects for power, 
the MLD seems to be in a sweet spot of just enough power for a Type I and more than 
enough power for a Type II engagement. Tactically, these two graphs show that for a 
Type I engagement, LASERs will, at best, be on par with the current CIWS guns and 
RAM missiles. LASERs do have the ability to produce augmenting damage (possibly 
conserving rounds or resulting in target destruction without burn-through) at ranges well 
beyond the limits of our current terminal defense weapons (from about 6,000 to 10,000 






E. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK ARCHITECTURE (GINA) 
ANALYSIS 
1. Model Experimental Design 
 The full GINA model, based on the project team’s assessment of the 
applicability of DEWs to current Naval missions, a representative sample of realistic 
threats, and current conventional weapons used in the selected missions, the model was 
capable of analyzing 1008 separate engagements. While it may be worthwhile to run all 
of these engagements to paint a complete picture of exactly how DEWs can be used in 
the future, limiting the scope of mission areas would give a better fit for the current fleet 
structure. Therefore, it was necessary to consider design of experiment principles, the 
UNTL hierarchy, and preliminary analysis to reduce the number of experimental factors. 
The following UNTL requirements had the most priority in terms of relative importance 
and a perceived mission capability gap or weakness: 
 NTA 3.2.1.1 Attack Surface Targets 
 NTA 3.2.2 Attack Enemy Aircraft and Missiles 
 NTA 3.2.9 Conduct Non-Lethal Engagement 
 NTA 6.3.3 Combat Terrorism 
By narrowing our modeling effort down to these NTAs, we were able to select 
fewer overall missions, and consolidate several sub-missions based on similarity and 
relevance based on guidance from Mr. Bill Glenny, Deputy Director of the CNO’s 
Strategic Study Group. That left the missions shown in Table 15 as ones that were worth 












AW 1.2 3 
ATFP 12 1 
NCO 19.6 2 
ATFP 15 1 
ATFP 9 2 
 
By only considering these missions and their associated threats, we were able to 
cut down the number of engagement combinations from 1008 to 212. An engagement 
was then created for each mission, using each mission threat, each mission weapon, and 
each model environment. For each mission threat, the detection altitude and ground range 
was assumed based on project team experience since little to no unclassified data was 
available for flight profiles or RADAR detection ranges. The vital area radius was 
specified for each mission (Table 16) and was the “engage by” range that determined 
whether or not a mission was successfully engaged or not. During the data entry process, 
the project team found that there was extra time available for additional engagements to 
be entered. Therefore, the remaining engagements were randomized and as many 
engagements were entered as possible. In total, 337 unique engagements were created 










Mission Description Vital Area Radius 
(m) 
ATFP 12 Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest Exercise 50 
ATFP 15 Nighttime Small Boat Attack at Anchor 100 
ATFP 4 Entry Control Point (ECP)Threat 200 
ATFP 8 Pier side Small Boat Attack Exercise 100 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise 500 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group 5000 
AW 1.12 Provide air defense for non-combatant 
evacuations operations 
500 
AW 1.13 Provide air defense for naval/joint/ combined 
TF operations 
5000 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using AW Weapons 500 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 
underway replenishment group 
1000 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious forces in 
transit and in the amphibious objective area 
3000 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action 
group 
3000 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, high-speed 
airborne threats with AW weapons 
1000 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with AW weapons 500 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne threats 




Conduct seizure of noncombatant vessels 200 
NCO 
19.9 





Conduct close–in surface self-defense using 
crew operated SUW Weapons 
100 
SUW 2.3 Engage surface targets with assigned anti-
surface sector 
1000 
2. Model Results and Analysis 
The results of all the engagements were then queried from GINA and exported 





statistical analysis on the results. The first thing that we wanted to know what how well 
each weapon covered the different warfare areas and how well they covered all warfare 
areas.  Figure 38 shows a radar plot of the percentage of missions within each warfare 
area in which there was either a successful Type I or Type II engagement.  
 
 
Figure 38. Weapon-Warfare Area Mission Success Rates 
ADS was 100% successful in all weather conditions in all warfare areas. This 
success of ADS is due to the fact that most ADS engagements take place at short ranges, 
where attenuation is unlikely to have a significant effect. As can be seen, not all weapons 
were modeled against missions in all warfare areas. This is due to the abbreviated set of 
missions that we chose to analyze due to time constraints and should be further pursued 
in follow-on research. Overall, for LASER weapons, the MLD was successful in the most 
engagements, followed by LaWS+. However, it should be noted that if close-in AT/FP 





















3. Type I Engagement Analysis 
Next the range of the first Type I Engagement was analyzed. The range of the first 
Type I Engagement was averaged for successful missions. Therefore, this average will 
provide the decision maker with an average level of performance predicated on the 
assumption that the weapon is being employed in a mission/threat context that is 
appropriate for that particular weapon. These ranges, shown in Figure 39, are shown side-
by-side with the conventional weapons that were also evaluated. In addition, the 
maximum range for a Type I Engagement of all missions is shown. 
 
 
Figure 39. Average and Maximum Ranges of First Type I Engagement (Given 
Mission Success) 
With respect to the DEWs, the ranked order based on greatest to least average 
range is TLS, MLD, LaWS+, ADS, and LaWS. The TLS has a high average based on one 
outlier from an engagement associated with AW 9.4 against a Cessna threat. Although 
this use of TLS may seem far-fetched, we showed through our model validation and 




























diameter, and better beam quality to produce the same effects with less power as the other 
LASERs produce with higher power (findings that are substantiated by a 2012 
Congressional Research Service report on Navy HEL programs (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for 
Congress 2012)). This TLS performance shows the potential of a lower power LASER  in 
a niche application for AT/FP threats that tend to be more lightly armored since they are 
typically not military-grade weapons, but rather suicide variants of commercial vehicles. 
Therefore, even though TLS only accomplishes 20% of the AT/FP mission, that 20% 
represents a majority of the specific threats that need to be addressed. This success of 
TLS is captured well in Figure 40, which shows the average maximum effective range (of 
all missions, not only successful ones) by threat.  
 
 

























































In the case of the TLS, it performs well against Cessnas, FAC, and FIAC. In the 
use case of a Cessna 150, TLS and the MLD both outperform the MK15 CIWS and the 
MK38 Bushmaster. In the use case of FAC threat, TLS and the LaWS+ are either on par 
or outperforming the CIWS. These results suggest a LASER has potential for close-in 
defense augmenting (or potentially replacing) crew-served weapons and allowing the 
CIWS to conserve ammunition for ASCM threats. However, the maximum effective 
range, as defined in this model as being 1% of the total fluence required for a Type I 
Engagement does not translate into a kill range, rather this is the range damage effects 
start to occur.  
Considering the number of Type I Engagements that are possible by threat, we 
can get a better idea of how each weapon can be employed.  Figure 41 shows the mean 
range of Type I Engagements (for all missions, not just successful), and we can see that 
overall when it comes to a Type I Engagement, the clear winners are the current 
conventional weapons for an all-weather, multi-threat solution. The best performing 
DEW is the ADS, which is not designed to produce these types of damage effects, but 
could if the current non-lethal safety controls were removed. The disparity between ADS 
and the HEL systems is a representation of the relative ease of heating a human with a 
microwave device, vice trying to burn through or structurally weaken a hardened vehicle. 
The reason by the number of Type I Engagements for HELs is so low is that the first 
Type I Engagement happens at such a close range, that follow-on engagements are not 
possible (assuming a swarm of threats in which they all start from the same range and 






Figure 41. Interaction Plot for Mean Number of Type I Engagements by Threat Type 
Figure 42 shows the ranges of Type I Engagements for all missions.  Figure 42 
shows that LASER weapons are not very effective in their current or near-term (as in the 
LaWS+) state in producing Type I Engagements. Nearly all of these engagements occur 
at ranges less than 1,000 meters, with a very few outliers against lightly armored threats. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that the tracking and aiming systems associated with 
these weapons are far more accurate than what could be expected from a crew-served 
weapon such as an M2 .50 caliber machine gun or a MK38 mod 1 crew-served 
Bushmaster. Considering that, there is a niche for DEWs to provide Type I Engagement 
effects that would be comparable to current conventional weapons, but that niche would 






























































Figure 42. Dot Plot of Range of First Type I Engagement by Weapon 
4. Type II Engagement Analysis 
Type I Engagements are not the only type of damage that DEWs can provide. 
DEWs can also provide Type II Engagements which in the case of a LASER is the 
ultimate structural failure of a threat vehicle by heating the material with one-sixth of the 
fluence needed for a complete burn-through of the material (Type I Engagement). In the 
case of a HPM, a Type II Engagement means heating a human to the point of intolerable 
pain without causing permanent damage to the human body. The ability to produce a 
Type II Engagement gives added value to the Navy because it is a type of damage effect 
that is not inherent to conventional weapons. A Type II Engagement is similar to a 
conventional “mission kill” in which the weapon produces enough damage to degrade or 
inhibit a threat’s ability to attack friendly forces, without actually completely destroying 





be unlikely to sink the ship because the SM-2’s small warhead is designed to fragment 
and destroy missiles, but it could potentially destroy a fire control radar or kill crew 
members thereby reducing or eliminating the combatant’s war making ability. The 
difference is that in the conventional case these mission kills are due to the fact that 
conventional weapon is not sufficient to actually destroy the threat or a because a gunner 
gets a lucky shot and with DEWs a Type II Engagement can be just as effective as a Type 
I Engagement when threats are under dynamic stress (for LASERs) or when a non-lethal 
application is desire (for HPMs) and is an intended end result of the weapon, not the 
unintentional result of using a conventional weapon against a threat for which it was not 
designed to engage or is not capable of fully destroying. Therefore, with lower powered 
DEWs, Type II Engagements is a unique niche for naval applications. 
 Figure 43 shows the average range of the first Type II Engagement for 
each DEW for missions that were successful as well as the maximum range of the first 
Type II Engagement. With respect to Type II Engagements, the ranked order based on 
greatest average range to least range is MLD, LaWS+, TLS, ADS, and LaWS. The 
similarity in performance both at the average and maximum ranges for TLS, MLD, and 
LaWS+ should be noted as this illustrates an opportunity to make cost and space trades 
without significantly impacting performance. We also see that the ADS is successfully 
engaging threats at about 700m on average, which mirrors the advertised maximum 
effective range of about 700 yards from the Air Force (Center for Army Lessons Learned 
2008). However, even though ADS is operating in a maritime environment, it is possible 
to effectively engage threats with the ADS out to about 1200 meters, which has 
significant implications for a wide range of AT/FP, NCO, and SUW threats that could 
potentially overwhelm conventional weapons by attacking in swarms or cause 







Figure 43. Average and Maximum Ranges of Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) First 
Type II Engagement (Given Mission Success) 
When broken down by mission, all of the DEWs evaluated bring some added 
value to the Navy in terms of their ability to produce Type II Engagements on a wide 
variety of threats, in various weather conditions, and at various detection ranges. From 
the mean range of Type  II Engagements by mission shown in Figure 44, the most 
consistent performer is the MLD, which is no surprise based the fact that it had the 
greatest average range of first Type II Engagement. On the low power end of the 
spectrum, TLS is effective against, AT/FP and AW threats. Therefore, if UAVs, LSFs, 
and small boats are the primary concern, then TLS would be the best choice as it can 
engage comparable threats at comparable ranges to the MLD and the LaWS+. We also 
see that for Type II Engagements, the LaWS is also capable of successfully engaging a 
variety of threats. However, the best performer in our analysis of the data is the ADS. It is 
the only weapon that is able to successfully produce Type II Engagements prior to threats 
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Figure 44. Interaction Plot for Range of First Type II Engagement by Mission 
We also evaluated the number of Type II Engagements by threat type, show in 
Figure 45. This graph also shows how much more efficiently the ADS is at heating 
human skin as compared to LASERs heating metals and other threat materials. 
Additionally, threats mapped to the ADS also move relatively slower, allowing more time 
for follow-on engagements. This chart shows the value that ADS brings to the fight for 
the Navy, engaging a broad spectrum of threats effectively using non-lethal effects. With 
respect to the LASER performances, it is clear that even if you did achieve a Type II 
Engagement against a threat, the ability to re-engage is limited to single digits at best. 
Therefore, the accuracy of a LASER would have to be weighed against the accuracy of a 
conventional weapon which could put more rounds out of the barrel, but may not be as 







Figure 45. Interaction Plot for Number of Type II Engagements by Threat Type 
Finally, we looked at a dot plot of the raw data for the range of the first Type II 
Engagement for all missions and environments, shown in Figure 46. The chart shows 
again that the ADS is the only weapon that was able to achieve a Type II Engagement in 
100% of the mission/threat/environment combinations that we modeled it against. The 
chart also shows that the MLD, LaWS+, and TLS do provide some Type II Engagement 
ranges, but unlike the ADS, they do not work well against all threats and are confined to 



























































Figure 46. Dot Plot of Range of First Type II Engagement (All Missions, All 
Environments) 
5. Conclusions 
With the exception of the LaWS, all of the DEWs evaluated were able to provide 
some level of value across the board. The most consistently best performer was the ADS, 
which has the added unique ability to provide a non-lethal Type II Engagement, very 
rapidly, at tactically relevant ranges out to about 1,000 meters against threats that are 
either difficult to engage with conventional crew served weapons or might be difficult to 
determine hostile intent, decreasing the commander’s desire to use a lethal engagement 
option. With respect to LASERS, the MLD was the best overall performer due to the 
combination of its relatively high power and small aperture. The LaWS, with its larger 
aperture required the 150kW output power of the LaWS+ variant to be effective and even 





 Future research should be done to complete the full analysis of all the 
possible engagements based on the threats and environments that were selected by the 
project team. Additionally, adding the actual data to the GINA model, if it were migrated 
to SIPR, would provide a more accurate analysis. Finally, the conventional weapon 
comparison was made simplistic in order to distil the engagement equation outputs to 
values that had cross-domain relative comparability, but an actual validated combat 
model should be used to evaluate the conventional weapon performance, using the actual 
weapon parameters in order to account for sources of weapon failure such was weather 
effects which were impossible to capture in a deterministic model at the unclassified 
level. 
F. SIMULATION 
One of the requirements in our tasking statement was to develop a preliminary 
concept of operations (CONOPS) for the selected DEWs. The modeling effort provided a 
deterministic approach that plays a role in CONOPS development, but simulation was 
necessary to fill the gap of how these weapons would perform in a stochastic 
environment with multiple threat types and a maneuvering weapon platform. Therefore, 
two simulation efforts were developed to emphasize different simulation strengths: an 
agent-based simulation in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) and a Monte 
Carlo simulation in Excel. Since the majority of the systems being evaluated were 
LASERs, the simulation effort focused entirely on LASER weapon analysis. 
1. Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) 
MANA is a cellular automaton model that was developed by New Zealand’s 
Defence Technology Agency (DTA) (McIntosh, MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform 
Automata) Version 4 User Manual 2007). MANA allows the assignment of 
characteristics and behavior rules to multiple individual autonomous agents (or 





The main advantage of using MANA is the ability to learn about complex 
behaviors that can emerge from the interactions of individuals. MANA allows the 
researcher to control many options, such as the terrain, the personality of the agents, the 
weapon and sensor characteristics (such as probability of kill and probability of detection, 
which can both depend on distance), the ability to communicate with other units, etc. 
However, the current MANA version (version 5) does not include a LASER model 
(McIntosh, MANA-V (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata - Vector) Supplementary 
Manual 2009). 
a. Modeling LASERs with Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA) 
The two weapon models included with MANA are for kinetic energy 
weapons and explosives. The project team chose to adapt the kinetic energy weapons 
model for LASER analysis. In the kinetic energy weapons model, a hit is a binary 
function – that is, the shot can either kill the target or not (with a certain probability Pk, 
which may depend on distance to the target, among other parameters). By contrast, the 
physics of LASERs is such that a specific cumulative amount of energy, whether 
transferred over a short or long period of time, is required to kill a target. 
As in the kinetic energy model, one of the parameters affecting the amount 
of energy that can be delivered from the LASER is distance. Figure 47 depicts the 
amount of time required for a Type I Engagement as a function of the distance to the 







Figure 47. Average penetration time 
The LASER model assumes knowledge of the time required for kill per 
distance, tk(r). In order to model a LASER using the tools given in MANA, the following 
values were assigned: 
 Every target was assigned N “life points” in the “number of hits 
required for kill” field. (This assignment can also be interpreted as 
the thickness of the armor that should be penetrated). 
 The LASER weapon was set to a kinetic weapon that is able to 
shoot s shots per second. 
 The probability of a Type I Engagement using a LASER was set to 
depend on the distance r.  
  ( )  
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Equation 20. Probability of Type I Engagement 
The time required for a Type I Engagement for a given distance is 
assumed to have a geometric distribution of Geo(Pk(t)). The time required for a Type I 
Engagement was based on the preliminary GINA model development analysis which 
suggested a geometric relationship between Type I and II Engagements and time. The 
average number of shots for a Type I Engagement is shown in Equation 21, which leads 
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Equation 21. Average Time for Type I Engagement 
As the distance of the target changes, the average Type I Engagement time 
changes, causing the probability of achieving a Type I Engagement to change. For the 
entire model to produce realistic performance results, s and N must be chosen such that 
the Type I Engagement probability is less than one (the larger the value for N and s, the 
more realistic the simulation). 
  ( )  
 
    ( )
   
Equation 22. LASER Probability of Type I Engagement Limitation 
In the MANA simulation developed, N and s were on the order of 
magnitude of 100. It should be noted that this magnitude (or threshold calculation) is a 
completely unique way of using MANA that, as far as the project team and MANA 
subject matter experts at the NPS SEED Center are aware. This project is the first attempt 
at using a completely unique methodology to using MANA to simulate DEWs. The 
methodology for adapting MANA to DEW simulations represents a possible solution to 
the current problems with binary Navy weapons models as highlighted in the 2012 report 
Laser Weapon System (LAWS) Adjunct to the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) published 
by NSWC Dahlgren. 
b. Assumptions 
The main assumption is that the criterion for deciding whether a target is 
killed is the cumulated energy received. This assumption means that according to the 
LASER model, even after long interruptions the target will “remember” that it already 
received a given amount of energy and will require less additional energy in order to be 
killed. One drawback to this method is that, unlike the GINA model, the different 





disadvantage for this type of analysis. Further research in this area is needed to identify a 
correction factor to account for beam quality and wavelength.  
c. Found Software Bug in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA) 
While working with MANA, a critical bug was encountered for LASER 
modeling: The “number of shots per second” field in the weapons tab may not be read 
correctly by MANA. This fault did not adversely affect the results of our analysis, but 
was reported to the NPS SEED Center to be fixed in the latest revision of MANA-V. In 
order to ensure that this bug did not influence our results, a workaround was crafted by 
the project team. Instead of adjusting shots per second, the time step was adjusted, which 
had the same effect, allowing the simulated DEW to “fire” at the correct number of shots 
per second. The version of MANA used by the project team, which will require this 
workaround is MANA-V, version 5.01.04. 
d. Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) Simulation 
Vignettes and Scenarios 
In order to compare the performance of each type of LASER weapon, four 
scenarios designed to simulate how well each of LASER weapons perform under realistic 
conditions and how many threats each LASER weapon can engage were developed. 
These four scenarios are FAC/FIAC swarm attack, counter UAV, counter ASCM, and an 
integrated scenario comprised of all three previous scenarios. For each scenario, a 
vignette was written by the U.S. Navy project team members to guide simulation 
development and goals. 
e. Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) 
One of the greatest threats facing the United States Navy is the 
asymmetric threat posed by small, fast surface craft in the Anti-Surface Warfare (SUW) 
mission area. A swarm attack in the littorals or during choke point transits against a 





The current Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) 
threats are fast, highly maneuverable craft armed with short range missiles, rockets, and 
heavy machine guns. While FAC/FIAC threats may not have sufficient firepower to 
actually sink a surface combatant, a “swarm” of maneuvering FIACs could nevertheless 
obstruct ship operations, harass consorts, deny maneuver space, distract form the primary 
mission objective and inflict damage to ship sensors and communications (even jet-skis 
could be used to launch a rocket propelled grenade) (Scott 2011). The FAC/FIAC threat 
has the advantage of operating at high speeds, and with lower drafts and can operate in 
shallow water where larger Warships are most vulnerable. The small size of a FAC/FIAC 
threat also makes them difficult to detect both visually and on RADAR reducing the 
Warship’s reaction time. These small boats often operate in groups of 2 to 5 in order to 
maximize their firepower while providing mutual protection and take advantage of the 
battlespace. 
The typical CONOPS for a U.S. Navy Warship is to increase to max speed 
and set a course away from the swarm threat (usually toward deeper water). In doing this 
maneuver, ships are able to increase the distance from the threat while creating a large 
wake that could potentially swamp or deter the incoming boats. This defense CONOPS 
continues until all threats have been neutralized, or enough distance has been placed 
between the threats that they can no longer engage the Warship.    
f. Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) 
Simulation Parameters 
Table 17 outlines the squad physical properties used in the MANA 
simulation tool.    The Blue force represents a single DDG with one LASER weapon 
installed on the ship capable of 360 degree coverage. In all scenarios, weapon placement 
was not considered, and therefore weapon coverage zones were not studied in this 
simulation. The Red force is comprised of seven small boats attacking the DDG. These 





by the DDG. After detecting the threat, the DDG navigates away from the boats at 16 
m/s.  Figure 48 shows a screen shot of the MANA simulation being executed. 
 
Table 17. Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) Simulation 
Parameters 










Red Force Small Boat 7 25 10 
 
 
Figure 48. Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) Screen Shot of DDG Engaging Fast Attack Craft 
(FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) Threats with a LASER 
The results of the LASER interactions with the attackers from this 
scenario are listed in Table 18. The enhanced version of the LaWS was able to engage all 
seven small boat threats. The current LaWS and the MLD were about on par with each 





the small boats effectively. This simulation confirms there is a role for LASER weapons 
in a FAC/FIAC engagement. These results also highlight this simulation methods 
inherent reliance on output power as the key driving force in determining burn through 
rates, which biases the results against systems like the TLS. 
 
Table 18. Fast Attack Craft (FAC)/Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) Simulation 
Type I Engagement Results 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
Average 2.567  7.000  0.000  3.033  
Standard Error 0.092  0.000  0.000  0.033  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.188  0.000  0.000  0.068  
 
g. Low Slow Flyer (LSF) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Low Slow Flyers (LSFs) are aircraft that fly at low altitudes with speeds 
less than 300kts. They typically have low infrared signatures and little distinctive 
electronic emissions. These aircraft can fly in patterns and altitudes similar to civilian air 
routes allowing them to incorporate easily with normal air traffic. In addition, they are 
sometimes difficult to detect by RADAR until in close proximity due to their low speeds 
and altitudes. If they are detected, it can be problematic to classify them as friend or foe 
due to their flight profiles. For these reasons, LSFs are viable threats to ships. In 
preparing against LSFs, ships typically use scenarios where the LSFs are in close 
proximity. Since LSFs are not expected to be detected and classified until they are within 
a close proximity to the defender, they require the use of close-quarter weapon systems 
employed by the ships’ Small Craft Action Teams (SCAT) such as the M2 .50 caliber and 
MK38 25mm machine guns.    
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are aerial vehicles that do not have a 
human pilot onboard the craft. They are advantageous in situations where the dangers of 





auto-pilot programming. They can be used for reconnaissance, electronic attack, strike 
missions, and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD). Due to these various 
capabilities, UAVs pose a significant threat, especially in maritime environments.  
h. Low Slow Flyer (LSF) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 
Simulation Parameters 
The Low Slow Flyer/Unmanned Arial Vehicle simulation parameters are 
outlined in Table 19. Like the FAC/FIAC scenario, the Blue force represents a DDG with 
a single LASER weapon. The Red force is comprised of seven attacking LSF/UAVs 
which fly toward the DDG simultaneously; starting from a detection range of 10km and 
moving inbound at 40 m/s. After detecting the LSF/UAVs, the DDG navigates away 
from the LSF/UAVs at 16 m/s (see Figure 49) 
 
Table 19. Low Slow Flyer (LSF) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Simulation 
Parameters 

















Figure 49. Low Slow Flyer (LSF) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Map Aware 
Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) Simulation Screen Shot 
In this scenario, all of the LASER systems are somewhat effective in 
engaging LSF/UAV threats (Table 20). Again, LaWS and the MLD are on par with each 
other and the TLS lags behind, with the LaWS+ as the clear front runner. 
Table 20. Low Slow Flyer (LSF) / Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Scenario 
Results 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
Average 3.567  7.000  0.433  4.900  
Standard Error 0.092  0.000  0.092  0.056  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.188  0.000  0.188  0.114  
 
 
I. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) 
Another significant threat to the Navy is ASCMs that are designed to fire 
against large boats and warships. ASCMs can be launched by warships, submarines, and 





attack during wartime very high. Avoiding detection, destroying the missile launch 
platform before it fires its missile and shooting down or decoying the incoming missile 
are three main strategies to counter the ASCM. The scenario parameters are listed in 
Table 21. 
Table 21. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Scenario Parameters 










Red Force Subsonic 
ASCM 
5 300 10 
Red Force Supersonic 
ASCM 
5 1000 10 
 
Two ASCM scenarios were considered: a subsonic ASCM attack and a 
supersonic ASCM attack. The Red force is comprised of five ASCMs fired 
simultaneously at the DDG. After detecting the ASCMs, the DDG navigates away the 
ASCM at 16 m/s. 
 
 





The subsonic ASCM scenario results are in Table 22 and the supersonic 
ASCM results are in Table 23. The results of this simulation are somewhat optimistic, 
showing that the LaWS+ would be able to effectively engage a subsonic ASCM 100% of 
the time; however, it does show that even with the low powered LaWS there is a potential 
to have some positive effect on the outcome of an ASCM engagement. This result 
suggests that the current plan to install a hybrid LASER weapon in conjunction with 
CIWS could be an added value to the Navy by potentially conserving ammunition. 
Table 22. Subsonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Scenario Results 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
Average 1.233  5.000  0.000  2.000  
Standard Error 0.079  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.161  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
Not surprisingly, none of the weapons fared well against the supersonic 
ASCM threat, even in this somewhat optimistic simulation. The LaWS+ was able to 
engage nearly two ASCMs successfully on average, suggesting that if missile defense is a 
primary concern, then this weapon, paired with the CIWS would most likely show 
tactically significant gains over the standard CIWS configuration.  
Table 23. Supersonic Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) Scenario Results 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
Average 0.000  1.900  0.000  0.000  
Standard Error 0.000  0.056  0.000  0.000  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.000  0.114  0.000  0.000  
 
j. Coordinated Attack 
The final scenario simulated in MANA is a combination of all of the 
above threat types in a coordinated attack shown in Figure 51. The scenario parameters 







Figure 51. Coordinated Attack Simulation Screen Shot 
Table 24. Coordinated Attack Parameters 










Red Force Small Boat 5 25 10 
Red Force UAV 3 40 10 
Red Force Subsonic 
ASCM 
1 300 10 
 
The results of the coordinated attack scenario, listed in Table 25, show 
some surprising conclusions. Whereas in a single threat type environment, it is easy to 
distinguish between the systems performance based on power alone, in the coordinated 
attack scenario, the LaWS, LaWS+, and MLD all performed about the same, with the 
LaWS+ able to kill a few more small boats than the other two. Again, TLS was not 
effective in this scenario. While the accuracy of these numbers of successful 





system of relatively low power has a clear role in the layered defense of a ship under 
attack from multiple threat types simultaneously. 
Table 25. Coordinated Attack Scenario Results 
LaWS 
  Subsonic ASCW UAV Small Boat 
Average 1.000  3.000  1.100  
Standard Error 0.000  0.000  0.403  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.000  0.000  0.150  
LaWS+ 
  Subsonic ASCW UAV Small Boat 
Average 1.000  3.000  5.000  
Standard Error 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
MLD 
  Subsonic ASCW UAV Small Boat 
Average 1.000  3.000  2.433  
Standard Error 0.000  0.000  0.679  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.000  0.000  0.254  
TLS 
  Subsonic ASCW UAV Small Boat 
Average 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Standard Error 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 
For every scenario, there were thirty simulations conducted for each type 
of DEW. The 30 simulations were then averaged to represent the performance of the 
DEWs. These results are shown in Appendix M. 
2. LASER Monte Carlo Simulation 
The purpose of performing a Monte Carlo simulation was to evaluate four 
different LASER systems quantitatively according to their operational performance. ADS 





further discriminate between the different LASER weapons evaluated by the project. The 





We considered scenarios in which a single vessel, nominally a DDG-51 class 
destroyer, is attacked by swarms of missiles and small boats. The vessel would try to 
defend itself by shooting the attackers down using its current weapons (guns and anti-
missile missiles) and the LASER systems. Our prime goal was to gain insights into the 
effect of different weapon systems on ship survivability. In addition, we considered 
situations in which the LASERs replace some of the ship’s existing weapons to see what 
combinations of weapons yielded the best outcomes. 
a. Simulation Methodology 
The simulation developed was a stochastic Excel based simulation. It 
modeled the defense capability of a vessel against a swarm of threats. The model allowed 
the vessel to “shoot down” the threats using the available weapons, which could include 
anti-missile missiles, guns, LASERs, or a combination of these weapon types. Each type 
of weapon is modeled to have a certain probability of intercepting the incoming attacker, 
resulting in the stochastic nature of the engagement outcome. Attackers which are not 
shot down by any of the weapons would be considered leakers. Therefore, any electronic 
warfare methods or any evasive maneuvering that might normally be employed to combat 
these threats was ignored in order to isolate the effects of only the weapons. 
 
The vessel would be considered to have survived a swarm attack when 
there were zero leakers in an engagement/simulation run. Running each scenario 





the percentage of simulation runs in which there are no leakers. The complete model 
takes into consideration the attributes as listed in Table 26. 
Table 26. List of Modeling Attributes 






































Melting Point   
Average 
Speed 

































    
Average Speed 
 
    
Number of 
Attackers  
    
Heat of Fusion 
 




    
These attributes account for the impact of the defense capabilities, threats 
and environment on the survival of the vessel. 
(1) Simulation LASER Modeling Methodology. The 
simulation team developed a similar, but independent model for LASER performance 
from the GINA modeling team to provide more depth to the overall performance analysis 





performance terms and metrics were used to adjudicate weapon performance in the 
simulation by way of mathematical performance models. 
 
Time to Effect. The time required for a target to be destroyed from the point the 
trigger is pushed, to the point when the threat has been eliminated.   
 
Maximum Effective Engagement Range. The maximum range at which the 
LASER can destroy a stationary target in 100 seconds.    
 
Number of Engagements within Kill Window. The number of targets that can 
be destroyed by a weapon system within its kill window. 
 
LASER Equations. The MOPs are dependent on various factors that are bounded 
by the laws of physics and related by various mathematical equations. These 
equations are used to model the LASER system and determine the MOPs. Several 
of the equations have been modified from the earlier model. The equations of 
interests are highlighted below. 
 
Time to Effect For a stationary target. The time taken for LASER to penetrate 
a stationary target is calculated by dividing the fluence required to penetrate/kill 
the target by the intensity of the LASER at the target, as shown in Equation 23 
below. 
 
                                           
    
  
 
Equation 23. Time to Effect for Stationary Target 
Emin is the fluence required to penetrate the target, as given in 
Combat Systems Volume 3, equation 17.8 (Harney, Combat Systems Volume 3 2004) 
and is as shown in Equation 24. It is the LASER intensity at the target calculated by 
multiplying the output intensity and the transmittance (as defined by Beer’s Law).   
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Equation 25. LASER Intensity at Stationary Target 
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(2) Time to Effect for Approaching Targets. Total fluence that 
can be transmitted over an engagement window (J/cm
2
) is calculated by integrating the 
LASER intensity on target over the duration of engagement as shown in Equation 26. 
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Equation 26. Calculation for Total Fluence that can be transmitted over an Engagement 
Window 
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Atmospheric attenuation is often expressed in dB/km, Aatm, and 
can be converted to      using the following relation obtained from Combat Systems 
Volume 1( (Harney, Combat Systems Volume 1 2004) as shown below. 
       
    
     
 
Equation 27. Conversion of atmospheric attenuation from dB scale to normal scale 
Time to effect is calculated by equating               as follows: 
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Equation 28. Time to effect for approaching target 
(3) Maximum Effective Engagement Range. Defining 
maximum effective range, Rmax, as the range at which a LASER can destroy a stationary 
target in 100s, we calculate the Rmax as follows:  
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(4) Number of Engagements within Kill Window. The number 
of engagements that can be made within a kill window is calculated with the following 
equation: 
             
      
    
 
Equation 30. Number of Engagements within Kill Window for LASER 
(5) Assumptions. The following are the assumptions made for 
the model that was created: 
 A target will be destroyed/eliminated when a sixth of the fluence 
required to melt through the target’s external material, has been 
applied to the target. This assumption is made on the basis that the 
pressure generated as the material melts is sufficient to cause 
physical failure of the material even before the LASER melts 
through the whole thickness of the material. This is an estimate for 
all LASER wavelengths based on empirical data from an interview 
with Dr. Gary Langford. 
 Target material that has been melted will be removed from the 
surface of the target by forces of gravity and air flowing across the 
surface of the target. 
 Rate of heat loss from the target to its surrounding is negligible 
compared to rate at which energy is transferred from the LASER 
beam to the target. 
 Range at which target is detected is always more than the 
maximum effective range of LASER. 
 All LASER weapons can operate continuously for the whole 
duration of an engagement. This assumption is made due to the 
lack of information and would result in overly optimistic results for 
LASER. This assumption should be taken into consideration when 
comparing LASER with other weapon systems. This assumption 
would not have an impact on the relative performance of different 
LASER systems, but would skew the difference in performance, in 
the favor of higher power LASERs. 
 Uniform beam profile for all LASERs.   








 Beam waist is determined using Equation 31 
              
 
     
   
 
Equation 31. Diffraction limited multimode Beam Waist (from Ophir-Spiricon 2010) 
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 Model assumes a thermal coupling factor,    of 0.01 for all 
material. 
 Variations in atmospheric attenuation due to different LASER 
wavelengths are ignored. 
(6) Simulation Engagement Adjudication Process. The 
simulation developed is a stochastic Excel based simulation. It models the defense 
capability of a vessel against a swarm of attackers. The model allows the vessel to shoot 
down the attackers using the available weapons, which may include anti-missile missiles, 
guns, LASERs or any combination of them. Each type of weapon is modeled to have a 
certain probability of intercepting the incoming attacker, resulting in the stochastic nature 
of the engagement outcome. Attackers which are not shot down by any of the weapons 
would be considered leakers.   
The vessel would be considered to have survived a swarm attack 
when there are zero leakers in an engagement/simulation run. Running each scenario 
numerous times, the survival chance of a vessel for the certain scenario is taken to be the 
percentage of simulation runs in which there are no leakers. The simulation model 
follows the engagement process as shown in Figure 52. 
 
 


























The model assumes that all inbound threats would always be 
engaged first with missiles, followed by LASER and lastly by guns. Threats that survive 
the earlier engagement will be passed on and be engaged by the next weapon type. This 
process is subjected to the availability of the weapon. For example, if missiles are not 
available or cannot be used in a certain scenario, a LASER would be used first followed 
by a gun. This engagement process is a reasonable model of reality, since missiles have a 
much further engagement range than the other two weapons and LASERs have the 
potential to engage beyond the maximum effective range of guns based on the GINA 
model validation analysis.   
b. Engagement Modeling 
(1) Missile Engagement Model. For the simulation, the 
probability of a missile intercepting its target is set to be 0.7. With this probability of 
intercept, when more than one missile is fired, the expected number of hits/intercepts is 
simply the number of missiles fired, n, multiplied by the 0.7. However, given the 
probabilistic nature of engagement, this number (of hits) can vary about the mean. For the 
missile engagement simulation, this variation is modeled as a binomial distribution. The 
number of hits (by the missiles) is generated randomly from a binomial distribution in 
Excel using Equation 32. 
   (         (               ())    ) 
Equation 32. Random Generator for Number of Hits achieved by Missile 
The cell references in the equation are defined as follows: 
 $B$16 – Number of missiles fired within the engagement window. 
This is the maximum number of missiles that can be launched 
within the available time ((Engagement Window)/ (Time Interval 
between Launch)), or the number of missiles in the inventory, 
based on whichever is less. The Engagement Window is calculated 
with Equation 33. 
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Equation 33. Engagement Window 
 $B$4-Probability of Intercept  
 B23-Number of inbound threats 
 
The CRITBINOM function generates a random number (of hits) 
from a binomial distribution based on the number of engagements possible within the kill 
window, and the probability of success. The MIN function is included to ensure that the 
number of hits does not exceed the number of threats. 
(2) LASER Engagement Model. The stochastic nature of 
LASER engagement outcome is modeled by randomly varying the fluence required to 
destroy each target in each engagement. This model is adopted as it reflects the reality in 
which it is a matter of time before a LASER weapon will destroy its target and the time 
taken to destroy a target can vary significantly depending on several factors (different 
aim point, jitter, moving target, etc.). With the varying fluence required to destroy a 
target, the number of hits/kills (by LASER) would vary, given the finite amount of 
energy that can be transmitted from the LASER within the kill window. This model is 
implemented in Excel using Equation 34 and Equation 35. 
   (      (       (        (     (    ()))     (    ()
     ())  ))       ) 
Equation 34. Random Generator for Number of Engagements that can be made by 
LASER within the kill window  
   (         (             ())        ) 
Equation 35. Random Generator for Number of Type II Engagements achieved by 
LASER 
Equation 34 is used to generate (randomly) the number of 





is used to generate the number of Type II Engagements achieved from the LASER 
engagements. The cell references and terms in the equations are defined as follows: 
 $N$39 – Total fluence that can be transmitted from the Laser 
within the engagement window 
 $C$12-Number of Laser weapon system on vessel  
 D23-Number of engagements that can be made by the laser 
weapon within the engagement window  
 $C$4-Probability of intercept, which is defined as the probability 
that a target that has been engaged (penetrated) by the Laser will 
not hit the vessel   
 (B23-C23)-represents the number of threats remaining after the 
missile engagement 
 
The MAX function is used in the equation to ensure that the 
fluence required to destroy the target is at least equal to FSK (fluence required for a Type 
II Engagement). The INT function is used to ensure that only complete engagements are 
considered.   
The probability of intercept is included to account for the chance in 
which a target that has been penetrated/”killed” by LASER, can still strike the vessel and 
cause damage. As with the missile engagement model, the CRITBINOM function would 
generate a random number (of hits) from a binomial distribution based on the number of 
engagements possible within the kill window, and the probability of success. The MIN 
function is included to ensure that the number of hits does not exceed the number of 
threats. 
 
(3) Gun Engagement Model. As with the missile engagement 
model, the stochastic nature of the gun engagement outcome is modeled using the 
CRITBINOM function as shown in Equation 36. The probability of intercept for gun is 
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Equation 36. Random Generator for Number of kills achieved by guns 
  (  (       )    (       )) ((     )      ) 
Equation 37. Mean probability of kill against missile targets, for each round fired by the 
gun within a 2000m range 
   (                ) 
Equation 38. Mean probability of kill for a specified duration of engagement using the 
gun within a 2000m range 
Cell references in the equations are defined as follows:   
 $D$16 – Total number of 5 sec engagements that can be made 
within the engagement window 
 $D$4 - Probability of Intercept for a 5 sec continuous gun 
engagement 
 (B23-C23-E23) - Number of threats remaining after Missile and 
Laser engagements 
 D6 & D7-The maximum effective and minimum engagement 
range of gun respectively  
 N50-The probability of kill for one round fired from the gun  
 N51- The number of rounds fired within a second of engagement  
 D9- The duration of each engagement, which is assumed to be 5 
seconds for the model      
As before, the CRITBINOM function would generate a random 
number (of hits) from a binomial distribution based on the number of engagements 
possible within the kill window, and the probability of intercept. The MIN function is 
included to ensure that the number of hits does not exceed the number of threats. 
Equation 37 returns the expected probability of kill/intercept for a 
missile target, by each round that is fired from the gun within a 2000m range. The 





derived from the LDP-17 Design Exercises (Tibbitts 1998).  Equation 37 is essentially a 
finite integral of that function from 100m to 2000m and dividing by the range in 
consideration. For a boat target, the probability of kill by each round fired from the gun 
within a 2000m range is taken to be a constant of 0.005, as stated in the LDP-17 Design 
Exercises (Tibbitts 1998).     
Equation 38 returns the probability of kill/intercept by the gun, 
given a specified rate of fire and the duration of engagement, which is taken to be 
3000rds/min and 5s respectively for the model. This probability is capped at 0.999 (using 
the MIN function) as firing an excessive amount of rounds on a target can never achieve 
a probability of kill of more than 1.   
(4) Determining Survival Rate. With the engagement models 
for the various weapon systems, the number of leakers is calculated easily by subtracting 
the number of threats that are intercepted by the various weapon systems from the 
number of inbound threats. Survival rate is determined by repeating each scenario (and 
the associated set of engagements) 50 times (or runs) and calculating the percentage of 
runs that have zero leakers. 
 
(5) Missile Characteristics. The missile defense capability that 
is modeled is based on generic subsonic anti-missile missile systems and has the 
attributes as listed in Table 27. The probability that a missile that is launched towards the 
threat will hit the threat is assumed to be 0.7 (Tibbitts 1998). The time between launch is 
the time required to prepare a missile system for the next launch and set to be 3 seconds 
for the model. The number of missiles on board a vessel is set to be 60 and it represents 
that maximum number of missiles that can be launched. To determine the contribution of 
missile system to the defense of the vessel, the number of launchers on board the vessel 





The minimum engagement range of the missile weapon system is 
set to be 2km. This may be considered to be the arming distance of the missile or a safety 
distance that is established to prevent collateral damage on friendly forces. 
  





















0.7 100 km 2 km 1000 
km/hr 
3 sec Variable 
(0,1, or 2) 
60 
 
(6) Gun Characteristics. The guns are modeled to resemble the 
20mm Phalanx CIWS, which represents a typical terminal defense capability of naval 
vessels. The characteristics of the guns are as listed in Table 28. The probability of 
intercept represents the probability of killing the target with 5 seconds of engagement at 
the specified rate of fire. This probability varies with the type of threat (Missile and Boat) 
as shown in Table 28. To explore the contribution of the terminal defense capability to 
the overall defense of the vessel, the number of guns on the vessel is varied in the 
simulation. 
The gun characteristics are extracted from the LPD-17 Design 
Exercises (Tibbitts 1998) and shown in Table 28, with 2 added assumptions. First, the 
guns can only engage in bursts of 5 seconds (or 250 rounds). The assumption that a gun 
can only fire 250 round bursts would imply that guns in the model are not able to switch 
between threats within the 5 seconds of engagement even if a target is destroyed in less 
than 5 seconds. Second, while the ship would usually hold a large number of rounds, the 
time taken to reload a gun is assumed to be too long, therefore limiting the ammunition 











































(7) LASER Characteristics. The probability of intercept is 
considered to be the probability that a destroyed target will not reach the vessel. It 
accounts for the chance that the target may still reach and destroy the vessel despite being 
penetrated by the LASER. This probability is larger for missile threats, compared to boat 
threats as it is assumed that it is more difficult for missile threats to maintain their course 
of movement after being penetrated by LASERs. It should be noted that this definition 
probability of intercept is unique to LASER engagements. The values selected for these 
probabilities were strongly managed assumptions based on the Directed Energy Weapons 
chapter of Dr. Robert Harney’s Combat Systems text and the idea that simply penetrating 
the hull of a boat will likely cause much less damage (requiring multiple “shots”) than 







Table 29. Modeled LASER Characteristics 
LASER 
Characteristics 
Type of LASER (Variable) 
No 
LASER 








0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
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(8) Sensor Characteristics . The detection ranges for missile 
and boat targets differ. For the simulation, the detection range for missile targets is set to 
be 50km and that for small boats varies between 0.5 km and 4 km. The variation in 
detection range for small boat targets is to allow assessment of the performance of the 
vessel defense under varying visibility.   
(9) Target Characteristics. Two types of targets are considered 
for the simulation: Small Boats and Surface Skimming Missiles. The characteristics of 





number of targets is varied in each scenario to allow differentiation in performance for 
various weapon combinations.   
Table 30. Modeled Target Characteristics 
  
Type of Target Boat Missile 
Target/Attacker 
Characteristics 
Number of Targets Variable (100–300) Variable (10–50) 
Operating Temperature 300 K 300 K 
Average  Speed  50 km/hr 2000 km/hr 










































(10) Environment Characteristics. The impact of atmospheric 
attenuation on LASER performance has been analyzed in earlier LASER Performance 
Analysis and is not explored in the simulation. For the simulation, atmospheric 
attenuation is set to be 0.8dB/km. This atmospheric attenuation would resemble 






(1) Scenario 1: Missile Swarm Attack. The following 
parameters were changed: 
 Number of incoming missiles (10, 20, 30, 40 , 50) 
 Type of LASER (No LASER, LaWS, LaWS+, MLD, TLS) 
 Number of Missile Launchers (0, 1, 2) 
 Number of Guns (0 or 2) 
 
The following factors were constant: 
 Target Characteristics: 
o Material: Stainless Steel 
o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Material Thickness: 0.5cm 
 Weapon Characteristics 
o Missile Max range > detection range 
o Detection Range : 50km 
o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Launch Interval: 3s 
o P(intercept): 0.7 
o Missile Inventory: 60 per ship 
o Attenuation (0.8 dB/km) 
 
(2) Scenario 1.1: Missile Swarm Attack – without Anti-Missile 
Missiles. The following parameters were changed:  
 Type of LASER (No LASER, LaWS, LaWS+, MLD, TLS) 
 Number of Targets (2, 4, 6, 8, 10) 
 Number of Guns (0 or 2) 
The following factors were constant: 
 Target Characteristics: 
o Detection Range:20km 
o Material: Stainless Steel 
o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Material Thickness: 0.5cm 
 Weapon Characteristics 
o Number of launchers: 0 
o Attenuation: 0.8dB/km 





o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Launch Interval: 3s 
o P(intercept): 0.7 
o Missile Inventory: 60 per ship 
 
(3) Scenario 1.2: Missile swarm attack – with 2 anti-missile 
systems. The following parameters were changed:  
 Type of LASER (No LASER, LaWS, LaWS+, MLD, TLS) 
 Number of Targets (10, 20, 30, 40, 50) 
 Number of Guns (0, 2) 
The following factors were constant: 
 Target Characteristics: 
o Detection Range:40km 
o Material: Stainless Steel 
o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Material Thickness: 0.5cm 
 Weapon Characteristics 
o Number of launchers: 2 
o Attenuation: 0.8dB/km 
o Missile Max range > detection range 
o Speed: 2000km/hr 
o Launch Interval: 3s 
o P(intercept): 0.7 
o Missile Inventory: 60 per ship 
 
(4) Scenario 2: Boat Swarm Attack. The following parameters 
were changed:  
 Detection Range (0.5, 1, 2, 4km) 
 Type of LASER (No LASER, LaWS, LaWS+, MLD, TLS) 
 Number of Guns (0, 1, or 2) 
 Number of threats (10, 20, 30, 40, 50) 
The following factors were constant: 
 Target Characteristics: 
o Material: Aluminum 
o Speed: 50km/hr 
o Material Thickness: 2 cm 





o Number of Missile Launcher = 0 (Missiles N/A for 
scenario) 
o LASER Engagement Range = 0 - 10km 
o Gun Engagement Range = 0 - 2km  
o Attenuation = 0.8dB/km 
d. Analysis 
The experiment design implemented for our analysis is full factorial 
design with 50 runs for each data point. This design is very robust and does not require 
assumptions on the different parameters and the interactions between them. For every 
scenario, the following analysis was conducted using Minitab: 
 Main effects analysis 
 Interaction analysis 
 One-way t-test 
e. Results 
(1) Scenario 1: Missile Swarm Attack. In this scenario, which 
includes a missile swarm attack, we have varied the number of missile launchers, number 
of guns, number of incoming targets and the LASER type.  Figure 53 depicts the main 
effects analysis. In main effects analysis, each graph shows the effect of a single 







Figure 53. Missile Swarm Attack Scenario Main Effects Analysis 
The main two parameters influencing the result are the number of 
missile launchers and number of incoming targets.  Figure 54 depicts the interaction plot. 
Similarly to main effects analysis, in interaction analysis each graph shows the 








Figure 54. Missile Swarm Attack Scenario Interaction Plot 
From the graphs in the top row, without missile launchers the 
probability of survival is close to 0. From the top-right graph, a single missile launcher 
can handle approximately 10 targets (up to 20 with low survival probability), while two 
launchers can handle about 30 incoming missiles. From the LASER type-number of 
targets interaction plots, the MLD is slightly better than the other LASERs in situations in 
which the missiles ensure some, but not full, survival rate. The rest of the LASERs do not 
have significantly different results in comparison with using only conventional weapons. 
Figure 55 depicts an interaction plot again with a t-test for a 95% 
confidence interval around the mean. Although MLD appears somewhat better than the 
other LASERs, the overlap of the confidence intervals indicates the difference is not 
statistically significant (at least to the 95% confidence level). Given this limited testing, 








Figure 55. LASER type/Number of Guns Interaction 
Figure 56 shows that MLD is significantly better than other 
LASERs when there are 20 targets. The reason is that in those cases, one or two missile 
launchers (in that order) will have some effect, but not a full one, and the MLD helps to 
improve the outcome. When the missile launchers are either 100% or 0% effective, a 








Figure 56. LASER type/Number of Targets Interaction 
 
(2) Scenario 1.1: Missile Swarm Attack – without Anti-Missile 
Missiles. In order to learn more about the performance of the different LASERs in a 
missile swarm scenario, we simulated conditions in which there were no anti-missile 
missiles. This kind of a situation can occur if there is a malfunction in the anti-missile 
system or if a missile was launched inside of the minimum engagement range/arming 
range for the anti-missile system. The number of targets that can be handled is much 
lower in this scenario. 
Figure 57 and Figure 58 depict the main affect and interaction 
plots for this scenario. MLD is the only effective LASER weapon for this scenario. This 


























Figure 59. LASER Type/Number of Targets Interaction 
To compare the effectiveness of LASERs and guns we will focus 
on the situation where there are one or two incoming targets (Figure 60 and Figure 61). 















Figure 61. LASER Type/Number of Guns Interaction (Two targets) 
 
(3) Scenario 1.2: Missile Swarm Attack – with Two Anti-
Missile Systems. To complete this scenario analysis, we also take a look at the situation 
where two anti-missile missile systems exist and function. In this case the main effects 







Figure 62. Missile Swarm Attack Scenario with Two Anti-Missile Systems Main 
Effects Analysis 
From the main effects plot, guns have only a slight effect on the 
survivability of the ship and that the MLD also has a slight positive effect on 
survivability without anti-missile missiles. Also, in this type of scenario, the maximum 








Figure 63. LASER Type/Number of Guns Interaction (Two Anti-Missile Systems) 
The only LASER that has a significant contribution to the survival 
rate is the MLD. The two anti-missile systems can handle up to 20 incoming targets. 
With 30 targets, the survival rate is smaller when most of the LASERs are incorporated. 
However, MLD improves the survival rate. With 40 targets, the MLD can improve the 
survival rate significantly, from about 5% to 40%, but even 40% is not an acceptable 
survival rate. 
 
(4) Scenario 2: Boat Swarm Attack. In this scenario, we 
analyze the performance of the different LASERs against swarms of suicide boats. We 
assumed that missiles are irrelevant in this scenario since they would not be used against 
this type of target. In our analysis we varied the detection range, the number of attacking 
boats, the number of guns and the number of attacking targets.  Figure 64 and Figure 65 














Figure 65. Missile Swarm Attack Scenario Interaction Plot 
From the interaction between number of guns and number of 
targets (middle right plot), one gun can handle about 10 targets, and two guns can handle 
about 20 targets. From the middle interaction plot,  the only LASER that has any effect is 








Figure 66. LASER Type/Number of Guns Interaction (Boat Swarm Scenario) 
The detection range has no effect on the outcome in the scenario 
examined.  Figure 67 shows the interaction between the number of targets and the 
LASER type. MLD has a substantial (and significant) effect even when there are up to 50 







Figure 67. LASER Type/Number of Targets Interaction (Boat Swarm Scenario) 
f. Findings 
Based on our simulation analysis, none of the LASERs tested can replace 
the ship’s missiles systems or guns despite the optimistic assumptions. The MLD was 
found to be the most effective of the LASERs, and significantly better than the other 
LASERs tested. The rest of the LASERs tested were indistinguishable from not using 
LASERs in almost all the scenarios and situations tested. The additional value of using 
LASERs is rather small. None of the LASERs can replace the current systems. However, 
the MLD can offer some complementary abilities where the existing weapons are not 













A. SHIPBOARD INTEGRATION 
In order to move DEW prototypes (or any weapon system for that matter) from 
test demonstrations to actual deployment and integration onto naval surface ships, the 
impact of doing so must be considered. If a new weapon system meets all performance 
requirements but cannot be integrated onto the appropriate platform, then the weapon is 
useless. Considerations to Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) constraints, cooling 
requirements, combat systems integration, and weapon coverage are critical for the 
installation of any weapon system. While there are various Navy ship classes that may 
potentially support the integration of a DEW, “the DDG [destroyer] provided the best 
opportunity to match new capabilities with emerging needs with higher-energy LASER 
weapons capabilities and the class (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, 
and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013).”  As outlined in the 
project scope, only the DDG-51 will be addressed in this project. The purpose of the 
shipboard integration section is to determine the feasibility of fully integrating the four 
possible prototypes, LaWS, MLD, TLS, and ADS on an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer. 
1. LASER Weapons System (LaWS) Shipboard Considerations 
On April 8, 2013, the Navy announced that it would install a prototype solid state 
LASER called the LASER Weapon System (LaWS) on a ship stationed in the Persian 
Gulf in early 2014 to conduct continued evaluation of shipboard LASERs in an 
operational setting (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). The proposed LASER was a 100 
KW variant of the 33 kW prototype that was temporarily installed on the USS Dewey 
(DDG-105) (Marks 2013). It should be noted that LaWS will not be fully integrated into 
the combat systems suite or be permanently mounted for the maiden deployment but 





The LaWS prototype is at TRL 6 and incoherently combines light beams from six 
fiber SSLs—commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) welding LASERs. The light from the six 
LASERs is incoherently combined because the individual beams are not merged into a 
true single beam; and although the beams are quite close to one another, they remain 
separate and out of phase with each other, and are steered and focused by the beam 
director so that they converge into a single spot when they reach the intended target 
(O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2013). This reduces the complexity of the system and hence the 
associated costs. 
a. Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) Constraints 
The selected platform to initially deploy with the LaWS prototype is the 
USS PONCE. The USS PONCE is a LPD-4 hull that has been converted to an Afloat 
Forward Staging Base, Interim (AFSB-I). However, LaWS on PONCE is considered a 
temporary installation of a 100 kW self-contained LASER system that provides power 
and cooling independent of associated shipboard systems. The Navy believes that the 
LASER power levels likely to be available in the near term, within reasonable size and 
cost, are in the neighborhood of 100 kW of radiated power (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard 
LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 
2013). For this reason we decided to look at the feasibility of a permanent installation of 
a 100 kW version of the LaWS on a DDG-51 ship. It goes without saying that if the 100 
kW systems are determined to be feasible with respect to size, weight and power, then 
any lower power level variants including the current 33 kW system will also be feasible. 
(1) Size and Weight. The main components of the LaWS are 
the LASER head, the LASER generation, and power source. The following section 
assumes that a 100kW LASER is the target power level for the system.  Figure 68 shows 
that the current LaWS prototype requires enough space to fill an entire DDG-51 FLT IIA 
class flight deck. However, by integrating the system into the ship and utilizing the 





LASER remaining on deck. The LaWS uses COTS welding LASERs from IPG 
Photonics (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress 2013). The largest LASER unit YLS-10000 is a 10 
kW self-contained LASER unit each with dimensions of 4.6’x2.8’x2.65’ (Photonics 
2012). A total of 10 of these LASER units will be required for a 100 kW system resulting 
in a total volume of 341.32 cubic feet of shipboard space. 
 
 
Figure 68. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) prototype onboard USS DEWEY 
(DDG-105) (from news.com.au 2013) 
The current plan is to integrate the LASER optics with a CIWS 
mount. Utilizing an existing CIWS mount would alleviate the need for additional deck 
space by joining the DEW with an existing conventional weapons mount. The fire control 
interface module will most likely be installed in the ship’s Combat Information Center 
(CIC).  
The weight of the LaWS system excluding the power supply and 
cooling subsystems is approximately 10,000 pounds (Sprangle 2012). This weight can be 





employed on DDG-51 class ships. The estimated weight of the LASER head is 1100 lbs. 
with the remaining weight belonging to the 10 LASER units and associated equipment. 
As a result, an estimated 10,000 lbs. will be added to the ship. By utilizing a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet provided by NPS Professor Fotis Papoulias, we were able to calculate 
the impact of adding this weight with respect to draft and stability. We assumed that the 
metacentric height at a draft of 20’ was 5’, while the assumed center of gravity was at 
25’. Based on an estimate that all the weight would be placed on the ship’s centerline at 
59’ above the keel, the additional weight of the LaWS will result in an increase in draft 
of .103 inches and a decrease in the ship’s metacentric height of .0037, or .37%. Given 
the relatively small increase in total shipboard weight by the addition of the LaWS, it is 
unlikely that the ship’s stability will be significantly affected by the placement of the 
system. 
(2) Power. The current LaWS rely upon its own generator for 
power. A major factor in reducing the overall size of the LaWS is by eliminating this 
generator by supplying the ship’s electrical power to the system. LaWS is about 25% 
efficient, meaning that about 400 kW of ship’s power would be needed to operate a future 
version of LaWS producing 100 kW of LASER light. The remaining 300 kW of electrical 
energy would be converted into waste thermal energy (heat) that needs to be removed 
from the system using the ship’s cooling capacity (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs 
for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013).  
The current DDG-51 electrical plant consists of three Gas Turbine 
Generator Sets (GTGs) rated at 2500 kW each and supplies 450 VAC, three-phase, 60 Hz 
power throughout the ship. While the DDG-51 class peace time ship electrical load is 
typically less than the generator rating (currently 2500kW), the practice is to have a 
minimum of two GTGs on line at all times to ensure continuity of service should there be 
a system fault, or casualty to one of the GTGs (Mahoney, et al. 2010). This operation of 
at least two generators at all times essentially represents 2500 kW of unused power that 





increase of 8% to the current shipboard electrical power plant produced during dual 
generator operations. The current DDG-51 Flight IIA configuration can easily support 
this requirement for a single LaWS system during normal electrical plant lineup, but 
would most likely come to full power in the event the system was to be employed. 
b. Cooling 
The DDG-51 class combatant ship has four 200-ton A/C plants on board 
and is designed to supply 44°F chilled water throughout the chilled water system (Fang, 
et al. 2011). The DDG-51 FLT IIA’s are being outfitted with five of these plants and 
plans are in place to upgrade the five plants from 200-tons to 300-tons on the FLT III’s. 
Two of these plants are online and operating at any given time during normal operations 
to provide cooling to critical shipboard systems. Because the LaWS operates at 
approximately 25% efficiency, 300 kW of waste heat will need to be removed (so as not 
to interfere with the beam propagation). This translates to approximately 86 tons of 
cooling required for single system operation. The current cooling load requirement for a 
DDG-51 in FY13 is approximately 155 tons (Vandroff 2013). Based on the 86 tons of 
cooling required and an existing cooling system capable of handling 400 tons, the current 
DDG-51 is able to support at least one 100 kW LaWS. 
c. System Placement 
Due to the scarcity of topside real estate on modern ships, a major 
advantage of the LaWS is its ability to be integrated into the current CIWS mount. 
Through the combined use of this low-cost mount technology, warfighters can gain an 
increase in capability without having to sacrifice current capabilities. Therefore, when 
considering adding a single LaWS to the ship, decision makers have two choices; forward 






Figure 69. Proposed LASER Head Placement Locations (after Vandroff 2013) 
While the LASER head will be co-located on a CIWS mount, the 
remaining equipment must be installed below deck. The shipboard experience of many of 
the project team members assisted in determining possible locations for equipment. In the 
case of the aft CIWS mount, the LASER units will likely be stored directly below the 
CIWS in the aft CIWS equipment room. Additional space is available in the #2 and #3 
director equipment rooms located directly below the two aft fire control directors. 
Similarly in the case of a forward CIWS installation, the forward CIWS equipment room 
will house the LASER equipment. 
d. Combat Systems Considerations 
As previously mentioned, the current integration plan for the LaWS on the 
DDG-51 is for it to be integrated with the CIWS. This integration will allow the LaWS to 
be controlled via the same methods that currently control the CIWS. Figure 70 depicts an 









Figure 70. Rendering of LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Integrated on Close-In 
Weapon System (CIWS) Mount (from O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, 
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013) 
LaWS is designed to be a “plug and play” system that integrates into a 
ship’s existing targeting technologies and power grids (Martinez 2013). LaWS can be 
directed onto targets from the radar track obtained from a MK 15 CIWS or other 
targeting source (Lundquist 2013). These functions are accomplished using the 





The LaWS will be remote operated by a console operator located in the 
ship’s CIC. The optics that would be added for the LASER to detect and track targets in 
support of a LASER engagement would immediately contribute additional capabilities to 
the entire ship combat system even without operating the LASER (Staton and Pawlak 
2012). The additional sensitivity and angle resolution provided by the LaWS optics 
would allow the identification, precision tracking, and “monitoring” (at high resolution) 
of potential threats or vehicles of interest at substantially greater ranges than could be 
achieved by the PTI alone (Staton and Pawlak 2012). The CIWS radar, or another source, 
would have to provide an initial, accurate cue to facilitate initial acquisition, but once 
acquired, the target could be examined and monitored with high resolution at range 
(Staton and Pawlak 2012). 
e. Weapon Coverage 
The actual weapon coverage of the LaWS system is assumed to be very 
similar to that of the CIWS since they share the same mount and therefore the same block 







Figure 71. Close-In Weapon System (CIWS)/LASER Weapon System (LaWS) 
Weapons Coverage 
Table 31 contains the CIWS mount traverse and elevation limitations as 
well as the mechanical speed in which the mount moves to engage a target.  
 
Table 31. Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Mount Cut-outs (from Navweaps.com 
2010) 
Elevation -25 to +85 degrees 
Speed in Elevation 115 degrees per second 
Traverse -150 to +150 degrees 
Speed in Traverse 115 degrees per second 
 
As in any shipboard weapon system, the weapons coverage limitations can 
be overcome by a vessel at sea through maneuver, and consideration must be given while 
at anchor or in port if the LaWS will be considered for ship defense in an Anti-





2. Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) Shipboard Considerations 
The Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) coherently combines beams from 
multiple slab Solid State LASERs (SSLs) to create a 100kW high-power beam with good 
Beam Quality (BQ). The system comprises a tracking subsystem, a LASER subsystem to 
generate the LASER beam, a beam director with stabilizer through which the LASER is 




Figure 72. Schematic of Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) (from O'Rourke, 
Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues 
for Congress 2013) 
A brief summary of the technical specifications for MLD is given in Table 32. 
Table 32. Summary of Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) Technical 
Specifications (from O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013) 
Wavelength 1.064 microns 
Beam Quality (BQ) < 3 
Dimensions A 15kW slab SSL ~ 1 ft. x 2 ft. x 3.5 ft. 
Weight ~20 tons 
Power Requirements 400–500 kW 






Tests in a maritime environment were performed in April 2011 by the Office of 
Naval Research (ONR), together with the main contractor Northrop Grumman. The 
system was installed on the Navy’s Self Defense Test Ship, the ex-USS Paul F. Foster, 
and integrated with the ship’s radar and navigation system. The high-energy LASER 
demonstration successfully tracked and defeated multiple moving small boat targets at 
operationally significant ranges, proving the potential for solid-state LASER weapons to 
defend Navy ships from small boat threats. MLD was also proven to withstand the 
challenging maritime environment of rain and fog, with waves up to eight feet and winds 
up to 25 knots (Northrop Grumman 2012). 
a. Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) Constraints 
MLD is physically the largest of the four systems being considered for 
shipboard installation. The current MLD system is comprised of a tracking subsystem, a 
LASER subsystem to generate the LASER beam, a beam director with stabilizer through 
which the LASER is fired, and a fire control computer interface. MLD also includes a 
containerized unit that houses power and HVAC requirements for the system. In its 
current configuration, the entire MLD system is capable of being operated and 
transported by truck and trailer. The MLD requires more space, adds more weight, and 
requires slightly more power than the other three systems that were considered for 
addition to the DDG-51 platform. 
(1) Size and Weight. The size and space of the MLD 
standalone prototype can be reduced through shipboard integration. Reduced 
requirements can be achieved by eliminating the need for the containerized power 
generator and HVAC cooling system. The required ‘hotel services’ can be provided by 
the DDG-51 platform. Similar to the LaWS, the MLD concept is to combine smaller 
LASERs to achieve the desired output power. This “stacking” is done in 15 kW 
increments. Each 15 kW slab SSL is housed in a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) measuring 





roughly 4.5 feet by 8 feet by 12 feet might be required for a SSL with a total power of 
300 kW (O’Rourke, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background 
and Issues for Congress 2013). The fire control interface module will most likely be 
installed in CIC.  
The combined weight of the MLD system is estimated at 20 tons. 
Since the actual weight could not be obtained through open source references, the weight 
of the MLD was estimated based on the maximum cargo weight of international 
intermodal containers for transport on the U.S. highway system. This assumption was 
based on the fact that the MLD in its self-sufficient containerized configuration is capable 
of transport by a single truck and trailer and is most likely a high estimation 
(www.ocema.org 2013). It is assumed that this weight can be reduced by half by 
eliminating the Power/HVAC module and by utilizing the ship’s generators and AC 
plants to provide the power and cooling requirements for the MLD. As a result, an 
estimated 20,000 pounds will be added to the ship by the LASER mount and associated 
equipment. Again by utilizing the DDG-51 hydro spreadsheet, with the same assumptions 
as described earlier, and based on an estimate that all the weight would be placed on the 
ship’s centerline at 32’ above the keel, the additional weight of the MLD will result in an 
increase in draft of .1996 inches and a decrease in the ship’s metacentric height of .0018, 
or .18%. Given this relatively small increase in total shipboard weight by the addition of 
the MLD, the impact to the stability of the ship will be essentially zero. 
(2) Power. The selection of a large platform such as DDG-51 
provides the advantage of sufficient power to support the high power requirements of the 
MLD. The power efficiency of the MLD is currently between 20–25%, but may increase 
to 30% in future (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). If we assume the worst case of 20% 
efficiency, at least 520kW of power would be required to produce a 105 kW output beam.  
Similarly to the LaWS power requirements already discussed, 





that could be utilized by additional systems. The MLD system would represent a load 
increase of 10.5% to the current shipboard electrical power plant and would be able to 
easily support this requirement for a single MLD. Like with LaWS, current load shed 
procedures may need to be revised to account for the increase in shipboard power 
requirements in the event of a generator casualty. 
b. Cooling 
An important consideration for the MLD is the utilization of the ship’s 
cooling capacity through shipboard integration in order to minimize equipment damage 
caused by overheating. The MLD must dissipate any excess heat that is generated by the 
LASER. Based on the worst case with 20% efficiency, the total power needed to operate 
a 105 kW system is 525 kW and the resulting waste thermal energy generated would be 
approximately 420 kW. 
A FLT IIA Arleigh Burke class destroyer currently has five 200T Air 
Conditioning and Refrigeration (AC&R) units located in various engineering main 
spaces. Two of these units are online at any given time to provide the ship with cooling 
for equipment and personnel. The current shipboard load requirement for the Flight IIA 
DDG-51 is approximately 170 tons (Vandroff 2013). Approximately 120 tons of cooling 
would be required to remove the 420 kW of excess heat generated. Therefore, sufficient 
cooling for a 105 kW MLD system can easily be supported by the current DDG-51 
platform. 
c. System Placement 
There are several potential options when considering the installation of the 
MLD system. One installation option would be to remove either the forward or aft CIWS 
mount in order to facilitate the placement of the MLD and associated equipment. Another 
would be to keep both CIWS systems in place and add the LASER as a new addition to 
the ship. There are definitely some trade-offs to consider with either approach, but for the 





mount rather than replacing an existing CIWS mount with the intention of potentially 
increasing the overall capability of the ship.  
Figure 73 depicts the notional shipboard installation of the MLD beam 
director and stabilizer located on the ship’s centerline, aft of the current aft CIWS mount 
and Vertical Launch System (VLS). The elevated mount would provide additional 
storage space for the LASER subsystems as well as the cooling and power piping and 
wiring necessary for system installation. The fire control computer interface is likely to 
be co-located with other fire control system interfaces in CIC. 
 
 
Figure 73. Notional Shipboard Installation of Maritime LASER Demonstration 
(MLD) (from Northrop Grumman 2012) 
d. Combat Systems Considerations 
In addition to the ship’s power and cooling systems, the MLD will require 
several inputs from the ship’s Combat Systems suite to perform the target detection, 
identification, and tracking functions. Initial tracking of high speed, remotely operated 
and maneuverable small boat surface targets would be provided by the ship’s 
complement of existing radars, and then passively and actively tracked by the beam 
director cameras through varying environmental conditions up to sea state three 





and Issues for Congress 2013). The MLD would have to be integrated with the ship’s 
radar and navigation system to take in inputs from the system. 
Active engagement of the target would be controlled by fire controllers 
located in CIC. A fire control network would be required to enable the engagement. 
Additionally, high resolution images provided by the stabilized, optical pointing and 
tracking system yield an extremely effective, multi-mission capability for situational 
awareness and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions at long ranges 
(Northrop Grumman 2012). 
e. Weapon Coverage 
With the installation of the MLD directly above the ship’s helicopter 
hangars, the weapon system will have similar weapons coverage to that of the aft CIWS 
mount. Assuming that the beam director is fully rotatable around its base, the weapon 
coverage on each side would be at least 180°, providing weapon coverage for the aft 
portion of the ship (Figure 74). Weapon cut-outs based on the ship’s structure would need 







Figure 74. Potential Weapon Coverage of Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) 
3. Tactical LASER System (TLS) Shipboard Considerations 
BAE Systems and Boeing have partnered to develop a system known as 
the MK 38 Tactical LASER System (TLS) based around a 10kW industrial fiber LASER. 
This tactical LASER weapon is integrated as a side-car add-on to the MK 38 MOD 2 
Machine Gun System (MGS), retaining the full capability of the machine gun system and 
the single operator philosophy of the MK 38 weapon (Sohm, et al. 2012). The system 
shown in Figure 75 combines both kinetic and directed energy weapons on a single 
mount to offer the war fighter with additional options with minimal impact to the current 
shipboard configuration. The addition of the LASER weapon module will provide high-
precision accuracy against surface and air targets such as small boats and UAVs (Reed 
2011). To date, 182 MK 38 Mod 2s have been delivered to the USN and have been 





the TLS is that it only requires minor alterations to the current ship configuration to 
complete the upgrade and that when deployed in pairs on U.S. Navy vessels will provide 
nearly 360 degrees of coverage against smaller asymmetric threats. This section will 
consider the additional requirements in adding a Tactical LASER System to the current 
DDG-51 configuration only. 
 
 
Figure 75. Artist impression of Tactical LASER System (TLS) (from Naval Open 
Source Intelligence: BAE Systems Completes Successful Test of Mk 38 Tactical LASER 
System Concept 2011) 
a. Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) Constraints 
Another advantage of TLS over many other types of directed energy 
weapons is that it does not require much more additional space, weight, or power over the 
current conventional weapon being employed. As an upgrade to an existing weapon 
system, the TLS provides an improved capability without the typical trade-offs associated 





(1) Size and Weight . While big in capability, TLS is compact 
in size. The TLS adds a Beam Director (BD) on the side opposite of the MK38 Electro 
Optical System (EOS) and houses the 10kW fiber LASER, thermal, and power 
management systems, which in one packaging concept, is underneath the gun mount in 
an environmental enclosure. The system still maintains the same deck space as the 
original MK38 MOD 2 (Sohm, et al. 2012). The BD is shown on the right side of the 
25mm barrel in Figure 76. Also shown is the mount packaging concept in which all of the 
necessary equipment to operate the LASER is co-located directly under the weapon 
mount. The remote operating station for each system (port and starboard) will most likely 
be installed in the ship’s bridge.  
 
 
Figure 76. MK38 Tactical LASER System (TLS) under Mount Packaging Concept 







While the actual weight increase of the TLS upgrade to the MK 38 
MOD 2 system was unavailable through open source research, the system weight can be 
estimated based on its dimensions and components. By estimating the dimensions of the 
equipment package shown in Figure 76 to be approximately 2m x 2m x .5m, the total 
dimension is 2m
3
. If the assumption that 1m
3
 of equipment weighs approximately 100kg 
is acceptable, then the total weight of the TLS equipment is estimated to be 200 kg or 441 
lbs. (Ang 2012). The TOPLITE electro-optical fire control system that is part of the MK 
38 Mod 2 system weighs 59kg (130 lbs.) (www.rafael.co.il 2013). We estimate that the 
TLS optics based on its apparent size will weigh at least twice that of the MK 38 optics 
adding an addition 260 lbs. to the system. The actual weight of the current MK 38 Mod 2 
system is 2300 lbs. (BAE Systems 2011). The addition of the TLS will add an additional 
700 lbs. to the MK 38 Mod 2 resulting in an overall system weight of 3000 lbs. 
Therefore, it is a safe assumption that this increase in weight to an Arleigh Burke Class 
Destroyer will be inconsequential to the overall stability of the ship. 
(2) Power. The power requirement from the DDG-51 will 
consist of the combined power requirement for the MK 38 MOD 2 system and the TLS. 
Due to the unavailability of open source power requirement data for the MK 38 MOD 2 
MGS, the power required was estimated by using an analogous system. The system that 
most closely resembled the MK 38 was the MK 96 (an automated gun system on the PC-
1 CYCLONE class) which resulted in an estimate of approximately 0.81 kW per system 
in addition to the TLS requirements (IHS Jane's 2012).   
The TLS is about 30% efficient, meaning 34 kW of power is 
needed to operate the 10 kW LASER and the remaining 24 kW are converted into 
thermal energy that must be removed from the system (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard 
LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 
2013). Additionally, the TLS provides power distribution and cooling systems in the self-





approximately 75 kW to operate the LASER, power management, and currently 
installed/designed thermal management systems (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for 
Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013).  
Based on the estimates, the combined power required from the ship 
for one system is 75.81 kW (0.81 kW from MK 38 MOD 2 and 75kW from TLS). The 
total power required for two systems (port and starboard) would be 151.62kW. 
Comparing the required power against the ship’s generated power; both systems 
combined will only require 3% of the total power produced during normal operations. 
Therefore, sufficient power is available to support the integration of the TLS system on a 
DDG-51 platform. 
b. Cooling 
TLS currently utilizes its own cooling system and operates independent of 
any shipboard cooling systems. The Thermal Management System (TMS) provides the 
environmental conditioning to the power electronics and LASER components including 
the beam director and is completely packaged in the environmental enclosure (Sohm, et 
al. 2012). It is an advantage with respect to efficiency of the fiber LASER technology 
used in the TLS over other solid-state LASER technologies that allow for the reductions 
in thermal management system weight, volume, and power. Another benefit of this 
LASER source is that due to the construction of the LASER, the system can be directly 
cooled with a propylene glycol water mixture, thus special liquids such as de-ionized 
water and specific cold weather start up procedures are not required (Sohm, et al. 2012). 
Since the MK38 TLS is designed for minimal ship impact, the TMS requires only 
electrical power. Additional engineering would be required to configure the TLS to 
utilize the ships cooling systems, though this modification would result in an unnecessary 





c. System Placement 
The installation location of the TLS will be the same as the MK 38 MOD 
1 and MOD 2 installs. The arrow in Figure 77 shows the physical location of the 
starboard system on the O-3 level amidships. The second system is located in the same 
area on the port side of the ship. As discussed above, all the associated equipment will be 
installed in the environmental enclosure as part of the weapon system foundation 
resulting in a similar shipboard footprint as the current MK 38 MOD 2 system. Other 
packaging configurations are being investigated such as an environmental enclosure that 
is next to the MK38 MOD 2 mount and the possibility of installing the LASER 
components below deck (Sohm, et al. 2012).  
 
 
Figure 77. Location of Tactical LASER System (TLS) Installation (after Vandroff 
2013) 
d. Combat Systems Considerations 
The integration approach to the ship is to keep the MK38 TLS interface 
similar to that of the MK38 MOD 2, which currently requires a mechanical interface 





et al. 2012). The TLS will rely on its installed equipment and operator to complete the 
Detect-to-Engage sequence and will not be part of the AEGIS Combat System. Initial 
detection may originate from the ship’s information networks, radars, or visually through 
the shipboard Optical Sight System (OSS) or MGS Electro-Optical System (EOS), and 
relayed to the TLS operators. After initial detection, the MK 38 TLS operator will 
perform the sensing and pointing with the MGS Electro-Optical System to track and 
engage the target. This dedicated sensor package includes a day-use electro-optical 
magnified camera, forward-looking infrared camera and eye safe LASER rangefinder. 
These sights help to ensure nearly 360-degree coverage for surface contact identification, 
night vision and periscope detection. 
The TLS will be remote operated and the consoles will be located on the 
ship’s bridge. Each system will have its own console operator that fires the MGS, and 
controls and fires the LASER with the ability to shift between systems as the tactical 
situation dictates. Independent drives allow the TLS to make azimuth corrections faster 
and point beyond the elevation limits of the MGS (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs 
for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). The 
current intent is to let the MGS Electro-Optical Sight (EOS) hand over track to the TLS. 
Recent field testing demonstrated a capability to identify and classify hostile targets and 
provide rapid hand-off to Mobile Active Targeting Resource for Integrated Experiment 
(MATRIX) system for interdiction (Selinger 2011).  
The MK38 TLS is a fully integrated system that provides substantial 
capability enhancements to the current MK38 MOD 2 MGS. It has the capability to 
independently search, detect and track targets, assign targets to the TLS and the 25-mm 
gun, conduct live fire LASER weapon and gun engagements, and monitor weapon 
effectiveness against both air and surface targets (Sohm, et al. 2012). The BD module 
provides all of the optical, electro-optical, mechanical, and electrical components 
required to perform precision beam control for the complete High Energy LASER target 





the BD with respect to the MK38 traversing mass. The independent drives are required to 
inertially stabilize the BD to levels not achievable by the MK38. The BD includes Near 
Infrared (NIR) and Midwave Infrared (MWIR) tracking capabilities. (Sohm, et al. 2012) 
e. Weapon Coverage 
The TLS weapon coverage will be nearly the same as the existing MK 38 
MOD 2 system. Figure 78 depicts the approximate cut-outs for each system.  
 
Figure 78. Tactical LASER System (TLS) Weapon Coverage 
The placement of the TLS system provides coverage primarily to the ships 
beam and can train between +/- 15° to +/- 165° with an elevation range of -20° to +40° 
(www.seaforces.org 2013). However, each system can be unmasked to engage threats 





4. Active Denial System (ADS) Shipboard Considerations 
In order to maximize the coverage of the system when installed, the 
addition of two systems will be considered. One system will be installed on the port side 
of the ship while the other will be installed on the starboard. Both systems will be placed 
amidships. While alternative design concepts are currently being explored for the ADS 
with respect to improved cooling methods and transition to solid state, these concepts will 
not be addressed here as we are only concerned with the current system configuration for 
the purpose of the project. These improvements will only further facilitate the installation 
and integration of the system for a maritime application in the future. 
a. Size, Weight, and Power (SWaP) Constraints 
There are currently three system design configurations of the ADS, each 
varying in size, weight, and power. The first ADS configuration consisted of a conex 
shipping container housing the necessary components, with the antenna mounted on the 
roof. This system, known simply as System 0, allowed for proof of concept testing that 
led to the ADS Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)  (LeVine 2009). 
For demonstration and warfighter assessment purposes, the ADS ACTD first integrated 
the millimeter wave beam into a hybrid-electric version of the Highly Mobile Multi-
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), popularly known as a “Humvee”  (LeVine 2009). This 
specific ADS variant is known as System 1. System 2 is armored, environmentally 
sealed, and designed to operate between 0 and 125 degrees Fahrenheit. System 2 is a 
containerized design composed of two boxes that can be transported by, or operated 
from, a variety of tactical trucks. It is a modified version of this system that will be 
considered for shipboard integration due to it increased power and range. 
(1) Size and Weight. The ADS System 2 in its current 
configuration consists of two sealed conex boxes per system as shown in Figure 79. The 
four main system components are the power generation/storage/conditioning, thermal 





(Hambling, Pain Beam to Get Tougher, Smaller, More Powerful 2009). One box contains 
the components necessary to produce the directed energy beam. The second box is a self-
contained power generator unit and operator station  (LeVine 2009). Shipboard space 
must be identified for the remaining equipment and system components to facilitate 




Figure 79. Active Denial System (ADS) System 2 (from Miller, NATO NAVAL 
ARMAMENTS GROUP 2009) 
Each system will require separate components such as the 
transmitter and antenna. The transmitter produces the millimeter wave energy which 
when directed to an antenna will project the energy beam. The approximate size of the 
component conex box is 9’ x 4’ x 4’ which when dispersed and installed onboard the 
destroyer will require a minimum volume of 144 cubic feet of available space. The 
generator and operator box is approximately 8’ x 4’ x 4’ in dimension requiring 





ship’s power and the likely placement of the operator station in CIC, the 
generator/operator box may be eliminated.  
Each antenna (Figure 80) is 86 inches when measured diagonally 
and is made up of 25 separate subreflectors. The antenna receives the output from the 
gyrotron through a beam conditioner that is focused on the small subreflector plate 
located in front of the main antenna. The subreflector then broadens the beam to evenly 
illuminate the main antenna reflector array, which then sends the millimeter wave beam 
down range  (LeVine 2009).   
 
 
Figure 80. Active Denail System (ADS) Antenna (from Miller, NATO NAVAL 
ARMAMENTS GROUP 2009) 
When installing any new equipment or system onboard a naval 
vessel, considerations must be given to the amount of weight that is added and the effects 





system 2 is 20,000 lbs. (Robinson 2012). As discussed earlier, this weight can be reduced 
by nearly half and distributed by utilizing the ships generators to provide power and by 
moving the operator stations to CIC. It can also be assumed that the system weight can be 
reduced by using the current ships armor in place of the protective armor provided by the 
self-contained system package.  
Since we are considering the installation of two separate systems, 
the result is an increase in weight to the ship of approximately 20,000 lbs. to the aft 
superstructure on the ships centerline. Based on an estimate that all the weight would be 
placed on the ship’s centerline at 68’ above the keel, the additional weight of both ADSs 
will result in an increase in draft of .205 inches and a decrease in the ship’s metacentric 
height of .0113, or 1.13%. Due to the increased height of the ADS system, this results in 
the largest delta in the metacentric height. However, at a slightly greater than 1 percent 
increase, the impact of adding the ADS to a DDG-51 is minimal. 
(2) Power. The current ADS have a power output of 100 kW 
(Hambling, Pain Beam to Get Tougher, Smaller, More Powerful 2009). One of the major 
advantages of selecting the DDG-51 as a potential platform for the ADS is the ship’s 
ability to provide sufficient power to the system. As discussed previously, this aids in 
reducing the size and weight of the system while providing a reliable source of input 
power. The DDG-51 electrical plant consists of three Gas Turbine Generator Sets (GTGs) 
rated at 2500 kW each. While the DDG 51 Class peace time ship electrical load is 
typically less than the generator rating (currently 2500kW), the practice is to have a 
minimum of two GTGs on line at all times to ensure continuity of service should there be 
a system fault, or casualty to one of the GTGs (Mahoney, et al. 2010). The output power 
of the ADS is 100 kW and has an efficiency of approximately 50%. Therefore, each 
system requires 200 kW to operate which equates to approximately 8% of the total 
available power provided by the ship. Both ADS arrays will be capable of being 
energized and operated simultaneously under normal steaming conditions with little to no 





In addition to the alternating current provided by the ships 
electrical plant, the Active Denial System requires a separate high voltage direct current 
power supply. The system will utilize a lithium ion battery bank to supply dynamic direct 
current (DC) power to the energy transmitter. This uninterrupted power supply is 
required to energize the superconducting magnet in turn generating the 95 GHz radiation.  
Lithium-ion batteries with high energy densities provide 
significant benefits in weight, volume, and extended mission durations as well as provide 
excellent cycle and calendar life with a lower self-discharge rate (Banner and Winchester 
2011). There are however several legitimate hazards and concerns with the use and 
approval of lithium ion batteries for shipboard use. Among these are the release of 
thionyl chloride, bromine, chlorine dioxide, hydrochloric acid, sulfur dioxide and sulfuryl 
chloride gasses (Banner and Winchester 2011). Also, the electrolyte contained in lithium 
cells can cause severe irritation to the respiratory tract, eyes, and skin. Perhaps the 
greatest concern with lithium ion batteries is its propensity to start or further complicate a 
shipboard fire. This hazard is primarily caused by the batteries releasing internal pressure 
through venting, and through this process, flammable gasses are produced and could 
potentially ignite (Banner and Winchester 2011). Lithium will burn in a normal 
atmosphere and reacts explosively with water to form hydrogen. The presence of minute 
amounts of water may ignite the material and the hydrogen gas. Use of lithium cells will 
require specialized training and equipment for shipboard firefighters. These hazards can 
be mitigated to a manageable level of risk through the proper storage and care of the 
batteries in a dry, well-ventilated area onboard the ship.  
To assure that the risks associated with all lithium batteries fielded 
in Navy applications have been characterized and accepted appropriately, the Navy 
employs a structured and tailored lithium battery safety program (Banner and Winchester 
2011). This safety program requires the system to meet the concurrence requirements for 
specific platform carriage and use prior to shipboard integration which states: For any 





recharged on a surface ship, aircraft, or submarine; specific concurrence from the 
technical authority for the platform in question must be secured prior to the issuance of a 
lithium battery approval by the Naval Ordinance Safety and Security Activity (NOSSA) 
(Banner and Winchester 2011). In this case, the approval authority currently resides with 
Code N84 of the NOSSA, under the auspices of the Explosive Safety Office for Naval 
Systems (Banner and Winchester 2011).  
b. Cooling 
One of the major technical challenges of the Active Denial System is in 
the reduction of the considerable amount of heat that is generated by the system 
components. The source developed for ADS achieved record breaking levels of power 
conversion efficiency for this type of device, in excess of 50 percent, and at output power 
levels of approximately 100 kilowatts  (LeVine 2009). To reach this level of efficiency 
the system utilized a gyrotron which requires very high magnetic fields that are achieved 
by a superconducting magnet operating at approximately 4 degrees Kelvin  (LeVine 
2009). The process required to cool the superconducting magnet to 4 degrees Kelvin 
takes about 16 hours in its current configuration  (Fortin 2012). From an operational 
standpoint, the system will need to be energized to its standby state well in advance of 
any weapon employment requirement.  
In its self-contained form, the ADS requirement for supercooling is 
accomplished with a liquid helium cryocompressor. Liquid helium was chosen due to its 
lower boiling point of 4 Kelvin (-268.93 Celsius) when compared to liquid nitrogen 
which boils at 77.36 Kelvin (-195.8 Celsius) (Warner 2004). Due to this need for 
supercooling, the shipboard chill water and sea water cooling systems will most likely not 
be employed with the current configuration of the system to perform the thermal 
management function. In addition to the extensive use of liquid cooling loops, radiators 





Since the boiling point of helium is so low, special care must be taken to 
prevent injury when handling it in its liquid form. Because helium is a nonflammable gas, 
its inert characteristics allow it to be stored with flammable or oxidizing gases. However, 
since these nonflammable gases will not support respiration (a sufficient concentration in 
a closed space will cause asphyxiation), they must be stowed on the weather deck or in 
other well-ventilated spaces (Integrated Publishing 2013). 
c. System Placement 
In order to integrate the ADS onto a DDG-51 ship, it is first necessary to 
identify the potential location of its associated equipment.  Figure 81 below depicts the 
probable location of each ADS antenna on the aft superstructure. The port antenna is 
shown in the figure, and the starboard antenna would be located in the same position on 
the opposite side.   
 
 
Figure 81. Active Denial System (ADS) Antenna Placement (from Miller, NATO 





For the most part, the 20,000 lbs. of equipment described earlier will be 
located in the vicinity of the antennas in the ships director equipment rooms just aft of the 
antennas. The red boxes in Figure 82 highlight the #2 and #3 director equipment rooms. 
These areas will also house the liquid helium cooling systems associated with each 
system. A plan prior to installation to cross-connect the two systems will provide some 
redundancy and flexibility and improve the overall system performance. Also included 
with the ADS equipment in one equipment room will be the lithium ion battery bank 
which will require the installation of proper ventilation.   
 
 
Figure 82. DDG-51 Director Equipment Rooms (from Miller, NATO NAVAL 
ARMAMENTS GROUP 2009) 
Finally, the operator systems for each ADS will be located in CIC. Two 
separate consoles will be required to provide the shipboard operators with the ability to 





d. Combat Systems Considerations 
An important consideration for the installation of the ADS is how it will 
integrate with the current shipboard Combat Systems. The system will rely on the current 
shipboard methods of detection although the ADS will not be directly integrated into the 
shipboard combat systems. Targets will be detected via the ships information networks, 
radars, or visually through its optical sight system (OSS) and relayed to the ADS 
operators. The operators who will be located in the ships CIC can then take manual 
control of each antenna system to conduct the tracking and engagement. Each ADS 
system will require its own operating console (Figure 83) which provides the operator 
with a joystick to control the antenna movement and employment of the weapon, as well 
as a video display to view the antenna camera to track and engage the potential threat. A 
LASER range finder has also been installed in the antenna to provide operators with the 
target range in order determine the required amount of power.  
 
 
Figure 83. Active Denial System (ADS) Operator Console (from Defense Update 
2007) 
A trained operator will interface with the system from the console by 
utilizing the optics system that is installed in the center of each antenna. The optics 





This optical system allows the system operator to aim and fire the system using the 
joystick while seeing exactly where the energy is directed as well as observing the 
reaction of the target on a display panel.  Figure 84 shows the operator display/control 
panel. The display/control panel is a touch screen that enables the operator to select the 
system’s output power and firing time based on the distance to the target. The ADS 
LASER rangefinder will assist the operator in the determination of these settings prior to 
engagement to prevent the accidental overexposure of this non-lethal system. The control 
pane allows the operator to select four power levels, from 25 to 100 percent, and six 
different time settings (Penn State 2008). 
 
Figure 84. Active Denial System (ADS) System 1 Operator Display (from Reilly 
2012) 
It is essential to have a stable beam directed at the target. Given the nature 
of the sea environment, the ADS would be subjected to the ship’s motion, which would 
affect the ability of the HPM to sustain the energy on a single spot. A stabilization 





installed to mitigate the effect of the ship’s motion, and to prevent the need for operators 
to make gross corrections while maintaining target tracking and engagements. 
e. Weapon Coverage 
The addition of two Active Denial Systems to the ship provides a 
significant standoff capability bridging the gap between shout and shoot while providing 
nearly 360 degrees of coverage. The ADS weapon coverage area is shown below in 
Figure 85. The areas at the ship’s bow and stern are masked by the ship’s superstructure. 
Like other systems onboard the ship this can be overcome by a vessel at sea through 
maneuver. Consideration must also be given to a ship at anchor or in port to effectively 
employ the weapon while understanding the potential limitations of weapons coverage. 
 
 






As the Navy proceeds with the procurement and installation of LASER weapons 
and high powered microwaves, the Navy will be faced with many integration challenges 
to its existing platforms. Competition among DEW and future combat systems additions 
with respect to topside real estate, weight, power, and cooling will have a major effect on 
which systems decision makers choose to further pursue. Table 33 below contains a 
summary of the shipboard integration section. Due to the likelihood that the TLS and 
ADS will be installed as pairs, the combined values are shown in the table for a dual 
system installation.  
Table 33. Shipboard Integration Summary 
   (2)TLS LaWS MLD (2) ADS 







Input Power 151.62 kW 400 kW 520 kW 400 kW 
Cooling 
Self-





Coverage Nearly 360° 180° 180° 
Nearly 
360° 
Combat Systems No Yes No Yes 
 
The MLD is by far the largest of the four systems with respect to weight and size. 
At an estimated 20,000 lbs., it is nearly as heavy as the two unit active denial system. 
While the LaWS will add an additional 10,000 lbs. to the ship, the addition of the TLS as 
an upgrade to each MK 38 GWS will have essentially zero impact on the overall stability 
of the ship. Both the LaWS and the TLS are installations to existing shipboard weapon 
systems and therefore require limited additional deck space. Conversely, the MLD and 
the ADS will be standalone systems that can take up potentially significant deck space.  
The MLD, LaWS, and ADS each require approximately 400 kW to 500 kW of 





will only require approximately 150 kW. The cooling requirements for the ADS and the 
TLS are part of their self-contained systems and are operated by the ships electrical 
system. The MLD and LaWS will require 120T and 86T of cooling respectively that is 
provided by the ship’s chill water system.  
The TLS and ADS by nature of their dual installations will provide the ship with 
nearly 360 degrees of coverage while the single MLD and LaWS systems installed either 
forward or aft will provide approximately 180 degrees of coverage. Both the MLD and 
LaWS will require inputs from the ship’s combat systems, thus increasing the complexity 
of the installation, while the ADS and TLS will be installed as standalone systems.  
The current DDG-51 platform can support each of the four systems with respect 
to SWaP constraints, cooling requirements, and combat systems integration. However, 
from a purely shipboard integration perspective, the TLS appears to be the best option as 
it minimizes the total impact to the ship. Additionally, although the current AEGIS 
destroyer can support a 100 kW LASER, a quick analysis of the current capability 
showed that as the power levels of these LASERs are increased in the future, the DDG-51 
platform must also be upgraded to account for the additional power and cooling 
requirements. 
B. SUSTAINMENT 
Sustainment is “the supportability of fielded systems and their subsequent life 
cycle product support - from initial procurement to supply chain management (including 
maintenance) to reutilization and disposal” (Defense Acquisition University 2003). That 
is, sustainment is supporting an operational system throughout the time it is being used 
until its ultimate disposal. Sustainment involves the materials (parts and units of the 
system), the management of these materials to include procurement and distribution, 






The sustainment graph (Figure 86) was taken from an interview with Dr. Gary 
Langford, a professor and recognized subject matter expert of directed energy 
technologies (Langford, Sustainment 2013). It depicts the time to have useable output 
energy as it relates to the integration of the DEW systems. As time progresses, the 
systems may take considerably less and less time to produce the desired output beam. At 
the initial stage, the systems will take some considerable amount of time prior to being 
ready to fire. Experts are on site overseeing the startup. At the integrated stage, the 
system is activated and formulating acceptable beams faster than at the initial stage as it 
begins to be incorporated on the ship. The optimized stage represents when the systems 
are going through the final stages of integration and are performing at a level conducive 
to operational requirements in a military environment (able to come “online” within 
seconds of activation).  
 
 





Curves of the initial phase indicate that throughout this period there may be some 
moments of significant progress in decreasing beam availability time along with some 
setbacks. Near the end of the initial phase the integration portion will commence. 
Throughout the integration phase a steady decline in beam availability time may occur as 
a result of the systems becoming more and more incorporated onto the platform. 
Moreover, there may be some overlap between the integrated phase and optimized phase. 
The optimized phase indicate that at some point there will be consistency in the amount 
of time to get the beam on; however, this steady rate may drop as the technology matures. 
2. Methodology and Approach 
The basis and intent of sustainment is to do what it takes to keep systems 
operational throughout their life cycles (Defense Acquisition University 2003). The 
scheduling of routine preventative maintenance activities to keep systems available for 
use, assessing systems to ensure proper operation, reviewing operational logs for 
indications of system wide issues, and satisfying supportability requirements of the 
system from its inception to ultimate disposal all are life cycle issues (Defense 
Acquisition University 2003).   These steps are based on an approach to sustainment that 
is centered on addressing issues relevant to maintaining the continuous operation of 
systems. 
Our approach to sustainment involves addressing the decision making 
considerations for materials, safety, supply chain management, operational unit support, 
and disposal of the systems. Materials involve developing supply requirements, storing 
components needed for repair and replacement, and providing personnel for warehouse 
functions. Safety concerns are those considerations that ensure equipment is operated 
properly while avoiding harm to personnel. Supply chain management includes the 
procurement and distribution of materials and services (Defense Acquisition University 
2012). Operational unit support is providing a Point of Contact (POC) for supply support 





ensure continued operation of a system (depot level support). Disposal involves the 
decision calculus of when, where, and how to get rid of or convert the system (Defense 
Acquisition University 2012). 
3. Materials 
Due to the lack of required specific open source data on LaWS, TLS, and MLD, 
addressing specific concerns of each DEW system and more importantly, differentiating 
between the systems is impossible. Therefore, all three will be grouped for the 
sustainment analysis. 
a. Solid State LASER (SSL) 
The number of SSL systems acquired will be based on the number of 
DDGs available in addition to the budget. In the case of the TLS, the number of MK 38 
Mod 2 mounts that will be upgraded will be dependent on the number of DDG platforms 
identified to receive the system. In addition, installation will occur during each ship’s 
preplanned availability period. Major components of SSL systems include the medium, 
optical equipment, flash pumps or diodes, and amplifiers. Considerations of components 
operating in a marine environment have to be made. For example, in order to function 
properly, optical equipment has to be extremely clean. Contaminants on optical 
equipment could absorb LASER energy, resulting in damage to the optical coating or the 
optical material. Maintaining clean optical equipment could pose a challenge at sea where 
the system may be exposed to saltwater, particulate laden aerosols (smoke), and high 
humidity. This requirement for the operational equipment requires those handling the 
optical equipment to wear gloves and clean the lens with a dedicated set of rags (e.g., 
microfiber), brushes (e.g., camel hair), and solutions. This requirement also includes 
having equipment available to handle extremely large optics. It should be noted that this 
reliance on large optics is not the case for the fiber SSLs since they use fiber optics. 
Although the MLD is more complex (MLD is a slab LASER as opposed to LaWS which 





units (LRUs) (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). These LRUs can be stored onboard 
ship as ready spares, allowing personnel to replace faulty equipment instead of requiring 
depot level maintenance. Furthermore, coverings will have to be provided to protect the 
system from exposure to the elements when not in use. Coverings can be in the form of 
an enclosed shell that shields the system or thick drapes to protect hardware and exposed 
wiring. Stabilizers must be in place to keep the system steady in the dynamic maritime 
environment which causes the ship to be in continuous motion. Mechanical components 
of the systems must be periodically lubricated. For this reason, the specific oil or grease 
must be stocked and available for routine and corrective maintenance. 
b. Active Denial System (ADS) 
The number of ADS units to be procured for future installation will be 
determined by the number of available platforms and naturally budgetary constraints. 
Installation will occur during a ship’s preplanned maintenance period. In addition to 
installed units, there will also have to be parts support. The ADS is composed of a variety 
of electrical and mechanical components which require considerations to be made when 
placing them on naval vessels. Naval vessels tend to have higher maneuver capabilities 
and differing operational profiles than typical commercial vessels (Kuseian 2013). For 
this reason, structures will have to be in place to provide stabilization for the system 
while the ship is the dynamic environment of the sea. Furthermore, lubricants and seals 
will have to be used in order to guard against the ill effects of metal being in humid 
surroundings.   Moreover, the system having as many line replaceable units as possible 
may assist in repair due to the modularity; however, there are some key components 
which may require off ship storage. These components are mainly used for power 
generation and wave production. Key components for power generation include a hybrid 
electric plant composed of batteries and a diesel generator  (LeVine 2009).   Upon 
shipboard integration, ADS will operate using the ship’s power grid. Gyrotons, a vacuum 





wave production and must have on-hand replacements depending on the failure rate  
(LeVine 2009).   
The operational success of a DEW depends on availability. Having test 
equipment to determine which part failed (or is failing) and parts onboard for repair and 
replacement is vital. However, some components require high levels of expertise, are 
extremely sensitive, or large in size discouraging storage onboard a ship.   Examples of 
these types of components include a liquid helium cryocompressor used for cooling the 
superconducting magnet and the antenna which focuses the beam  (LeVine 2009). Parts 
such as these will have to be housed at depot level facilities. Minor components such as 
the batteries will require onboard storage. Extra materials may be needed such as 
coverings for the system which will be stored onboard the ship. These coverings are 
necessary to protect the system from the harsh maritime environment considering the 
ADS was developed in conjunction with the Army. 
4. Safety 
Markings and signs around the location of the system will be required to alert 
personnel of the possible dangers inherent to DEWs. Visual and audible alarms will be 
required to indicate when the systems have been activated (as is common with current 
weapon and electronic systems). These signs and alarms are necessary to inform 
personnel of possible exposure to harmful beams and the necessary protective measures 
required in the area. Personal protective gear will be provided to protect operators of the 
system from exposure to eyes and skin. Eyewear will be appropriate for wavelength and 
optical density for the system in use. Moreover, warning labels on systems will be 
necessary to alert personnel of potential dangers. For example, connected optical fiber 
systems are enclosed; however, if they are disconnected then there’s a possibility of 
harmful exposure (University of Maryland 2012). Kill switches will be in place to 
disengage the system in an emergency situation. Flat and polished surfaces can act as 





materials around the system will prevent unwanted exposures to the beams. Safety 
training and training manuals must be provided to system operators. The training and 
manuals will outline procedures conducive to proper operation and avoidance of injury to 
personnel. Supplies for signs, warning labels, and protective gear will be based upon 
number of units and manning requirements. 
5. Supply Chain Management 
Supply chain management involves the “cross-functional approach to procuring, 
producing, and delivering products and services to customers” (Defense Acquisition 
University 2012). Navy Supply Systems Command Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP 
WSS) is responsible for providing weapons support to Naval Forces (Naval Supply 
Services Command 2011). Procuring parts necessary for repair or replacement will be 
handled through current ship requisition computer programs. Moreover, a ship’s need for 
extensive repairs will be made known through casualty reporting (CASREP) procedures 
that indicate the type of damage and any technical information needed to conduct repairs. 
Personnel performing preventative and corrective maintenance requirements must have 
specialized training of the system. Logistical considerations for parts, software upgrades, 
and technical support will have to involve a mixture of forecast and agility. This forecast 
will ensure that there are economic quantities of resources (e.g., parts and fuel) available 
based upon anticipation of customer needs (e.g., scheduled underway replenishments and 
maintenance periods) along with rapid responses to operational crises (e.g., emergency 
repairs) and available upgrades to software. 
6. Operational Unit Support 
Operational unit support involves providing shipboard personnel with a point of 
contact to resolve any type of supportability issues. Operational requirements may 
prevent ships from travelling to a depot level facility whenever a problem arises. For this 
reason, there has to be a mechanism in place to address issues without jeopardizing the 





order to troubleshooting and repair these DEW systems. Call centers will be composed of 
technical experts with an in-depth knowledge of the repair, maintenance, and operation of 
the systems. There may be situations that phone consultations cannot rectify. At this 
point, technicians may be required to travel directly to the ship for further investigation. 
This travel can be accomplished through scheduled underway replenishments or private 
means funded by the company as outlined in the contract. 
7. Sustaining Engineering 
Sustaining engineering is “those technical tasks (engineering and 
logistics investigations and analyses) to ensure continued operation and maintenance of a 
system with managed (i.e., known) risk” (Defense Acquisition University 2012). Due to 
the high technical aspect of the equipment in the system along with storage restrictions 
onboard ships, major repairs will be conducted at depot facilities. Depot level support 
involves the repairing, testing, analyzing, and upgrading (to include software) of 
equipment at highly sophisticated shop facilities. Depot support entails providing 
personnel of high technical expertise for not only repairs but also for consultation in 
regards to maintenance (Defense Acquisition University 2011).   
Part of ensuring that a system continues to operate involves having performance 
standards and analysis for continued use in place. These standards will be used to indicate 
whether or not there are fleet wide system faults causing discontinued use of the units. 
This situation is similar to how fighter jets are grounded when there are problems like 
cracks in engine components.   These performance standards will be evaluated not only at 
depot facilities but also during routine ship inspections from outside personnel like the 
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV), a group of recognized experts under the 
direction of the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
to periodically examine vessels to determine fitness for further service (Board of 
Inspection and Survey 2011). Part of the examination process would be periodic firings 





not the output beams are hitting the desired targets. For example, possible mechanisms 
include positioning a sensor on the target to detect the firings of the testing LASER. In 
addition, built in test equipment (BITE) can assist in determining the proper firing and 
operation of the system. 
8. Disposal 
Disposal involves removing the system from operational service at the end of its 
lifespan. Getting rid of the system may involve transferring, redistributing, selling, or 
complete destruction of system materials (Defense Acquisition University 2012). 
Considerations have to be made involving the impact to the environment, storage or 
destruction of materials, and redistribution of any salvageable items. Options for disposal 
include donating systems to other organizations such as educational institutes (e.g., NPS), 
reselling materials back to the manufacturer, disabling the systems electrically, 
preventing reactivation, or completely destroying the systems through alterations of 
design (University of Iowa 2013). In all cases, legal and regulatory requirements must be 
adhered to as outlined by the DoD. Plans will have to include salvaging of exotic metals 
and removal of hazardous materials. Timing of disposal is a major consideration and will 
have to be done in a manner conducive to the operational requirements of the ship. 
Disposal schedules will inform operators of when and where to get rid of systems and 
what may have to be done prior in preparation for disposal. Disposal will involve close 
interaction with naval shipyards which traditionally handle disposal (Naval Sea Systems 
Command 2009). In addition, plans will include measures that have to be taken in cases 
where there is a replacement system that will be installed. 
C. TRAINING AND MANNING 
In a dynamic global environment where threats to national interests fall along the 
full spectrum of warfare, military forces must be properly organized, equipped, and 
trained to employ the most technologically advanced equipment, tactics, and procedures 





to ensure that troops are properly organized, trained and equipped, and that available 
systems provide the required capabilities and effects on the battlefield (Lincoln 2004). To 
ensure readiness and efficiency in threat engagements, operators must be well versed in 
the deployed systems, tactics and procedures to facilitate time and cost effectiveness 
during operation. Readiness and efficiency can be achieved through proper manning and 
training of personnel operating the system. 
1. Manning 
The establishment of adequate manning for a system is of critical importance, but 
there is also a need to consider the tradeoffs. Vice Admiral William Burke, Deputy Chief 
of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems said that the Navy is looking for ways to 
reduce crew size by using labor-saving technology, but he said that it is necessary to look 
at the trade-offs. In his statement, he mentioned “I’m not for taking existing ships and 
looking to take people off” (Burgess 2013), commenting on “optimal manning” 
initiatives over the last decade to reduce crew size on some ships, something he said the 
fleet sardonically called “suboptimal manning” (Burgess 2013). The point to note here is 
to maximize the throughput with lean manning, but yet maintain the performance 
required for the mission. Alternative approaches like looking at automation of process 
and capitalizing on proficiency of individual skills may compensate for the decrease in 
labor size. 
With respect to crew manning requirements and operations, smart systems to 
control and monitor energy consumption, as well as the health of critical systems, can 
support both manning and resource conservation. Effective training and reliable man-to-
machine interfaces will allow for more effective use of platform resources and potentially 







Readiness and efficiency are directly impacted by the established training plan. 
The importance of an effective training program brings about personnel development as 
well as operator’s proficiency in systems which are vital in time critical mission (Expert 
2010). The impacts of an effective training program can be seen as follows. 
Training helps in optimizing the utilization of human resources that further help to 
align individuals in achieving the organizational goals as well as their individual goals 
and provides an opportunity and broad structure for the development of human resources 
technical and behavioral skills in an organization. Technical competence is vital during 
operations when the operator’s proficiency in systems play an important role in time 
critical missions, increased system knowledge will also determine the level of safety and 
maintenance during operation.  
Training helps in improving upon the quality of work and improves the safety of 
the organization thus preventing a standstill in organization strength at a low level of 
proficiency.  An effective training program demonstrates a commitment to keeping 
individuals on the cutting edge of knowledge and practice. (Hub 2012). 
Notwithstanding the common importance of training described above, it should be 
noted that relevance in training pertaining to application is equally important to ensure 
that whatever the operators are trained in, it is logical and applicable. For example, 
personnel need to be educated specifically concerning the weapon system they support 
and generally about DE technical concepts such as generation, attenuation, and 
propagation. Understanding how the atmosphere affects DEW platforms is necessary for 
those who support DEW systems and operators to maximize employment (Narcisse 
2007). Concepts such as temperature, pressure, and other considerations such as optical 
turbulence affecting range employed are areas where operators should be trained to 
ensure that they are proficient when using such a high end system. Having discussed the 





the life cycle costs of a system. Consideration should be taken early in the capabilities 
development process beginning with the analyses that support development of the Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD). The ICD can facilitate and ensure that projected training 
requirements and associated costs are appropriately addressed across the program life 
cycle. 
3. Life cycle Costs of Training and Manning for a System 
To ensure naval forces continue to maintain global dominance, future platforms 
and combat systems must be affordable to acquire, operate and maintain over their entire 
life cycle. This affordability can be achieved with the reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
(TOC) by developing and aiding the insertion of technology to reduce platform 
acquisition cost, reduce life cycle and sustainment costs, and achieve crew manning 
requirements. Total Ownership Cost includes all costs associated with the research, 
development, procurement, operation, training and disposal of platforms. 
Training is one of the elements that have a very high return on investment
 (Defense 
Acquisition University 2011)
. Training is often considered a cost to the program and requires the 
trainees to be absent from their daily duties for a period of time. This investment in skills 
improvement is a long term investment - often short term needs preclude the training 
(Defense Acquisition University 2011).
 
Specific examples of the return on investment by integrating training include:  
 
 Many maintenance failures are due to operational error, a good operator 
training program will reduce equipment failure, reduce accidents, and 
allow for higher system availability at reduced cost (cost avoidance in this 
case) (Defense Acquisition University 2011). 
 The skill level of the maintainer is critical to a quick and effective repair 
process (Defense Acquisition University 2011). 
 Item managers and procurement specialists need to be trained on the 
automated supply systems (often part of an enterprise resource program) 
in order to correctly enter information, understand reports, and be able to 





the system can result in significant spare part shortages, incorrect items 
ordered, or mismanagement of the supply base (Defense Acquisition 
University 2011). 
 Design engineers should be trained on product support approaches and 
how system design influences (both positively and negatively) the 
availability, reliability and ownership cost of the weapon system (Defense 
Acquisition University 2011). 
Training costs impact the O&S cost in the overall TOC. If training is not 
realistically planned and accounted for in the early phase, it may incur an increase cost 
for the program and not achieve its objectives. 
4. Projected Training and Manning Requirements for a Directed Energy 
Weapon (DEW) System 
In the following sections, the project training and manning requirements for the 
respective DEW systems will be discussed. Notwithstanding, there is limited information 
on the requirements for some of the DEW systems. 
a. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) 
 The LASER is designed to integrate with the Navy’s existing 
shipboard Combat Systems, where a single operator can control the system. The operator 
will require specialized training, similar to the instruction that Navy crews receive for the 
MK 15 Phalanx Close-in Weapon System or the MK 45 lightweight gun. With this 
training, the Sailors will be able to maintain the LASER at an organizational level (Jean 
2010).
 
b. Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) 
The MLD is a solid state, directed energy system previously installed and 
tested on a decommissioned Spruance class destroyer. MLD is also the first LASER 
system to be integrated with a ship’s radar and navigation system. Given the maturity of 
LASER systems, it will not be long for the LASER to operate synergistically with kinetic 





number of operators required to man the system could just be the same as those already 
operating the current kinetic energy weapon systems. 
c. Tactical LASER System (TLS) 
TLS is paired with the MK 38 Mod 2 Machine Gun System (MGS), 
sharing the initial sensing and pointing systems operator control console. As such, the 
same operator that remotely controls and fires the MGS, also controls and fires the 
LASER with the ability to shift between systems as the tactical situation dictates (Merida 
2012). 
Due to this operational concept, similar to the LaWS and MLD, the 
operator manning the gun system (installed with the LASER system) will only be 
required to complete the specialized weapon training as part of their Navy training term 
during the Gun System Operation Training (applicable to LaWS, MLD, and TLS). 
d. Active Denial System (ADS) 
Based on the land based deployment of ADS, the estimated number of 
crews required is between 3–4 personnel  (LeVine 2009). The required crew for a land 
system can be used as an estimation for crew personnel operating the ADS mounted on 
the naval vessel. Currently, two units of ADS will be mounted onboard the Navy vessels 
(DDG-51 Destroyers) and could possibly require around two operators (Miller, NATO 
NAVAL ARMAMENTS GROUP 2009). 
5. Conclusion 
To date, the training and manning requirements for the DEW systems researched 
suggest that they do not require the commitment of significant additional manpower 
resources. The development of DEW systems thus far showed that the DEW are intended 
to integrate with main gun system installation onboard the existing Navy ships. As such, 
the manning of the DEW systems is concurrent with the existing weapon systems.  Table 

















Similar to MK 15 
Phalanx 
Similar to the MK 15 Phalanx 
close-in weapon system or  
MK 45 lightweight gun 
1–2 operators 
The laser is designed to tie 
into the Navy’s existing 
shipboard combat system 
TLS 
Based on LaWS training requirement, it is assumed 
that the same format of training will take place for 
TLS, MLD and ADS. 
1–2 operators 
The laser system is paired 




Operates in tandem with 
kinetic energy weapons 
ADS 3–4 operators Shipboard ADS 
 
With the LASER system installed as part of the main gun system/vehicular 
platforms, there is no requirement for the operator to go through LASER system training. 
Depending on the deployment of the LASER system, the training for the system and 
personnel may vary. 
D. COST ESTIMATION 
The bottom line truth with respect to cost estimation of future DE projects is that 
there are a lot of unknowns, perhaps more so than any other acquisition project in 
existence today. Despite that directed energy projects have been around for decades, the 
associated technologies are still in their infancy in terms of practical application, as well 
as acceptance by military leadership. As a result, it is not known with any degree of 
certainty which systems the Navy will ultimately attempt to acquire, what quantity will 
be purchased, or even what specific surface ship platforms the systems will be integrated 
with. 
Although the Navy is developing LASER technologies and prototypes of 
potential shipboard LASERs, and has a generalized vision for shipboard 
LASERs, the Navy currently does not have a program of record for 
procuring a production version of a shipboard LASER, or a roadmap that 





(O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013) 
This type of situation makes the job of a cost estimator extremely difficult due to 
the abnormally high degree of uncertainty associated with any potential calculation 
attempt. The best alternative option is to begin by creating a set of assumptions about 
prospective systems based on current U.S. Navy trends. It is necessary to recognize that 
all assumptions must not only be consistent with, but more importantly physically 
possible given the stringent constraints imposed by the SEA-19B Capstone Project 
guidance. Several of the perceived trends are outlined below: 
The Navy and DoD have conducted development work on three principal 
types of LASERs for potential use on Navy surface ships—fiber solid 
state LASERs (SSLs), slab SSLs, and free electron LASERs (FELs). One 
fiber SSL prototype demonstrator developed by the Navy was the LASER 
Weapon System (LaWS); another Navy fiber SSL effort is called the 
Tactical LASER System (TLS). Among DoD’s multiple efforts to develop 
slab SSLs for military use was the Maritime LASER Demonstration 
(MLD), a prototype LASER weapon developed as a rapid demonstration 
project. (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile 
Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013) 
This guidance was utilized as the basis for the project’s directed energy 
technology cost estimating methodology. All estimates are calculated by analogy. 
1. External Source Data 
 Electronics Standard Factors Handbook (Schmit and Hicks 1999). 
This document consist of the statistical analysis on the historical data of 
Government support costs obtained from previous Navy budgets, which 
will aid us in the determination of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
in deriving the cost estimation. 
 Joint Inflation Calculator (Naval Center for Cost Analysis 2013). This 
document generates inflation rates and indices for Navy and Marine Corps 







The first, and arguably most difficult, task was to determine the details of the cost 
estimate. What “exactly” were we tasked with costing?  The group’s initial hunch was to 
attempt to derive a total life cycle cost; however, due to the high degree of uncertainty 
associated with this type of technology the idea was dismissed. An estimated total life 
cycle cost would offer little value to the Navy given the large number of assumptions it 
would inevitably have to be based upon. Instead, the objective became to determine and 
estimate the integration, as well as implementation, cost of select directed energy 
technologies deemed relevant by the Navy, and suitable for shipboard use by our project 
group. The selected objective is based on several assumptions outlined in a subsequent 
section of the report.  
Although directed energy technologies share many similarities, they are also quite 
different in terms of the specific components required to make them function. Since 
component, research and development (R&D), test and evaluation (T&E), and shipboard 
integration cost can vary significantly from project to project (even in projects that appear 
similar in premise), it was determined that individual custom tailored cost estimates for 
each of the selected technologies would be preferential to a single gross DEW estimate. 
A cost estimate was done for each of the four systems considered for shipboard 
integration, MLD, LaWS, TLS, and ADS. Cost estimate scenarios (vignettes) were 






Table 35. Cost Estimate Scenarios 







Yes Minimal To derive the cost estimate of 
deploying two units of Active 
Denial System (ADS) onboard a 




No Power scaling 
upgrade; T&E 
To determine and estimate the 
upgrade and shipboard installation 
cost of the LASER Weapon 
System (LaWS) from its current 





Yes Power scaling 
upgrade, BQ 
upgrade, T&E 
To derive the cost estimate of 
integration and installation of the 
Maritime LASER Demonstration 




Minimal Minimal To determine the estimated single 
unit cost of installing and 
deploying the Tactical LASER 
System (TLS) on DDG-51 class 
ships. 
 
Since much of the financial data for these scenarios is proprietary, and therefore 
not accessible to the project group, the next step was to obtain some type of baseline 
costs from trusted published references.  Table 36 depicts both the actual figures and data 










Active Denial System 
(ADS) 
$7.5M  Cost plus award fee contract to 




$17M  Per mount cost with CIWS 
integration once upgraded; 





$98M  Indefinite delivery/indefinite 








In order to facilitate organization, the project cost estimate work scope was 
decomposed into smaller discrete components, meaning that all required WBS sub-
elements were identified. The items on the WBS generally consisted of the following: 
design, hardware, contractor support, government support, software and integration.They 
were derived using an Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD) table 
applicable to surface ships from a document of Standard Factors (Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis 1999).”DoD policies require that a WBS be established to provide a framework 
for program and technical planning, cost estimating, resource allocation, performance 
measurement, and status reporting.”  In addition, “the top three levels are the minimum 
recommended any program or contract needs for reporting purposes unless the items 
identified are high cost or high risk. Then, and only then, is it critical to define the 
product at a lower level of WBS detail” (Defense Acquisition University 2012). 
Maximum effort was made to ensure the project cost estimate WBS is compliant with 
DoD policies. 
For all systems, the cost estimate is calculated by analogy, and based on a cost 
factors approach. The Analogy method is most appropriate to use early in the program 





unavailability of costing data for comparable/similar systems, the project group 
considered multiple cost factor combinations from various projects. The goal was to 
determine a best fit, and minimize uncertainty.  “A cost factor is derived from cost-to-
cost relationships between two similar systems. To derive a cost factor, one must select 
analogous tasks or products that represent a cost-to-cost relationship.”  Also, “uncertainty 
in a cost estimate using analogy is due to subjective evaluations made by the technical 
staff and cost estimators in their determination of the cost impacts of the differences 
between the old and new systems” (Williams and Barber 2011). Utilizing Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) faculty as technical staff it was agreed that cost factors 
derived from historical EMD ships data would be sufficient and adequate for analogous 
comparison. Specific factor ratios are provided in Figure 87. 
 
Figure 87. Cost Factors 
For comparative consistency, the group utilized a cumulative inflation approach 
to calculate the projected inflated cost for FY13. Inflation rates were obtained from the 
Joint Inflation Calculator. Even a cursory examination of Table 36 shows the baseline 
figures selected to be quite different in nature. In order to be of value, the baseline figures 
need to be normalized in some way such that an actual “apples to apples” comparison 
could be made. The group reconciled the actual cost figures with respect to the various 
cost factors identified with a more detailed summary of the normalization/reconciliation 
process for each system is provided in its specific methodology section. 
Taking the cost estimates’ high degree of uncertainty into consideration, 
sensitivity analysis was conducted for each of the respective systems. The analysis was 





Electronics Standard Factors Handbook provides Coefficient of Variance (CV) data for 
each cost factors. This CV value is used to calculate the standard deviation from the mean 
value, and subsequently used to derive the 95% confidence interval (CI) in accordance 
with the following equation: 
   (
 
 
)       
   
   
 
Equation 39. Standard Deviation from the mean value 
                
Equation 40. 95% Confidence Interval 
3. Assumptions 
 Total Life cycle Cost Estimate would be a waste of time due to high 
degree of uncertainty. 
 Estimating an implementation cost of a single unit is feasible. 
 Federal dollars expended to date are “sunk.” 
 DDG-51 class integration assumed due to short time requirement. 
 Sufficient power, cooling, weight, and space are available on the DDG-51. 
 Total hardware cost is proportional to LASER power (linear fit assumed 
for hardware). 
 Cost factors for aggregate shipboard electronics distributions are 
applicable to DEW. 
4. Tactical LASER System (TLS) 
a. Objective 
To derive the cost estimate of deploying two units of the Tactical LASER 
System (TLS) on DDG-51 class ships. 
b. Facts 
 TLS is a fiber Solid State LASER (SSL) with a LASER with a 





mm machine guns currently installed on some DDG-51 ship class 
decks (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). 
 In March 2011 the Navy awarded a $2.8 million contract to BAE 
to develop a prototype of the TLS. Boeing is collaborating with 
BAE on the project (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for 
Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for 
Congress 2013). 
 The LASER weapon consists of a Boeing 10kW fiber-LASER 
developed by International Photonic Group (IPG), coupled with 
the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) Mobile Active Targeting 
Resource for Integrated Experiments (MATRIX) system, a mobile 
beam control and fire control solution also developed by Boeing 
(Defense Update 2011). 
 Field testing of the major components in the summer of 2012 at 
Eglin Air Force Base in Florida showed the system could 
distinguish between friendly and enemy activities in both daytime 
and nighttime environments (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs 
for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for 
Congress 2013). 
 The TLS is about 30% efficient, meaning 34 kW of power is 
needed to operate the 10 kW LASER (U.S. Navy 2011). 
 Currently, the TLS will utilizes its own power distribution and 
cooling systems; the power requirement from a ship would be 
approximately 75 kW to run the LASER, power management, and 
currently installed/designed thermal management systems (U.S. 
Navy 2011). 
c. Ground Rules and Assumptions 
 Two TLS units would be required per ship; the units would likely 
be installed on the main deck, one port, and one starboard. 
 The weapon system would likely be operated from a standalone 
console installed on the bridge. 
 Since the proposed system is equipped with independent search, 
tracking, beam, and fire control; integration with currently installed 
shipboard combat systems would not be required. 
 The $2.8M contract awarded to BAE included funding for required 





 Additional engineering development (design) would be required 
for actual shipboard integration and use; cost of additional 
development will be included in the final objective based cost 
estimate and be equivalent to approximately 15% of the total 
design cost. 
d. Cost Summary 
The deployment cost of TLS on DDG-51 class will primarily consist of 
the sum of the per unit hardware cost multiplied by two, the hardware integration cost, as 
well as some minimal costs associated with training and contractor support. 
Unfortunately, the $2.8M contract base figure obtained by the project group is not 
indicative of the sum of these costs since, as stated in the assumptions, it includes funding 
for R&D, design, and T&E. With one exception, these latter items are excluded from the 
cost estimate objective. However, it is first necessary to decompose the baseline contract 
amount into its respective discrete components, and identify the WBS sub-elements 





Table 37. Tactical LASER System (TLS) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
 
 
After the total contract is decomposed, the discrete components are 
adjusted for inflation. In this case, the adjustment from FY11 to FY13 yields an inflation 
factor of 3.20%. At this point, the sensitivity analysis is conducted. The total system cost 
calculation provides us with a 95% confidence interval from $1.2M to $5.2M FY13. 
Table 38 provides a start to finish estimate for TLS which includes design, prototype 
hardware assembly, as well as T&E. In accordance with project methodology, it is now 
necessary to factor out of the total cost estimate all elements not pertaining to the 
objective of estimating the single unit cost of installing and deploying the Tactical 
LASER System (TLS) on DDG-51 class ships. These elements include: 85% of the 





Table 38. Tactical LASER System (TLS) Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
The sum of the remaining items, including two times the cost of hardware, 





Table 39. Tactical LASER System (TLS) Objective Cost Estimate 
 
Given the objective cost estimate (Equation 41), the project group is 95% 
confident that the cost of installing and deploying a two TLS on a single DDG-51 class 
ship will be between $825K and $4.8M FY13. 
 15% Design + 2 Contract HW  + Applicable CS & GS Elements + Software + Integration
 
Equation 41. Objective Cost Estimate 
5. Active Denial System (ADS) 
a. Objective 
To derive the cost estimate of deploying two units of Active Denial 
System (ADS) onboard a DDG-51 class ship. 
b. Facts 
 The Active Denial System (ADS) has a Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) of 7, meaning that prototypes have been created and 





Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for 
Congress 2013). 
 Raytheon Missile Systems has been awarded a $7,549,715 cost-
plus award-fee contract. The purpose of this contract program is to 
design, fabricate, test, and rapidly field a fixed ADS referred to as 
System 2 and ADS2 (U.S. Department of Defense 2005). 
c. Ground Rules and Assumptions 
 The ADS has a physical dimension of 36 cubic meters (6m long x 
3m wide x 2m tall). As mentioned earlier on, the ADS will be able 
to fit on-board the DDG-51 class ship. 
 Shipboard organic power will be adequate to support the operation 
of the ADS. 
 The cost estimation will focus on the production, integration, and 
installation cost for one unit on one platform only, rather than total 
life cycle cost. 
 ADS is not “plug and play”; some physical modifications will be 
required to the DDG-51 class ship in order to accommodate the 
ADS. 
d. Cost Summary 
The initial goal was to approach the vendor to obtain the total cost of 
designing and manufacturing a single unit of the ADS. However, due to the sensitivity of 
the product no vendor was willing to reveal the cost figure. Therefore, an alternate 
approach relying on trusted published articles from web based sources was selected. 
Through research, a contract figure of $7,549,715 published by U.S. Department of 





Table 40. Active Denial System (ADS) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
 
As the contract was awarded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, there was a need to 
include the inflation rate incurred until FY2013 for present reference. The inflation rate 
was obtained from the Joint Inflation Calculator. The next step was to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis on the various cost factors to establish a range of estimated total cost. 
The total system calculation provides us with a 95% confidence interval from $3.7M to 





Table 41. Active Denial System (ADS) Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Table 41 provides a start to finish estimate for ADS which includes 
design, prototype hardware assembly, as well as T&E. In accordance with project 
methodology, it is now necessary to factor out of the total cost estimate all elements not 
pertaining to the objective of deploying one unit of ADS within a DDG-51 class ship. 
The objective cost estimate equation will be similar to that of TLS provided in the 
preceding section; however, since ADS has not undergone T&E in a maritime 






Table 42. Active Denial System (ADS) Objective Cost Estimate 
 
The project group is 95% confident that the cost of installing and 
deploying two ADS on a single DDG-51 class ship will be between $2.5M and $15.1M 
FY13. 
6. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) 
a. Objective 
To determine and estimate the upgrade and shipboard installation cost of 
the LASER Weapon System (LaWS) from its current 33kW output to 150 kW. 
b. Facts 
 The cost apportioned for the development cost of the LaWS was 
obtained from CRS report for Congress (O'Rourke, Navy 
Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress 2011). The yearly breakdown 






Table 43. Funding for LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Development 
 
 
 Funding for each year is projected from that year to a base 
reference year 2010. The inflation rates used for the calculation are 
obtained from the Joint Inflation Calculator and presented in Table 
44. 
 The LaWS prototype incoherently combines light beams from six 
fiber SSLs (commercial, off-the-shelf welding LASERs, each with 
a power of 5.5 kW) to create a LASER with a total power of 33 
kW and a BQ of 17 (Taylor 2010). 
 
Table 44. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Base Costing Inflation Adjusted Totals 
 
 
c. Ground Rules and Assumptions 
 It is observed that Congress has requested no funding for LaWS in 
2011. From this cut in funding, we infer that from 2011 and 





 The funding for LaWS development includes all items in the WBS, 
encompassing the hardware components required to deliver the 
current 33kW output. 
 The cost of improved hardware components is scaled according to 
its power output (150kW from 33kW); assuming that the cost is 
linearly proportional to the output power. This would increase the 
hardware cost by a factor of 4.5 (approximate). 
 No further engineering development (design) is suspected to be 
required for actual shipboard integration and use; although the 
upgraded 150kW weapon variant is not believed to have been 
built, it is assumed the blueprints exist. 
 Additional T&E will be required for the upgraded 150kW variant; 
cost of T&E will be included in the objective estimate calculation. 
 Cost estimate assumes hybrid option (Phalanx CIWS) is also 
included. 
d. Cost Summary 
The deployment cost of LaWS on DDG-51 class will primarily consist of 
the scaled hardware improvement cost, the hardware integration cost, as well as the cost 
of additional T&E associated with the upgrade. No further design is required, and 
therefore a design cost estimate was not conducted. Given the $28.1M initial investment 
figure calculated by the project group it is first necessary to decompose the baseline 
amount into its respective discrete components, and identify the WBS sub-elements 





Table 45. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 
 
 
As the contract was awarded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2010, there was a need to 
include the inflation rate incurred until FY2013 for present reference. The inflation rate 
was obtained from the Joint Inflation Calculator. The next step was to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis on the various cost factors to establish a range of estimated total cost. 
The total system cost calculation provides us with a 95% confidence interval from 





Table 46. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Table 46 provides a start to finish estimate for LaWS which includes 
design, prototype hardware assembly, as well as T&E. In accordance with project 
methodology, it is now necessary to factor out of the total cost estimate all elements not 
pertaining to the objective of determining and estimating the upgrade and shipboard 
installation cost of the LASER Weapon System (LaWS) from its current 33kW output to 
150 kW. The objective cost estimate equation will be similar to those provided in the 
preceding sections; however, since LaWS requires a technology upgrade, the hardware 





Table 47. LASER Weapon System (LaWS) Objective Cost Estimate 
 
 
The project group is 95% confident that the upgrade and shipboard 
installation cost of the LASER Weapon System (LaWS) from its current 33kW output to 
150 kW will be between $16.2M and $70.3M FY13 per unit. 
7. Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) 
a. Objective 
To derive the cost estimate of integration and installation of the Maritime 
LASER Demonstration (MLD) onboard DDG-51 class ships. 
b. Facts 
 The contract award for the development of the first MLD unit is 
$98M (Department of the Navy 2009); the original scope of work 
includes assembling, integration and demonstration of the MLD 
(Optics.org 2011). 
 In March 2009, Northrop Grumman (NG) demonstrated a version 
of MLD that coherently combined seven slab SSLs, each with a 





kW (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and 
Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). 
 In 2011, MLD was the first LASER of that energy level to be put 
on a Navy ship, be powered from the ship, and counter a target at 
range in a maritime environment (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard 
LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and 
Issues for Congress 2013). 
c. Ground Rules and Assumptions 
 The $98M contract awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2009 
includes the required funding for R&D, design, prototype hardware 
assembly, and T&E. 
 No further engineering development (design) is required for actual 
shipboard integration and use. 
 No additional hardware upgrade is required; the MLD is intended 
to operate at the originally designed 105kW power level. 
 The original contract’s high price tag (relative to other analyzed 
systems) is correlated to the MLD project’s robustness and high 
technical readiness level (TRL). 
d. Cost Summary 
The deployment cost of MLD on DDG-51 class will primarily consist of 
the projected hardware cost and hardware integration cost. No further technology upgrade 
is required, and therefore an upgrade cost estimate was not conducted. No further design 
is required, and therefore a design cost estimate was not conducted. Given the high $98M 
initial contract figure obtained by the project group it is necessary not only to decompose 
the baseline amount into its respective discrete components, and identify the WBS sub-









As the contract was awarded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, there was a need to 
include the inflation rate incurred until FY2013 for present reference. The inflation rate 
was obtained from the Joint Inflation Calculator. The next step was to conduct a 
sensitivity analysis on the various cost factors to establish a range of estimated total cost. 
The total system cost calculation provides us with a 95% confidence interval from 





Table 49. Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Table 49 provides a start to finish estimate for MLD which includes 
design, prototype hardware assembly, as well as T&E. In accordance with project 
methodology, it is now necessary to factor out of the total cost estimate all elements not 
pertaining to the objective of deriving the cost estimate of integration and installation of 
the Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) onboard DDG-51 class ships. The objective 
cost estimate equation will be similar to those provided in the preceding sections. The 





Table 50. Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) Objective Estimate 
 
 
The project group is 95% confident that the integration and installation of 
the Maritime LASER Demonstration (MLD) onboard DDG-51 class ships will be 
between $17.3M and $145.4M FY13 per unit. 
8. Conclusion 
It can be reasoned from the overall methodology that the selected costing 
approach presented is not ideal, primarily due to the “reverse-engineering” steps utilized 
in obtaining the various cost factors. A 95% confidence interval was calculated around 
the cost factors using each of the respective factors’ associated co-variance value. Even 
though both the cost factors and co-variance data are subject to the same bias that account 
for the primary sources of error, the wide range of estimates given by the high and low 
calculations should more than compensate for any weaknesses attributable to the bias. A 
preferred approach would have been to obtain the actual cost data associated with the 
respective cost factors, and subsequently derive the total cost in a forward manner. 





As a result, the best alternative method was used which bases the calculations on 
historical data obtained from prior projects. The cost estimation project group had made 
every effort to ensure the validity and applicability of historical data used. 
In addition, due to extreme scarcity of open source and unclassified contracting 
data, the baseline cost estimation figures are all mainly based on a single data point from 
a trusted published document pertaining to the programs development. Ideally, additional 
data points should have been used to verify, reinforce, or if necessary refine and adjust 
the final objective based cost estimate. 
Although it is important to acknowledge that cost will only be one of many 
attributes evaluated when making final project recommendations, a cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV) assessment is provided as follows: 
 Given today’s budgetary constraints, the Tactical LASER System is 
selected as the optimal choice with respect to CAIV. 
 With a middle objective estimate of less than $2.4M, the TLS acquisition 
burden is projected to be an entire order of magnitude smaller than any 
other solid state LASER system. 
 Acquisition of LaWS would cost approximately 16 times that of TLS. 
 Acquisition of MLD would cost approximately 1.7 times that of LaWS, 
and 27 times that of TLS. 
With a middle objective estimate of $7.4M, the Active Denial System is 
considered to be a good investment based on the additional and unique capability the 
system has the potential to provide to the warfare commander. 
E. OPERATIONAL AVAILABILITY 
The project team attempted to include an analysis on the operational availability 
of the four selected systems (LaWS, ADS, TLS, MLD). This analysis was to include 
analyzing reliability and maintainability of the systems with a comparison to current 
conventional systems. As this project was conducted at the unclassified level, open 












VI. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
An Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) was conducted in order to provide an 
analytical comparison of the operational effectiveness of the various DEWs. The 
weapons were analyzed by performance, integration, schedule and cost criteria. 
Preference weightings for the four criteria were assigned based on perspective of the 
three stakeholders for the project (operator/user, exploratory developer, and system 
developer). For operators/users, the energy/power output and beam quality are essential 
performance parameters that are linked. These two parameters represent a trade-off in 
damage effects on targets at various distances, size and weight of the DEW device, and 
prime power conversion efficiencies. Secondary issues include reliability, 
maintainability, and potential hazards due to support and usage.    The operator/user 
perspective is concerned about mission success which incorporates performance (0.50), 
cost (0.05), and schedule (0.25) for platform integration of the DEW (0.20). Contractors 
who perform engineering exploration of DEW candidates will have an initial focus on 
performance, in order to establish a competitive advantage over potential rivals and to 
establish themselves firmly as a premier provider of equipment, knowledge, and support. 
During the exploration phase of prototyping and demonstrating the DEW, the 
contractor(s) will have preference weighting similar to that of the user, reiterating the 
particular focus on performance factors. However, once sufficient damage on military 
relevant targets is demonstrated by the prototype DEW, the contractor’s attention turns to 
developing the DEW that is designed for platform integration, now with particular 
emphasis on life cycle costs). During prototype development, the contract developer(s) 
has preference weightings focused on increased performance (0.55), life cycle costs 
(0.35), and schedule (0.10). During this development phase, the tradeoff between 
energy/power output and beam quality may favor one DEW design over another design. 
The cost factor becomes more dominant once the utility of DEW is recognized as 





development, i.e., what missions could be performed by prototype DEWs if the decision 
was made to integrate the best candidate(s) on ships. From this baseline of demonstrating 
minimal mission effectiveness, the development emphasizes achieving damage on similar 
targets at greater range. In other words, any improvement in performance (energy/power 
output and beam quality) is now on par with cost and schedule. All three are equal (0.33).  




Figure 88. Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) Top Level 
 Each of the three criteria was evaluated based upon the factors pertaining to it 
discussed in Chapter 5 and summarized here. Within the performance criterion, 
considerations were given to how the weapons performed amongst the different mission 
areas along with average ranges to first Type I and Type II engagements. In evaluating 
integration, considerations were made to sustainment, training and manning, and 





engineering, and disposal of the various weapons. Training and manning were evaluated 
based upon the additional personnel and work centers required for the various weapons. 
Shipboard integration involved evaluating factors such as weight, power requirements, 
cooling, coverage, and combat systems integration of the various weapons. The single 
unit procurement cost was the amount associated with each weapon system. The criteria 
were appropriated preference weights based on their respective value according to three 
stakeholder (Operator/User, Exploratory Developer, and System Developer) perspectives.  
Figure 89, Figure 90, and Figure 91 shows the AOA with the criteria and weights from 














Figure 90. Operator Integration Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) Breakdown 
 






Figure 92 displays the results of the AOA from the perspectives of the various 
stakeholders. For the operator, ADS is the best with a value of 0.66. An Exploratory 
Developer would find the TLS most satisfactorily with a score of 0.66. Like the 
Exploratory Developer, the TLS performed the best for an System Developer with a score 
of 0.70. On average, the TLS outperformed the other systems with a value of 0.62 
whereas the LaWS had the lowest on average amongst the systems with a value of 0.20. 
Despite the LaWS being the lowest it should be noted that its score was pretty 
comparable to the LaWS+ and MLD which had scores of .27 and .31 respectively 
indicating that any additional considerations that may be needed in order to place the 
LaWS, LaWS+, or MLD onto a platform may not result in much added value. In 
addition, ADS was not too far from the TLS on average with a score of .57. Although 
these results give some indication of the value of each system, an analysis of cost versus 
performance is called for in order to provide further clarity on which of the systems 
should be chosen. 
 
 



















Figure 93  shows a Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) Analysis amongst 
the various stakeholders. When cost is not included in the total performance of the 
systems, ADS is the highest scoring weapon system. Moreover, it’s one of the cheapest. 
Although the LaWS, LaWS+, and MLD have comparable performance scores across the 
board, their costs are quite different and tend to go up as performance goes up. LaWS, 
LaWS+, and MLD cost $18,392,473, $38,451,727, and $65,073,960 respectively. Both 
ADS and TLS perform at a similar level of MLD, but at far cheaper costs of $5,689,818 
and $1,836,919 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 93. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) Analysis 
The AOA indicates that the most expensive option is not necessarily the ‘best’ 
option. When considering performance as the key contributing factor, the ADS system 
would be the best option (the operator’s point of view). If considering both cost and 





Since the key drivers for the Navy include cost and performance, we would recommend 





VII. CONCLUSION  
This report conducted an in-depth analysis at the unclassified level of several 
promising DE technologies and specific DEW prototypes for integration onboard U.S. 
Navy ships.   
A. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology using GINA and other models to corroborate GINA results 
focused on what current prototypes are capable of as opposed to what DE could be in the 
future. The result of that methodology was to reveal a lower cost means of meeting 
current U.S. Navy missions requirements. Validation of the models was conducted 
against available test data to ensure that all model results were consistent with 
experimental data in operational environs. Missions, threats, and weapons were mapped 
to determine which weapons would be suitable for given mission and threat 
combinations. A cost analysis was also conducted to illustrate the available trade space 
between alternatives. 
1. Mission Driven Analysis 
An analysis was conducted on which missions of the U.S. Navy DE offers both 
current utility and potential for future uses. Using the UNTL, UJTL, and SFTM, a list of 
81 missions and mission areas were identified. These missions could be completed by a 
DEW based strictly on the laws of physics and what is reasonable for a DEW (USW 
missions were not counted due to the high attenuation in seawater for example). There 
are other missions as well which a DEW could support but is not the prime factor in 
completing the mission, combat search and rescue (CSAR) is an example. Weapons are 
required for the protection of the CSAR aircraft, and a DEW has the potential to fill this 





2. Technology Driven Analysis 
An analysis of what current DEW technology can achieve was then conducted. As 
those missions in which DE could play a part were already identified, this list was 
narrowed further. The list of 81 potential missions for DE was limited further by what 
current DEW prototypes have the potential to fulfill. Current DEW prototypes can 
potentially fulfill 29 of the previously identified 81 mission areas. Of these 29 missions, 
21 are purely defensive in nature while the remaining eight have defensive elements. For 
example, ‘to engage surface ships could be offensive or defensive. No purely offensive 
mission was assessed as feasible by current DEW prototypes (e.g., naval surface fire 
support and strike warfare are two examples). 
The defensive missions for which DEWs are suitable also suggests which systems 
are appropriate to compare DEW performance against. BMD, strike, air defense against 
ASCM and manned aircraft, and surface warfare against major combatants are not 
achievable by current DE prototypes. Since these mission areas are not possible DE 
missions, the 5-inch gun, Standard Missiles, Tomahawks, and Harpoons are not suitable 
to compare against DEW.    CIWS, 25mm machine gun, and crew served weapons fulfill 
the same mission set as DEW have the potential to satisfy and this conventional set forms 
the appropriate weapons from which to compare DEWs. The expectation for the future is 
that DEWs will fulfill the BMD, strike, air defense, and surface warfare missions, but 
much greater power levels and beam quality must be achieved first. ABL was capable of 
BMD at a range of over 200km with a megawatt class laser (Cadena and Selinger 2009). 
Similar performance may be possible from a ship borne SSL in the future.   The analyses 
beyond the four-year timeframe of this project suggest further analyses into alleviating 
the effects of atmospheric. 
3. Model Validation 
The model validation was presented in Chapter 4. The overall model had two 





had to be validated separately in order for the results to be accepted. Excel was the 
chosen tool to complete this validation. 
a. HPM 
Results of several tests conducted by the Army with ADS have been 
reported. These results were used to build the model as specific parameters of the system 
were not available.  Figure 24 from Chapter 4 is reproduced here as Figure 94. From the 
tests performed by the Army at a range of 500 yards, it took about one second from the 
time that ADS was energized to when the people moved out of the beam (LeVine 2009). 
This time is similar to what the project team developed for the model as shown by the red 
line in Figure 94. 
 
 
Figure 94. Active Denial System (ADS) Performance in Weather 
b. LASER 
Validation of the model depicting LASER performance was done 




























Threat Range (meters): Human appraoching at 10 mph 








assumptions had to be made and this is all detailed extensively in Chapter 4. Reproducing 
Figure 30 here as Figure 95, the performance of TLS is similar to that of LaWS+. A 
congressional report has said that TLS is on par with other LASER weapon systems 
despite the substantially lower power (O'Rourke, Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, 
Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress 2013). 
 
 
Figure 95. LASERs vs. Aluminum Boat, Clear Day 
A second test case was done to additionally validate the LASER model. 
As opposed to targeting a boat, a LSF was used instead.  Figure 31 is reproduced as 
Figure 96. Again, it should be noted that TLS performs similar to LaWS while MLD has 
an effective range over a mile. The range for MLD has been advertised as in the miles as 
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Figure 96. LASERs vs. Aluminum LSF, Clear Day 
4. Mission Threat Mapping 
Perhaps the most unique aspect of this student project was not attempting to put a 
DEW on a ship, or even to do it in a four year timespan, but the manner in which the 
missions were analyzed. GINA provided a very unique tool to combine missions, threats, 
weapons, and environments. Arguably, the analyses the project team conducted could 
have been done with Excel using manual inputs to gather atmospheric data from 
MODTRAN 5 and correlating the data to a successful mission or not. The issue would be 
adding or changing analysis criteria (for example, someone could determine that the 
environment does not matter but the color of the operator’s eyes does). This change in 
excel could prove to be very difficult depending on the level of complexity of the 
spreadsheet and the amount of documentation on the construction of the model. In GINA, 
changing an attribute or adding a new factor or set of data is accomplished by adding an 
additional X-Type for eye color and removing the one for environment. Using GINA, 
these modifications to are an expansion of the computer environment, but not the manner 










Range of First Type I
Engagement




















As GINA has already been approved for use on DoD’s Secure Internet Protocol 
Router Network (SIPRNET), transferring the model and inputting classified data could 
provide more fidelity to the results reported here, (although such results will be the same 
on the gross level). The portability and tailorability of GINA could provide a unique 
analysis tool for determining interoperability for future systems, one part of which is the 
determination of effectiveness when two objects interact. This project demonstrated that 
changing threats, capabilities, environments, and other factors are readily implemented, 
thereby eliminating the need for extensive and expensive programming. The GINA 
interface is both intuitive and easy to use. Further, the GINA model could be modified for 
a non-DEW use altogether. Arguably, this project’s validation of GINA as a complex 
modeling tool for determining the feasibility of DEWs is the most significant output of 
the project. 
5. Cost Analysis 
Although specific cost data for operational DEW units do not exist, the cost 
estimation conducted in Chapter 5 provides great insight into comparative cost analyses 
in both collective as well as independent consideration of costs. Electrical distribution 
systems have been used for decades and several procurement programs have existed for 
developing, maintaining, and servicing these distribution systems. Comparing a DEW to 
such electrical distribution systems was done due to the lack of mature DEW systems. 
Fundamentally, electrical distribution systems and DEWs have similar complex electrical 
properties, traits, and attributes. Due to the covariance in each individual piece of data, 
the 95% confidence interval provides a substantial degree of likelihood for each 
prototype DEW. For the current embodiments of DEWs, ADS and TLS will cost 
approximately the same amount, LaWS+ and MLD will cost significantly more, and 
LaWS will be somewhere in the middle. Scaling the energy/power outputs to 
accommodate additional missions from the set of 81 potential missions will depend on 
the concept of operations. Of the two types considered in this report, multiple low power 





single beam aimed at the same target point. The cost of multiple lower output DEWs is 
notably and significantly less than a single higher output DEW. Moreover, the volumetric 
coverage of defending against swarm- or single-attack is greater for multiple lower output 
DEWs. And finally, a large number of multiple lower output DEWs is inherently more 
survivable. If one ship is sunk or otherwise rendered inoperable, the remaining ships will 
still be functional rendering the fleet still operational just at a degraded capability.   
The biggest takeaway from the cost analysis is that two each of TLS and ADS 
could be installed on a DDG-51 for less than any single unit of the other three systems. 
This would provide a tremendous added capability to current ships. TLS would be able to 
augment current kinetic weapons. Either TLS could be used exclusively against 
unarmored targets like small boats or UAVS or TLS could be used in conjunction with 
kinetic weapons to possibly reduce the conventional ammunition expended. ADS could 
be used for those AT/FP missions which currently do not have an adequate nonlethal 
option. Current tactics of using fire hoses, beanbags, or rubber bullets are not adequate 
against a determined adversary. ADS would provide a nonlethal option with a significant 
standoff range of over 200 meters. 
B. LASER 
Of the three LASER prototypes (TLS, LaWS/LaWS+, and MLD) analyzed for 
this project, the 10 kW TLS consistently performed as well or better than the other more 
powerful LASERs. The integration of TLS will be much less disruptive compared to 
significant modifications required for any of the other systems as the majority of the TLS 
equipment is in a box to be placed under existing 25mm machine gun mounts as shown in 
Chapter 5. This would facilitate quick installation as it could be done pier side as opposed 
to requiring a dry dock. The consistent high performance of TLS (compared to the other 
LASERs) and significantly lower cost made it the clear winner. If the trend of LaWS, 
LaWS+, and MLD was followed for TLS, the cost would be around $90 Million as 





C. HIGH POWER MICROWAVE (HPM) 
At the onset of the project, most of the team though ADS would be useless for the 
Navy (considering the Navy has not considered it for use onboard ships). Although the 
integration requirements are similar to MLD, the complexity is similar to a basic radar 
which can be very inexpensive. The greatest advantage to ADS is the identified gap of a 
nonlethal standoff weapon. Similar to TLS, the high performance and low cost of ADS is 
disproportionate compared to the other three options. If the trend of LaWS, LaWS+, and 
MLD was followed for ADS, the cost would be around $130 Million as opposed to the $7 
Million as estimated. 
D. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
Some general Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) were generated for the use of 
DEW. TLS, being similar in effect of a conventional weapon, could easily be used with 
existing tactics for use of the 25mm machine gun. ADS on the other hand does not have a 
current conventional analog, but would easily be integrated to force protection tactics 
with the limited avenues of approach to a ship. 
There is one distinct use for the TLS (or similarly low-powered LASER) 
compared to one of the other higher powered alternatives. As discussed previously, the 
Hughes’ Salvo Equations show that several smaller, less capable vessels are preferred 
over a few large, powerful ships (Hughes 2000). Current development of weapons for the 
Navy leans towards the later, a high-tech fleet with large (compared to other fleets) and 
expensive ships. Putting a LASER on this kind of ship would result in Figure 97, a single 
ship with a large laser targeting a single threat. This concept is acceptable as long as the 






Figure 97. Single High-Powered LASER 
An alternative concept is shown in Figure 98, several ships with a single (or 
multiple) low-powered LASERs each. The aggregate power on the target from the 
multiple LASERs could equal that of the single large laser, but the system is more 
survivable. In the event one of the ships is destroyed or incapacitated, the remaining ships 
still offer the same ability, although in a degraded capacity. Arguably, it would be just as 
complicated developing a targeting system able to put multiple lasers onto the same aim 
point as it would be to develop the mirror/lens system of a large laser that can focus a 
single high-power beam. 
 
 
Figure 98. Multiple Low-Powered LASERs 
E. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Any of the potential prototypes would offer a unique (although limited) capability 





PONCE for an operational deployment is a step in the direction of incorporating DEW 
into the fleet as a whole, but there is much work to be done. A significant amount of time 
and money has been spent pursuing DEW for the military with varied results. Sometimes 
cutting your losses may be the right answer; however, the project research indicates that 
this is not one of those times. DE is on the cusp of being an operational weapon and the 
“game changer” politicians and researchers have been striving for since Townes and 






This project used the Systems Engineering Process to examine how mature 
directed energy technologies can provide mission-essential performance across multiple 
warfare area domains and mission sub-sets for the U.S. Navy. While we achieved our 
goals of identifying and characterizing the capability gaps and providing a coherent 
vision of naval missions that could incorporate DEWs, the project team acknowledged 
that additional research and analysis could be conducted as a continuation of this project 
to provide even greater fidelity in the feasibility of ‘stacking’ TLS modules and 
comparing it to the scalability of LaWS and MLD, the feasibility of integrating DEW 
onto ship borne aircraft, applying GINA across mission domains to determine future 
requirements, expanding GINA to include a cost X-Type, an improved combat model to 
compare DEWs and conventional weapons, and modeling the anticipated operational 
availability of a DEW. 
Perhaps the most applicable future study would be on the scalability of TLS and 
comparing TLS against a single 10 kW module of the LaWS or 15kW LRU of the MLD. 
If TLS is limited by either the inability to add more units like LaWS and MLD, or to 
increase the number of paths through the medium to increase power, the future potential 
of TLS is limited. The future capabilities and upgradability is an aspect of the DEW 
systems which was not considered but is important for the selection of a system. TLS 
may perform better now, but if LaWS or MLD is easier to upgrade, that could be a key 
selling point. This study would require significant depth on the three systems, the method 
in which the beam is created, and the optics of the system. 
Although the tasking statement tasked the project team to explore DEW for the 
Navy, the project team scoped the project to surface ships only. This was done for several 
reasons detailed in Chapter 1, but there is still the potential for DEW onboard aircraft as 
shown by the ABL. The C-2 and decommissioned S-3 are the largest aircraft flown from 





MV-22 and CH-53 are large and may be other possibilities). Adding a DEW to an aircraft 
would extend the reach of the ship and be a low cost and precise option of strike warfare. 
TLS being relatively small would be a likely candidate to integrate to an aircraft, but the 
power requirements may be an issue. A study on the capabilities of these platforms and 
the ability to integrate a DEW could potentially benefit from much of what was done 
with the ABL program, specifically with the optics and fire control systems. 
Expanding on the GINA model is another area which should be explored. Our 
project focused on what the Navy is currently required to do, what current DEWs can do, 
and how that could integrate. Expanding upon the missions and threats already input into 
GINA could lead to what future weapon requirements should be to counter these threats. 
This would require analyzing current and projected missions, threats, and environments. 
This analysis could help focus future R&D efforts for not only weapon systems, but 
platforms these systems would integrate with. If a megawatt class SSL was to be put on a 
ship, that ship would have to be specifically designed for the cooling and power loads 
required to fire the LASER. 
GINA also could be modified to include a cost X-Type. This would allow a 
variation on the current CAIV analysis. The project team was able to judge the overall 
performance of a system and then compare that to the cost of a system. Putting cost into 
GINA would allow the analysis of the cost of a specific mission based on the weapon 
used. This could give more fidelity to the sustainment costs of each system and a more 
accurate ‘per round’ comparison to conventional weapons. 
The conventional weapon comparison was simplified to distil the engagement 
equation outputs to values that had cross-domain relevance. An actual combat model 
validated against contextually significant data should be used to evaluate the 
conventional weapon performance. Using actual weapon parameters to account for 
sources of weapon failure, the effects of weather could be captured in a deterministic 





The final area for further study is an analysis on the operational availability of 
potential DEW systems. To truly determine the operational availability, the Mean Time 
Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) for the system needs to be 
known. Analyzing the MTBF and MTTR of major components would be more useful as 
it would give insight to which parts are more likely to fail or take a long time to repair. 
Initially, this analysis can be done with a two-state homogeneous Continuous Time 
Markov Chain. This analysis still would require some form of failure rate which the 
project team was unable to acquire. Once the LaWS has completed the deployment on 











APPENDIX A. THREAT AND WEAPON MAPPING 
Mission Threat Map (From GINA Model DEWAnalysisSEA19B, at p4ie.nps.edu) 
Mission 
ID 





Pier Demonstration/Passive Protest 
Exercise 
Person Running 5 mph 
ATFP 
15 
Nighttime Small Boat Attack at Anchor FIAC Fiberglass Boat 
ATFP 4 Entry Control Point (ECP)Threat Person Running 5 mph 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack Exercise FIAC Fiberglass Boat 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise Cessna Cessna 150 




AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group C-802 Saccade 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group AS-11 Kilter 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group F-14 Tomcat 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a strike group MiG-19 Fulcrum 
















Provide air defense for naval/joint/ 




Provide air defense for naval/joint/ 




Provide air defense for naval/joint/ 




Provide air defense for naval/joint/ 




Provide air defense for naval/joint/ 





AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using AW 
Weapons 
C-802 Saccade 













AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 
underway replenishment group 
C-802 Saccade 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 
underway replenishment group 
F-14 Tomcat 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 





AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 
underway replenishment group 
AS-11 Kilter 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a convoy or 
underway replenishment group 
MiG-19 Fulcrum 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious 
forces in transit and in the amphibious 
objective area 
C-802 Saccade 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious 
forces in transit and in the amphibious 
objective area 
F-14 Tomcat 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious 






AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious 
forces in transit and in the amphibious 
objective area 
AS-11 Kilter 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for amphibious 
forces in transit and in the amphibious 
objective area 
MiG-19 Fulcrum 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action 
group 
F-14 Tomcat 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action 
group 
AS-11 Kilter 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action 
group 
MiG-19 Fulcrum 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a surface action 
group 
C-802 Saccade 










AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, high-
speed airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
F-14 Tomcat 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, high-
speed airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
MiG-19 Fulcrum 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with AW 
weapons 
C-802 Saccade 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats with AW 
weapons 
AS-11 Kilter 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne 





AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude airborne 
threats with AW weapons 
Cessna Cessna 150 
NCO 
19.6 





Conduct seizure of noncombatant 
vessels 
FIAC Fiberglass Boat 
NCO 
19.9 
Conduct drug traffic suppression and 
interdiction operations 
FIAC Fiberglass Boat 
NCO 
19.9 





Conduct close–in surface self-defense 




Conduct close–in surface self-defense 
using crew operated SUW Weapons 
FIAC Fiberglass Boat 
SUW 
1.10 
Conduct close–in surface self-defense 
using crew operated SUW Weapons 
FAC Aluminum Boat 
SUW 
2.3 





Engage surface targets with assigned 
anti-surface sector 












ADS Active Denial System 
ATFP 
15 
Nighttime Small Boat Attack 
at Anchor 







Nighttime Small Boat Attack 
at Anchor 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
ATFP 
15 
Nighttime Small Boat Attack 
at Anchor 





Nighttime Small Boat Attack 
at Anchor 




Nighttime Small Boat Attack 
at Anchor 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
ATFP 4 Entry Control Point 
(ECP)Threat 
ADS Active Denial System 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack 
Exercise 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack 
Exercise 
ADS Active Denial System 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack 
Exercise 
MK 38 Mod 
2 
25mm Bushmaster 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack 
Exercise 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
ATFP 8 Pierside Small Boat Attack 
Exercise 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise LaWS LASER Weapon System 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise ADS Active Denial System 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise MK 38 Mod 
2 
25mm Bushmaster 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise MK 15 Close-In Weapon System 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
ATFP 9 Terrorist A/C Attack Exercise TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a 
strike group 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a 
strike group 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a 
strike group 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 1.1 Provide area defense for a 
strike group 




Provide air defense for non-
combatant evacuations 








Provide air defense for non-
combatant evacuations 
operations 




Provide air defense for non-
combatant evacuations 
operations 




Provide air defense for non-
combatant evacuations 
operations 




Provide air defense for 
naval/joint/ combined TF 
operations 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 
1.13 
Provide air defense for 
naval/joint/ combined TF 
operations 




Provide air defense for 
naval/joint/ combined TF 
operations 




Provide air defense for 
naval/joint/ combined TF 
operations 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
MK 15 Close-In Weapon System 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 1.2 Conduct air self-defense using 
AW Weapons 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a 
convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a 
convoy or underway 
replenishment group 






AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a 
convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a 
convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 1.4 Provide area defense for a 
convoy or underway 
replenishment group 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for 
amphibious forces in transit 
and in the amphibious 
objective area 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for 
amphibious forces in transit 
and in the amphibious 
objective area 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for 
amphibious forces in transit 
and in the amphibious 
objective area 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 1.5 Provide area defense for 
amphibious forces in transit 
and in the amphibious 
objective area 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 1.6 Provide area defense for a 
surface action group 
RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, 
high-speed airborne threats 
with AW weapons 





AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, 
high-speed airborne threats 
with AW weapons 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, 
high-speed airborne threats 
with AW weapons 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, 
high-speed airborne threats 
with AW weapons 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 9.1 Engage medium/high altitude, 
high-speed airborne threats 
with AW weapons 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
ADS Active Denial System 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
MK 15 Close-In Weapon System 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
MK 54 5 Inch/54 Cal. Deck Gun 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 9.3 Engage low altitude threats 
with AW weapons 
RIM-66 MR SM-2 Block III Medium 
Range 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
ADS Active Denial System 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
LaWS+ LASER Weapon System 
Enhanced 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 





AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
MLD Maritime LASER 
Demonstration 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
MK 54 5 Inch/54 Cal. Deck Gun 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
AW 9.4 Engage low/medium altitude 
airborne threats with AW 
weapons 




Conduct seizure of 
noncombatant vessels 
ADS Active Denial System 
NCO 
19.6 
Conduct seizure of 
noncombatant vessels 





Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 
ADS Active Denial System 
NCO 
19.9 
Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 
MK 54 5 Inch/54 Cal. Deck Gun 
NCO 
19.9 
Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 





Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
NCO 
19.9 
Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 




Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 




Conduct drug traffic 
suppression and interdiction 
operations 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
SUW 
1.10 
Conduct close–in surface self-
defense using crew operated 
SUW Weapons 
ADS Active Denial System 
SUW 
1.10 
Conduct close–in surface self-
defense using crew operated 










Conduct close–in surface self-
defense using crew operated 
SUW Weapons 
MK 15 Close-In Weapon System 
SUW 
2.3 
Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 
LaWS LASER Weapon System 
SUW 
2.3 
Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 





Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 
MK 54 5 Inch/54 Cal. Deck Gun 
SUW 
2.3 
Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 




Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 




Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 
TLS Tactical LASER System 
SUW 
2.3 
Engage surface targets with 
assigned anti-surface sector 














APPENDIX B. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK 
















    /// <summary> 
    /// Provides content manager data services that aggregates data from multiple 
types. 
    /// </summary> 
    class DEWContentManager : 
        ContentManagerBase 
    { 
 
        private IClient r_client; 
 
        private const string m_modtran_call = “C:\\Program Files\\Spectral 
Sciences, Inc\\MODTRAN(R)\\5.2.2\\modtran.bat”; 
        private const string m_modtran_input = “C:\\Program Files\\Spectral 
Sciences, Inc\\MODTRAN(R)\\5.2.2\\NavyMaritime.tp5”; 
        private const string m_modtran_output = “C:\\Program Files\\Spectral 
Sciences, Inc\\MODTRAN(R)\\5.2.2\\NavyMaritime.tp6”; 
 
        private object m_lock_object = new object(); 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Initializes a new instance of an AggregateContentManager class. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name=“p_control_handler”>Provides data and control factory 
services.</param> 
        /// <param name=“p_xtype_spec”>Specification of XType.</param> 
        /// <param name=“p_client”>Provides user access services.</param> 
        public DEWContentManager(IContentHandler p_content_handler, IContent 
p_xtype_spec, IClient p_client) 
            : base(p_content_handler, p_xtype_spec, p_client) 
        { 
            r_client = p_client; 






        /// <summary> 
        /// Cause the content to be pushed all the way to the ContentServer. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name=“p_content”>Reference to content.</param> 
        public override void updateContent(IContent p_content) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                IContentManagerClient l_content_manager_client = 
ProtectedClientFactory.getContentManagerClient(p_content); 
                this.protectedMapCollectFilter(l_content_manager_client); 
                if (l_content_manager_client.getRowCount() == 0) 
                { 
                    return; 
                } 
                foreach (IContent l_resource in p_content) 
                { 
                    IContentManagerClient l_resource_content_manager_client = 
ProtectedClientFactory.getContentManagerClient(l_resource); 
                    l_resource_content_manager_client.save(); 
                    if (l_resource_content_manager_client.isNew()) 
                    { 
                        lock (m_lock_object) 
                        { 
                            double l_slant_range = this.callModtran(l_resource); 
                            this.callAnalyzer(l_resource, l_slant_range); 
                        } 
                      
                    } 
                } 
                
r_content_handler.updateContent(l_content_manager_client.getContentHolder());
 //Update after isNew() checked 
            } 
            catch (Exception l_exception) 
            { 
                throw new XslentException(l_exception, “Error processing 
engagement”); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void callAnalyzer(IContent pContent, double p_slant_range) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                /* 
                If Engagement.Weapon.WeaponType = HEL Then use the LASER portion 
of DEWAnalyzer 
                If Enagement.Weapon.WeaponType = HPM Then use the Microwave 
portion of DEWAnalyzer 






                */ 
 
                // Get the related threat instance 
                Guid threadGuid = UtilityContent.getGuid(pContent, “ThreatGUID”); 
                IFilter l_filter = FilterFactory.newFilter(“Threat,” “ThreatGUID,” 
threadGuid.ToString()); 
                IContent l_threat = 
r_content_handler.collectContent(r_client.getDssId(), “Threat,” l_filter, 
r_client); 
 
                // Get the related weapon instance 
                Guid weaponGuid = UtilityContent.getGuid(pContent, “WeaponGUID”); 
                l_filter = FilterFactory.newFilter(“Weapon,” “WeaponGUID,” 
weaponGuid.ToString()); 
                IContent l_weapon = 




                string l_weapon_type = UtilityContent.getString(pContent, 
“WeaponType”); 
 




                if (“HEL.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    // Then use the LASER portion of DEWAnalyzer 




                    dewAnalyzer.VitalAreaRadius = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “VitalAreaRadius_m”); 
 
                    // Set the inputs 
                    dewAnalyzer.DetectionAlt = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ThreatDetectionAltitude_m”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.DetectionRange = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “ThreatDetectionGroundRange_m”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.ThreatSpeed = UtilityContent.getDouble(l_threat, 
“ThreatSpeed_mPERs”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.Transmissivity = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “AtmosphericAttenuation”); 
 
                    // Weapon inputs 
                    dewAnalyzer.LSWavelength = UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“DEWWavelength_m”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.LSLensDiameter = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, “LaserAppertureDiamater_m”); 






                    dewAnalyzer.LSPower = UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“DEWPower”); 
 
                    // Engagement inputs 
                    dewAnalyzer.MeltingTemp = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorMeltingPoint_K”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.Density = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorDensity_gPERcm3”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.SpecificHeat = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorSpecificHeatCapacity_JPERgK”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.HeatOfFusion = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorLatentHeatOfFusion_JPERg”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.Thickness = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorThickness_cm”); 
                    dewAnalyzer.Relectance = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ArmorReflectivity”); 
 
                    // Run that analyzer 
                    dewAnalyzer.EvaluateLaserPerformance(); 
 
                    // Set the results in the engagement content 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfHardKillsPossible,” 
dewAnalyzer.NumberHKPossible); 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfSoftKillsPossible,” 
dewAnalyzer.NumberSKPossible); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstHardKill,” 
dewAnalyzer.RangeFirstHK); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstSoftKill,” 
dewAnalyzer.RangeFirstSK); 
                    pContent.setField(“DEWMaximumEffectiveRange,” 
dewAnalyzer.MaxEffectiveRange); 




                } 
                else if (“HPM.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    //Then use the Microwave portion of DEWAnalyzer 
                    DEWAnalyzerVS2010.DEWAnalysisSEA19B dewAnalyzer = new 
DEWAnalyzerVS2010.DEWAnalysisSEA19B(); 
 
                    dewAnalyzer.VitalAreaRadius = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “VitalAreaRadius_m”); 
 
                    if (dewAnalyzer.VitalAreaRadius < p_slant_range) 
                    { 
                        throw new XslentException(“Threat Detection Ground Range 
cannot be less than Mission Vital Area Radius”); 
                    } 
 





                    
dewAnalyzer.setMicrowaveData(UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“DEWWavelength_m”),  
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, “DEWPower”),  
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“MicrowaveAntennaArea_m2”), 
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“MicrowaveAntennaConstantOfProprtionality”),  
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“MicrowaveAntennaEfficiency”)); 
 
                    // Set the inputs 
                    
dewAnalyzer.setMWScenarioData(UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“AtmosphericAttenuation”), 
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ThreatDetectionGroundRange_m”), 
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ThreatDetectionAltitude_m”), 
                        UtilityContent.getDouble(l_threat, “ThreatSpeed_mPERs”)); 
 
                    // Run the analyzer 
                    dewAnalyzer.EvaluateMicrowaveKillEffectiveness(); 
 
                    // Set the results in the engagement content 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfHardKillsPossible,” 
dewAnalyzer.MWHKP); 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfSoftKillsPossible,” 
dewAnalyzer.MWSKP); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstHardKill,” 
dewAnalyzer.MWRangeFirstHardKill); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstSoftKill,” 
dewAnalyzer.MWRangeFirstSoftKill);                       
                       
                } 
                else if (“CONV.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    //Then use ConventionalWeaponAnalyzer 
                    DEWAnalyzerVS2010.ConventionalWeaponAnalyzerSEA19B analyzer = 
new DEWAnalyzerVS2010.ConventionalWeaponAnalyzerSEA19B(); 
 
                    // Set the inputs 
                    analyzer.ThreatDetectionAltitude = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “ThreatDetectionAltitude_m”); 
                    analyzer.ThreatDetectionRange = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “ThreatDetectionGroundRange_m”); 
                    analyzer.ThreatSpeed = UtilityContent.getDouble(l_threat, 
“ThreatSpeed_mPERs”); 
 
                    analyzer.WeaponActivationTime = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, “WeaponActivationTime_sec”); 






                    analyzer.WeaponMinEffectiveRange = 
UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, “WeaponMinimumEffectiveRange_m”); 
                    analyzer.WeaponSpeed = UtilityContent.getDouble(l_weapon, 
“WeaponSpeed_mPERs”); 
 
                    analyzer.VitalAreaRadius = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“VitalAreaRadius_m”); 
 
                    // Analyzer does its calcs 
                    analyzer.CalculateNumberOfHardKillsPossible(); 
 
                    // Set the results in the engagement content 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfHardKillsPossible,” 
analyzer.NumberHardKillsPossible); 
                    pContent.setField(“NumberOfSoftKillsPossible,” 
analyzer.NumberSoftKillsPossible); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstHardKill,” 
analyzer.RangeOfFirstHardKill); 
                    pContent.setField(“RangeOfFirstSoftKill,” 
analyzer.RangeOfFirstSoftKill); 
 
                } 
                else 
                { 
                    // Throw error 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                throw new XslentException(ex, “Error processing call to 
analylzer”); 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        private double callModtran(IContent pContent) 
        { 
            double l_slantrange = 0.0; 
            string l_weapon_type = UtilityContent.getString(pContent, 
“WeaponType”); 
            try 
            { 
                ModTran5.ModTran5 mt5 = new ModTran5.ModTran5(m_modtran_input, 
m_modtran_call, m_modtran_output); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Setting up modtran input values”); 
                double l_wavelength = 0.0; 
                if (“HEL.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    l_wavelength = Math.Round(UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“DEWWavelength_m”) * 1000000, 4); 
                    //LASER wavelength must be specified in micrometers 







                } 
                else if (“HPM.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    l_wavelength = Math.Round((1) / 
(UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “DEWWavelength_m”) * 100), 4); 
                    m_diagnostics.debug(“Microwave calculated wave length: ‘{0},’” 
l_wavelength); 
                    //l_wavelength = 1/(UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“DEWWavelength_m”) * 100); 
                    //Microwave wavelengths must be specified as wavenumbers in 
units 1/cm 
                } 
 
                string l_rainrate = UtilityContent.getString(pContent, 
“EnvironmentRainRate_mmPERhr”); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Rainrate from engagement: ‘{0},’” 
l_rainrate); 
                double l_bandwidth = 0.05;// * 0.5; 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Bandwidth (hardcoded): ‘{0},’” l_bandwidth); 
                 
                double l_threat_altitude = 
Math.Round(UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, “ThreatDetectionAltitude_m”) / 1000, 
4); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Threat detection altitude from engagement: 
‘{0},’” l_threat_altitude); 
 
                double l_threat_range = UtilityContent.getDouble(pContent, 
“ThreatDetectionGroundRange_m”) / 1000; 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Threat detection range from engagement: 
‘{0},’” l_threat_range); 
                //All ranges and altitudes in MODTRAN must be specified as 
kilometers 
 
                l_slantrange = Math.Round(Math.Sqrt(Math.Pow(l_threat_range, 2) + 
Math.Pow(l_threat_altitude, 2)), 4); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Calculated slant range: ‘{0},’” 
l_slantrange); 
 
                pContent.setField(“InitialSlantRangeToThreat_m,” l_slantrange); 
                 
                string V1 = Math.Round((l_wavelength - l_bandwidth), 
4).ToString(); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Calculated V1: ‘{0},’” V1); 
 
                string V2 = Math.Round((l_wavelength + l_bandwidth), 
4).ToString(); 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Calculated V2: ‘{0},’” V2); 
 
                m_diagnostics.debug(“Calling SetParam”); 
                mt5.SetParam(l_rainrate, “0,” l_threat_altitude.ToString(), 






                // Don’t run modtran for conventional weapons 
                if (“HEL.”Equals(l_weapon_type) || “HPM.”Equals(l_weapon_type)) 
                { 
                    m_diagnostics.debug(“Calling GenerateInput”); 
                    mt5.GenerateInput(); 
 
                    m_diagnostics.debug(“Calling RunExe”); 
                    mt5.RunExe(); 
 
                    m_diagnostics.debug(“Calling ReadOutput”); 
                    string l_attenuation = mt5.ReadOutput(); 
 
                    m_diagnostics.debug(“Returned attenuation: ‘{0},’” 
l_attenuation); 
 
                    if (null == l_attenuation || l_attenuation.Length == 0) 
                    {                     
                        m_diagnostics.debug(“WARNING!!! Returned attenuation has 
no value!  Setting it to 1”); 
                        l_attenuation = “1”; 
                    } 
 
                    pContent.setField(“AtmosphericAttenuation,” l_attenuation); 
                } 
 
            } 
            catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                throw new XslentException(ex, “Error processing call to modtran”); 
            } 
 
            return l_slantrange; 
        } 






APPENDIX C. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK 
ARCITECTURE (GINA) X-TYPES, VECTORS, AND FORMS 
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Xslent.Dss 




    Xslent.ContentManagers
.Elements.VCollection,
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APPENDIX D. VISIUAL BASIC (VB) .NET CODE 
Note: originally, a Type I Engagement was called “Hard Kill” and a Type II 
Engagement was called “Soft Kill.” The original terminology was changed due to 
confusion, but remains in the code. 
Imports System.Math 
 
Public Class DEWAnalysisSEA19B 
    ‘Thesis Advisor: Prof. Gary O. Langford, Naval Postgraduate School, Systems 
Engineering Department 
    ‘Contact: golangfo@nps.edu 
 
    ‘Software Author: LT Daniel P. Ciullo (USN) 
    ‘Contact: dan.ciullo@gmail.com 
 
    ‘LASER Analysis Code 
 
    ‘Laser Weapon Variables 
    Public LSWavelength As Double 
    Public LSLensDiameter As Double 
    Public LSGuassianBeamMFactor As Double 
    Public LSPower As Double 
 
    ‘Laser Calculated Variables 
    Public Waist As Double 
    Public Divergence As Double 
    Public HalfAngle As Double 
    Public RayleighRange As Double 
    Public MaxEffectiveRange As Double 
    Private PeakIntensityAtRange As Double 
    Private AvgIntensityAtRange As Double 
    Public TotalIntensityOnThreat As Double 
 
 
    ‘Threat Target Variables 
    Public MeltingTemp As Double 
    Public Density As Double 
    Public SpecificHeat As Double 
    Public HeatOfFusion As Double 
    Public Thickness As Double 
    Public Relectance As Double 
    Public DetectionRange As Double 
    Public DetectionAlt As Double 
    Public ThreatSpeed As Double 
 
 
    ‘Threat Calculated Variables 





    Public FluenceForSoftKill As Double 
    Public LSHardKillsPossible As Double 
    Public LSSoftKillsPossible As Double 
    Public ThreatSlantRange As Double 
 
    ‘Scenario Variables 
    Public Transmissivity As Double 
    Public AmbientTemp As Double 
    Public Attenuation As Double 
 
    ‘Scenarior Calculated Variables 
    Public NumberHKPossible As Double 
    Public NumberSKPossible As Double 
    Public VitalAreaRadius As Double 
    Public RangeFirstHK As Double 
    Public RangeFirstSK As Double 
 
    ‘For GINA to run the MODTRAN 5 software 
    Public Function CalculateSlantRange(GroundRange As Double, Altitude As Double) 
        Return Sqrt(Pow(GroundRange, 2) + Pow(Altitude, 2)) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Equation 3.37 from Combat Systems Vol. 2, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
    Private Function CalculateRayleighRange() As Double 
        Return (PI * Pow(LSLensDiameter, 2.0)) / (LSGuassianBeamMFactor * 
LSWavelength) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Combat Systems Volume 2, equation 3.37, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
    Private Function CalculateBeamWaist() As Double 
        Return LSLensDiameter / Sqrt(LSGuassianBeamMFactor) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Equation G.69 from Combat Systems Appendix G, Dr. Robert C. Harney. 
    ‘In this version, the full angle diverence is calculated differently using the 
M-squared beam quality factor. 
    Private Function CalculateHalfAngle() As Double 
        Return LSWavelength / (PI * Waist) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Combat Systems Volume 6, equation M.6, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
    Private Function CalculateDivergence() As Double 
        Return Sqrt(2) * HalfAngle 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Converts the total transmittance over the detection range and allows it to be 
considered at each point of integration as the threat moves inbound 
    Private Function CalculateThreatSlantRange() As Double 
        Return Pow(Pow(DetectionAlt, 2.0) + Pow(DetectionRange, 2.0), 0.5) 
    End Function 
 
    Private Sub ConvertTransmittanceToAttenuation() 





    End Sub 
 
    ‘Equation M.5 from Combat Systems Appendix M, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
    Private Function CalculatePeakIntensityAtRange(ByVal Range As Double) As 
Double 
        Return (4.0 * LSPower * Pow(Math.E, -1 * Attenuation * (Range / 1000))) / 
(PI * (Pow(Waist, 2.0) + Pow(Range, 2.0) * Pow(Divergence, 2.0))) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Equation 17.8 from Combat Systems Vol. 3, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
    Public Function CalculateFluenceForHardKill() As Double 
        Return Density * Thickness * (SpecificHeat * (MeltingTemp - AmbientTemp) + 
HeatOfFusion) / (1 - Relectance) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Prof. Gary O. Langford, NPS SE Department, LASER Weapon SME, based on 
empirical data. For CO2 LASERs ONLY use 20% reduction. 
    ‘Contact: golangfo@nps.edu 
    Public Function CalculateFluenceForSoftKill() As Double 
        Return FluenceForHardKill / 6 
    End Function 
 
    Public Sub EvaluateLaserPerformance() 
        ThreatSlantRange = CalculateThreatSlantRange() 
        ConvertTransmittanceToAttenuation() ‘This allows a more accurate 
integration of Intensity by considering attenuation at each point of integration 
        RayleighRange = CalculateRayleighRange() 
        Waist = CalculateBeamWaist() 
        HalfAngle = CalculateHalfAngle() 
        Divergence = CalculateDivergence() 
        FluenceForHardKill = CalculateFluenceForHardKill() 
        FluenceForSoftKill = CalculateFluenceForSoftKill() 
 
        RangeFirstHK = 0 
        RangeFirstSK = 0 
        MaxEffectiveRange = 0 
 
 
        Dim CRange As Double 
        CRange = ThreatSlantRange 
 
        Dim Time As Double = 0 
 
        Do While CRange > VitalAreaRadius 
 
            PeakIntensityAtRange = 0.0 
 
            PeakIntensityAtRange = CalculatePeakIntensityAtRange(CRange) 
 
            ‘Total Average Intensity on Threat: Average computed using a conical 
intensity profile 
            ‘Conical intensity profile is a simplified model of the Guassian 





            ‘This accounts for any jitter that may be inherent in the system 
            ‘From Prof. Gary O. Langford, LASER Weapon SME, NPS, SE Dept. Contact: 
golangfo@nps.edu 
            ‘For description of Guassian intensity profile see fig. M-8, Combat 
Systems Appendix M, Dr. Robert C. Harney 
            ‘Division by 10000 converts W/m^2 to W/cm^2 (to compare against 
fluence for damage units) 
            TotalIntensityOnThreat = TotalIntensityOnThreat + (((1 / 3) * 
(PeakIntensityAtRange)) / 10000) 
 
            ‘Check to see if Hard Kill threshold has been reached for the first 
time 
            If RangeFirstHK = 0 And TotalIntensityOnThreat > FluenceForHardKill 
Then 
                RangeFirstHK = CRange 
            End If 
 
            ‘Check to see if Soft Kill threshold has been reached for the first 
time 
            If RangeFirstSK = 0 And TotalIntensityOnThreat > FluenceForSoftKill 
Then 
                RangeFirstSK = CRange 
            End If 
 
            ‘MER as 10% of fluence for hard kill from Prof. Gary O. Langford, 
LASER Weapon SME, NPS, SE Dept. 
            ‘Contact: golangfo@nps.edu 
            If MaxEffectiveRange = 0 And TotalIntensityOnThreat > 0.1 * 
FluenceForHardKill Then 
                MaxEffectiveRange = CRange 
            End If 
 
 
            CRange = CRange - ThreatSpeed 
        Loop 
 
        NumberHKPossible = TotalIntensityOnThreat / FluenceForHardKill 
        NumberSKPossible = TotalIntensityOnThreat / FluenceForSoftKill 
 
 
    End Sub 
 
    ‘Microwave Analysis Code 
 
    ‘Microwave Weapon Variables 
    Public MWWavelength As Double 
    Public MWPower As Double 
    Public MWAntennaArea As Double 
    Public MWAntennaK As Double 
    Public MWAntennaGain As Double 
    Public MWAntennaEfficiency As Double 
 





    Public MWTrans As Double 
    Public MWThreatRange As Double 
    Public MWThreatSpeed As Double 
 
    ‘Resultant Variables 
    Public MWHKP As Double 
    Public MWSKP As Double 
    Public HKRadDose As Double 
    Public SKRadDose As Double 
    Public MWKillWindow As Double 
    Public MWIntialIntensity As Double 
    Public TimeToMWSK As Double 
    Public TimeToMWHK As Double 
    Private KWIntensity As Double 
    Public MWRangeFirstHardKill As Double 




    Public Sub setMicrowaveData(W As Double, P As Double, AA As Double, AK As 
Double, AE As Double) 
        MWAntennaArea = AA 
        MWAntennaEfficiency = AE 
        MWWavelength = W 
        MWPower = P 
        MWAntennaK = AK 
 
        MWAntennaGain = CalculateAntennaGain() 
 
    End Sub 
 
    Public Sub setMWScenarioData(atn As Double, TrRng As Double, TrAlt As Double, 
TrSpd As Double) 
        MWTrans = atn 
        MWThreatSpeed = TrSpd 
        MWThreatRange = Sqrt(Pow(TrRng, 2) + Pow(TrAlt, 2)) 
 
    End Sub 
 
 
    ‘Payne, Craig. Principles of Naval Weapon Systems 2ed. Naval Institute Press: 
Anapolis, MD, 2010 
    ‘Eq. 3–13 
    Private Function CalculateAntennaGain() 
        Return ((4 * PI * MWAntennaArea * MWAntennaEfficiency) / (Pow(MWAntennaK, 
2) * Pow(MWWavelength, 2))) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Eq. 3–20 with atmospheric attenuation from Harney ch 17 pg. 1037. 
    ‘Payne, Craig. Principles of Naval Weapon Systems 2ed. Naval Institute Press: 





    ‘Transmittance is used instead of attenuation because in this case we are not 
integrating over the entire range since we are predominately dealing with short 
ranges of engagement 
    ‘By using transmittance which is calculated in MODTRAN5, we save calculation 
time by not coverting back to attenuation as in the LASER use case 
    Private Function CalculateIntensityOnTarget() 
        Return ((MWPower * MWAntennaGain * MWTrans)) / ((4 * PI * 
Pow(MWThreatRange, 2))) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Derived by LT Daniel Ciullo from data from Hymes, Boydell and Prescott. 
“Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects.” Tables 4.3 & 4.4 
    ‘Derived using power regression in MS Excel. 
    Private Function CalculateTimeToPain() 
        Return 99.896 * Pow(KWIntensity, -1.336) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Derived by LT Daniel Ciullo from data from Hymes, Boydell and Prescott. 
“Thermal Radiation: Physiological and Pathological Effects.” Tables 4.3 & 4.4 
    ‘Derived using power regression in MS Excel. 
    Private Function CalculateTimeToLeathality() 
        Return 99.896 * Pow(KWIntensity / 10, -1.336) 
    End Function 
 
    ‘Developed by LT Daniel Ciullo 
    Public Sub EvaluateMicrowaveKillEffectiveness() 
 
        MWIntialIntensity = CalculateIntensityOnTarget() 
 
        KWIntensity = MWIntialIntensity / 1000 
 
        MWKillWindow = MWThreatRange / MWThreatSpeed 
 
        TimeToMWHK = CalculateTimeToLeathality() 
        TimeToMWSK = CalculateTimeToPain() 
 
        MWRangeFirstHardKill = TimeToMWHK * MWThreatSpeed 
        MWRangeFirstSoftKill = TimeToMWSK * MWThreatSpeed 
 
        MWSKP = MWKillWindow / TimeToMWSK 
        MWHKP = MWKillWindow / TimeToMWHK 
 







APPENDIX E. THREAT AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPON DATA 
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12 Muzzle velocity for guns, average speed for missiles 
13 Number of bursts for guns, single missile launch for missiles 






B. THREAT DATA 
Designator Name Type Speed (m/s) Material Thickness 
(cm) 



























Dhow Dhow Small 
Boat 
4 (assumed) Oak (assumed) 2.5 
(assumed) 










































PC Boghammer Patrol 
Craft 







Person Running 5 
mph 
Personnel 2 (assumed) N/A N/A 
 
 
                                                 





APPENDIX F. TAPE 5 BASELINE INPUT FILE 
M   1    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    .000    .00 
f   8    0  380.000   1.00000   1.00000 3f 4 f 
01_2009 
 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00                              !CARD 1A5 
 1.85 2.25 1.00 1.00 2.75 4.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73 1.00 1.00               !CARD 1A6 
    3    0    0    0    0    0      .000      .000      .000      .000      .000 
      .000      .000      .000    10.000      .000      .000    0        0.00000 
       900      1145         1         2rn        w1aa 
















Public Class ConventionalWeaponAnalyzerSEA19B 
    ‘Thesis Advisor: Prof. Gary O. Langford, Naval Postgraduate School, Systems 
Engineering Department 
    ‘Contact: golangfo@nps.edu 
 
    ‘Software Author: LT Daniel P. Ciullo (USN) 
    ‘Contact: dan.ciullo@gmail.com 
 
 
    ‘Allows an array of missiles to be evaluated in order to determine how many 
kills are possible 
    Class Missile 
        ‘Allow main class variables to be visible 
        Inherits ConventionalWeaponAnalyzerSEA19B 
 
        Public CurrentDistanceFromPlatform As Double 
        Public LaunchInterval As Double = WeaponActivationTime 
        Public InFlight As Boolean = False 
 
    End Class 
 
    ‘Threat Input Variables 
    Public ThreatSpeed As Double ‘meters per second 
    Public ThreatDetectionRange As Double ‘meters 
    Public ThreatDetectionAltitude As Double ‘meters 
 
 
    ‘Platform Input Variable 
    Public VitalAreaRadius As Double ‘meters 
 
    ‘Weapon Input Variables 
    Public WeaponSpeed As Double ‘meters per second 
    Public WeaponMaxEffectiveRange As Double ‘meters 
    Public WeaponMinEffectiveRange As Double ‘meters 
    Public WeaponActivationTime As Double ‘Seconds between rounds/missiles fired 
from platform 
 
    ‘Intermediate Variables 
    Public ThreatSlantRange As Double 
 
    ‘Analysis Output Variables 
    Public NumberHardKillsPossible As Double 
    Public NumberSoftKillsPossible As Double = 0.0 ‘Always Zero for Conventional 
Weapons 





    Public RangeOfFirstSoftKill As Double = 0.0 ‘Always Zero for 
ConvetionalWeapons 
 
    Private Function CalculateThreatSlantRange() 
 
        Return Sqrt(Pow(ThreatDetectionAltitude, 2.0) + Pow(ThreatDetectionRange, 
2.0)) 
 
    End Function 
 
 
    ‘Calculate total kills possible and record range of first kill 
    Public Sub CalculateNumberOfHardKillsPossible() 
 
        Dim tIntercept As Double = 0 
        Dim RangeIntercept As Double = 0 
 
        NumberHardKillsPossible = 0 
        RangeOfFirstHardKill = 0 
 
        ThreatSlantRange = CalculateThreatSlantRange() 
 
        NumberHardKillsPossible = Truncate(ThreatSlantRange / ThreatSpeed / 
WeaponActivationTime - Max(VitalAreaRadius, WeaponMinEffectiveRange) / ThreatSpeed 
/ WeaponActivationTime) 
 
        tIntercept = (ThreatSlantRange + WeaponActivationTime) / (WeaponSpeed + 
ThreatSpeed) 
 
        RangeOfFirstHardKill = tIntercept * (-1.0 * ThreatSpeed) + 
ThreatSlantRange 
 








APPENDIX H. MODTRAN 5 CLASS WRAPPER 
A. DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
MODTRAN5 runs by receiving inputs via an input file in order to perform 
atmospheric calculations. This is called a Tape 5 file, which harkens back to the original 
FORTRAN implementation of the application of the early 1980s. MODTRAN5 then 
writes the results into an output file. Several output files are generated, but we were 
concerned with the Tape 6 file in particular because it provides a point estimate of 
average transmittance over a user-defined frequency band. In order for GINA to leverage 
MODTRAN5 for atmospheric calculations, the team developed a MODTRAN5 C# 
Wrapper as a gateway. 
The MODTRAN5 C# Wrapper would write to the input file using values from the 
GINA model, run MODTRAN5 and then read the output file, returning the resultant 
value back to the GINA model. 
The software development effort for MODTRAN5 C# Wrapper was broken down 
into three tasks: (1) Input File Format Analysis and Creation, (2) Output File Analysis 
and Extraction, and (3) Software Coding.  
1. Input File Format Analysis and Creation 
The input file to be read by MODTRAN5 and generated by MODTRAN5 C# 
Wrapper was a “NavyMaritime.tp5” file. According to the MODTRAN®5.2.1 User’s 
Manual, each input file must be formatted to include six cards minimally: Card 1, Card 
1A, Card 2, Card 3, Card 4 and Card 5. For our model, three additional cards were 
required: Card 1A Option, Card 3A1 and Card 3A2. The additional cards allowed us to 






In order for the wrapper to generate a valid and correct input file, the team had to 
analyze the complicated input file structure. Each card contained the values of the 
following variables16:  
 
 CARD 1: MODTRN, SPEED, BINARY, LYMOLC, MODEL, T_BEST, 
ITYPE, IEMSCT, IMULT, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, M6, MDEF, I_RD2C, 
NOPRNT, TPTEMP, SURREF  
FORMAT (4A1, I1, A1, I4, 10I5, 1X, I4, F8.0, A7)  
 CARD 1A: DIS, DISAZM, DISALB, NSTR, SFWHM, CO2MX, 
H2OSTR, O3STR, C_PROF, LSUNFL, LBMNAM, LFLTNM, H2OAER, 
CDTDIR, SOLCON, CDASTM, ASTMC, ASTMX, ASTMO, AERRH, 
NSSALB  
FORMAT (3A1, I3, F4.0, F10.0, 2A10, 2A1, 4(1X, A1), F10.0, A1, F9.0, 
3F10.0, I10)  
 CARD 2: APLUS, IHAZE, CNOVAM, ISEASN, ARUSS, IVULCN, 
ICSTL, ICLD, IVSA, VIS, WSS, WHH, RAINRT, GNDALT  
FORMAT (A2, I3, A1, I4, A3, I2, 3I5, 5F10.0)  
 CARD 3: H1, H2, ANGLE, RANGE, BETA, RO, LENN, PHI  
FORMAT (6F10.0, I5, 5X, 2F10.0)  
 CARD 3A1: IPARM, IPH, IDAY, ISOURC  
FORMAT (4I5) (If IEMSCT = 2 or 4)  
 CARD 3A2: PARM1, PARM2, PARM3, PARM4, TIME, PSIPO, 
ANGLEM, G  
FORMAT (8F10.0) 
 CARD 4: V1, V2, DV, FWHM, YFLAG, XFLAG, DLIMIT, FLAGS, 
MLFLX, VRFRAC  
FORMAT (4F10.0, 2A1, A8, A7, I3, F10.0) 
 CARD 5: IRPT  
FORMAT (I5) 
                                                 
16 The cards did not lend themself to human-interpretation as they record only the values of the listed 
variables without indication of what they represented.  The above formats extracted from the user manual 





The value formats were specified using the codes listed below with their 
representation listed on the right: 
 A – Alphabet 
 I – Integer 
 F – Floating Point 
 2A1 – 2 Alphabet with up to 1 Character 
 10I5 – 10 Integer with up to 5 Characters 
 F10.0 – Floating Point with up to 10 Characters 
If no value was available for a variable, it would be represented by a blank space.  
Figure 99 shows the input file “NavyMaritime.tp5,” the file format and the lines 
representing the cards. 
Card 1 M   6    2    2    1    0    0    0    0    0    0    0    0   -1          .0500 
F   8    0   380.000   1.00000   1.00000 f 4 f    
15_2009 
    3    0    0    3    0    0     0.000      .000      .000      .000           
    50.000       .10                  .0                                         
    2    2    0    0 
       45.   60.                                                                 
        .3     .3500     .0001    0.0002R $       MT      
    0 
Card 1A 







Figure 99. NavyMaritime.tp5 File Format 
2. Output File Format Analysis and Extraction 
The output file generated by MODTRAN5 was named “NavyMaritime.tp6.” The 
MODTRAN5 C# Wrapper would be able to read the contents and extract the Average 
Transmittance Result if the file contained no error.  Figure 100 shows a correctly 






Figure 100. MODTRAN Tape 6 File Format 
 
3. Coding of Software 
The MODTRAN5 Wrapper was written in .NET Framework 4.5 using C# 
Programming Language. The software package contained three C# source files: (1) 
Program.cs, (2) Form1.cs, and (3) MODTRAN5.cs. 
The Program.cs file starts the program in standalone mode. The Form1.cs file 
encodes the Graphical Interface through which a human user can enter inputs to be read 
by the MODTRAN5 executable for atmospheric calculations. This was used for software 
debugging and verification.  Figure 101 shows the Graphical Interface of the 
MODTRAN5 C# Wrapper. The file MODTRAN5.cs is the main library class file for 
creating the input file, running the MODTRAN5 executable and extracting of result from 
the output file.  
The software package could be compiled into a library file (.dll file) so that 
MODTRAN5 class can be called or imported into other software (such as GINA). To do 
so, one could refer to Form1.cs which is an example of how the MODTRAN5 class could 





The input file for MODTRAN5 was created by MODTRAN5.cs based on the 
format as understood from the “Input File Format Analysis and Creation” task. Each card 
was coded as a C# struct for ease of reference and development. The MODTRAN5.cs file 
then executes the MODTRAN5 executable file by calling a batch file that wraps the 
executable file. The MODTRAN5 executable file then reads the input file and performs 
its calculations before generating the output file. The output file is read by the 
MODTRAN5.cs where it looks for a specific line containing the result required as shown 
from the “Output File Format Analysis and Extraction.” 
 
Figure 101. MODTRAN5 C# Wrapper Form1 User Interface 
Once tested, the wrapper class was then interfaced into GINA using a custom 
content manager. Content managers are objects used by GINA to process, move, and 





“Save and Update” content manager so that when an Engagement X-type is saved, this 
code as well as the appropriate analysis code is called so that the engagement results can 












    class ModTran5 
    { 
        Card1 c1 = new Card1(); 
        Card1A c1A = new Card1A(); 
        Card1AOption c1AOption = new Card1AOption(); 
        Card2 c2 = new Card2(); 
        Card3 c3 = new Card3(); 
        Card3A1 c3A1 = new Card3A1(); 
        Card3A2 c3A2 = new Card3A2(); 
        Card4 c4 = new Card4(); 
        Card5 c5 = new Card5(); 
        string inputfile = ““; 
        string outputfile = ““; 
        string exefile = ““; 
 
        public  ModTran5(string input, string exe, string output) 
        { 
            inputfile = input; 
            outputfile = output; 
            exefile = exe; //MODTRAN cannot be run directly from the exe file. 
Therefore, this points to a batch file that runs MODTRAN 
        } 
 
        public struct Card1 
        { 
            // Set up Card 1 (mandatory - main radiative transport) 
            public string MODTRN;     // MODTRAN band model 
            public string SPEED ;      // Slow algorithm 
            public string BINARY ;     // Output will be ASCII 
            public string LYMOLC ;     // Exclude 16 auxiliary trace gases 
            public string MODEL ;        // Mid-latitude wstringer canned 
atmosphere  






            public string ITYPE;        // Slant path to ground 
            public string IEMSCT;       // Compute path radiance, including solar 
scatter  
            public string IMULT;       // Include multiple scatter, computed at H2 
(target/pixel) 
            public string M1;           // Temperature/pressure default to MODEL 
(Mid-latitude wstringer profile) 
            public string M2;           // Water vapor defaults to MODEL profile 
            public string M3;           // Ozone defaults to MODEL profile1. 
            public string M4;           // Methane defaults to MODEL profile 
            public string M5;           // Nitrous oxide defaults to MODEL profile 
            public string M6;           // Carbon monoxide defaults to MODEL 
profile 
            public string MDEF;         // Default O2, NO, SO2, NO2, NH3, and HNO3 
species profiles. 
            public string I_RD2C;       // Normal program operation - no user 
input for profiles 
            public string NOPRNT;       // Minimize prstringing to Tape6 output 
file 
            public string TPTEMP;       // Temperature at H2 - not important, only 
VIS/NIR 
            public string SURREF;   // Earth reflectance (albedo) 50// right 
across spectrum 
 
        } 
 
        public struct Card1A 
        { 
            // Set up Card 1A (mandatory - main radiative transport continued) 
            public string DIS;        // Not using DISORT multiple scattering 
algorithm 
            public string DISAZM ;     // Therefore, also not using azimuth 
dependence in DISORT 
            public string DISALB ;     // Don”t calculate atmospheric correction 
data 
            public string NSTR ;         // Isaacs 2-stream multiple scattering 
model 
            public string SFWHM ;        // Default solar irradiance data 
            public string CO2MX ;      // CO2 mixing ratio, 370 ppm by volume 
            public string H2OSTR ;    // No scaling of canned water vapor profile 
(MODEL/M2)ing 
            public string O3STR ;     // No scaling of canned ozone profile 
(MODEL/M3) 
            public string C_PROF ;     // No scaling of default molecular species 
profiles 
            public string LSUNFL ;     // Don”t read alternative solar irradiance 
data 
            public string LBMNAM ;     // Don”t read alternative band model file 
            public string LFLTNM ;     // Must read filter file specified 
            public string H2OAER ;     // Don”t bother to modify aerosol 
properties on the basis of H2OSTR 





            public string SOLCON ;      // Unity scaling of TOA solar irradiance, 
but apply seasonal correction 
            public string CDASTM ;     // No Angstrom law manipulations 
            public string NSSALB ;       // Use reference aerosol single-
scattering albedo 
 
        } 
 
        public struct Card1AOption 
        { 
            public string Card1AOptionFName; 
        } 
 
        public struct Card2 
        { 
            // Set up Card 2 (mandatory - main aerosol and cloud options) 
            public string APLUS ;     // Don’t use flexible aerosol manipulations 
            public string IHAZE;        // Rural aerosol model, visibility = 23 km 
(modified below) 
            public string CNOVAM;     // Don’t invoke NOVAM 
            public string ISEASN;       // Use default seasonal aerosol tweaking 
            public string ARUSS;    // Don’t use extended user-defined aerosol 
facility 
            public string IVULCN;       // Background stratospheric aerosol 
profile 
            public string ICSTL;        // Continental influence of maritime 
aerosols - not applicable to this case 
            public string ICLD;         // ** No clouds or rain 
            public string IVSA;         // Don’t use Army Vertical Structure 
Algorithm for boundary layer aerosols 
            public string VIS;         // km. Reduce visibility, scales up aerosol 
amount in boundary layer 
            public string WSS;          // Use default wind speed for named MODEL 
            public string WHH;          // Use default 24 hr average wind speed 
for named MODEL 
            public string RAINRT;       // ** Rain rate is zero (mm/hour), anyway 
no cloud/rain (ICLD) 
            public string GNDALT;       // Target surface (H2) is at sea level 
        } 
 
        public struct Card3 
        { 
            // Set up Card 3 (mandatory - Line of sight geometry) 
            // To define path (LOS) geometry in this case use PHI, H1 and H2 
(combination 3c in manual) 
            public string H1;           // **Not used in this case - we are using 
a slant path to space 
            public string H2;           // **km. Target pixel is at sea level 
            public string ANGLE;        // Not used in this case. (Zenith angle at 
H1) 
            public string RANGE;        // **Not used in this case. Path length. 






            public string RO ;           // Not used in this case. Radius of the 
Earuth, will default to a reasonable value. 
            public string LENN;         // Not used in this case. Short path/long 
path switch. 
            public string PHI;         // degrees. Zenith angle at H2 
(pixel/target) to H1 (satellite camera) 
        } 
 
        public struct Card3A1 
        { 
            // Set up Card 3A1 (Solar scattering geometry, required for IEMSCT = 
2) 
            public string IPARM;       // Will specify relative solar azimuth 
angle and solar zenith angle below (PARM1 and PARM2) 
            public string IPH;          // Use Mie-generated internal database for 
aerosol phase functions 
            public string IDAY;// Compute day number corresponding to 2 Nov 2009 
(works out as IDAY = 306). 
            public string ISOURC;       // The Sun is the extraterrestrial source 
of scattered radiation 
        } 
 
        public struct Card3A2 
        { 
            // Set up Card 3A2 (Solar scattering geometry, also required for 
IEMSCT = 2) 
            public string PARM1;       // deg. The Sun azimuth is 50 deg East of 
LOS azimuth (H2 to H1) 
            public string PARM2;       // deg. Sun zenith angle at H2 
(target/pixel). 
            public string PARM3;        // Not used in this case. 
            public string PARM4;        // Not used in this case. 
            public string TIME;         // Not used in this case. 
            public string PSIPO;        // Not used in this case. 
            public string ANGLEM;       // Not used in this case. 
            public string G;            // Not used in this case. (Henyey-
Greenstein asymmetry parameter) 
        } 
 
        public struct Card4 
        { 
            // Set up Card 4 (mandatory - spectral range and resolution) 
            public string V1;         // Start of spectral computation range in nm 
(see FLAGS(1)) 
            public string V2;         // End of spectral computation range in nm 
            public string DV;         // Spectral increment in nm 
            public string FWHM;         // Convolution filter width in nm 
            public string YFLAG;      // Not going to generate .plt or .psc files 
            public string XFLAG;      // Not going to generate .plt or .psc files 
            public string DLIMIT; 






            public string FLAGS2;   // Use nanometres for spectral units 
(FLAGS(1)). 
            public string FLAGS3;   // Use nanometres for spectral units 
(FLAGS(1)). 
            public string FLAGS4;   // Put ALL radiance components in convolved 
data (tp7) 
            public string FLAGS5;   // Use nanometres for spectral units 
(FLAGS(1)). 
            public string FLAGS6;   // Use nanometres for spectral units 
(FLAGS(1)). 
            public string FLAGS7;   // Put ALL radiance components in convolved 
data (tp7) 
        } 
 
        public struct Card5 
        { 
            // Set up Card 5 (mandatory - Repeat option) 
            public string IRPT;         // Stop program, only one sub-case in this 
run 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard1(){ 
        // Set up Card 1 (mandatory - main radiative transport) 
            c1.MODTRN = “M”;     // MODTRAN band model 
            c1.SPEED = “ “;      // Slow algorithm 
            c1.BINARY = “ “;     // Output will be ASCII 
            c1.LYMOLC = “ “;     // Exclude 16 auxiliary trace gases 
            c1.MODEL = “6”;        // Mid-latitude wstringer canned atmosphere  
            c1.T_BEST = “ “;        // Mid-latitude wstringer canned atmosphere  
            c1.ITYPE = “2.”PadLeft(4);        // Slant path to ground 
            c1.IEMSCT = “2.”PadLeft(5);       // Compute path radiance, including 
solar scatter  
            c1.IMULT = “1.”PadLeft(5);       // Include multiple scatter, computed 
at H2 (target/pixel) 
            c1.M1 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Temperature/pressure default to 
MODEL (Mid-latitude wstringer profile) 
            c1.M2 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Water vapor defaults to MODEL 
profile 
            c1.M3 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Ozone defaults to MODEL profile1. 
            c1.M4 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Methane defaults to MODEL profile 
            c1.M5 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Nitrous oxide defaults to MODEL 
profile 
            c1.M6 = “0.”PadLeft(5);           // Carbon monoxide defaults to MODEL 
profile 
            c1.MDEF = “0.”PadLeft(5);         // Default O2, NO, SO2, NO2, NH3, 
and HNO3 species profiles. 
            c1.I_RD2C = “0.”PadLeft(5);       // Normal program operation - no 
user input for profiles 
            c1.NOPRNT = “-1.”PadLeft(5);       // Minimize prstringing to Tape6 
output file 
            c1.TPTEMP = “ .”PadLeft(8);       // Temperature at H2 - not 





            c1.SURREF = .”0500.”PadLeft(7);   // Earth reflectance (albedo) 50// 
right across spectrum 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard1A() 
        { 
            // Set up Card 1A (mandatory - main radiative transport continued) 
            c1A.DIS = “F”;        // Not using DISORT multiple scattering 
algorithm 
            c1A.DISAZM = “ “;     // Therefore, also not using azimuth dependence 
in DISORT 
            c1A.DISALB = “ “;     // Don”t calculate atmospheric correction data 
            c1A.NSTR = “ 8 “;         // Isaacs 2-stream multiple scattering model 
            c1A.SFWHM = “0.”PadLeft(4);        // Default solar irradiance data 
            c1A.CO2MX = “380.000.”PadLeft(10);      // CO2 mixing ratio, 370 ppm 
by volume 
            c1A.H2OSTR = “1.00000.”PadLeft(10);    // No scaling of canned water 
vapor profile (MODEL/M2)ing 
            c1A.O3STR = “1.00000.”PadLeft(10);     // No scaling of canned ozone 
profile (MODEL/M3) 
            c1A.C_PROF = “ “;     // No scaling of default molecular species 
profiles 
            c1A.LSUNFL = “f”;     // Don”t read alternative solar irradiance data 
            c1A.LBMNAM = “ “;     // Don”t read alternative band model file 
            c1A.LFLTNM = “4”;     // Must read filter file specified 
            c1A.H2OAER = “ “;     // Don”t bother to modify aerosol properties on 
the basis of H2OSTR 
            c1A.CDTDIR = “f”;     // Data files are in the default location 
            c1A.SOLCON = “ “;      // Unity scaling of TOA solar irradiance, but 
apply seasonal correction 
            c1A.CDASTM = “ “;     // No Angstrom law manipulations 




        } 
 
        public void SetupCard1AOption() 
        { 
            c1AOption.Card1AOptionFName = “15_2009”; 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard2() 
        { 
            // Set up Card 2 (mandatory - main aerosol and cloud options) 
            c2.APLUS = “  “;     // Don’t use flexible aerosol manipulations 
            c2.IHAZE = “4.”PadLeft(3);        // MARITIME extinction, default VIS 
= 23 km (LOWTRAN model). 
            c2.CNOVAM = “ “;     // Don’t invoke NOVAM 






            c2.ARUSS = “   “;    // Don’t use extended user-defined aerosol 
facility 
            c2.IVULCN = “0.”PadLeft(2);       // Background stratospheric aerosol 
profile 
            c2.ICSTL = “3.”PadLeft(5);        // Continental influence of maritime 
aerosols - not applicable to this case 
            c2.ICLD = “0.”PadLeft(5);         // ** No clouds or rain 
            c2.IVSA = “0.”PadLeft(5);         // Don’t use Army Vertical Structure 
Algorithm for boundary layer aerosols 
            c2.VIS = “0.000.”PadLeft(10);         // km. Reduce visibility, scales 
up aerosol amount in boundary layer 
            c2.WSS = .”000.”PadLeft(10);          // Use default wind speed for 
named MODEL 
            c2.WHH = .”000.”PadLeft(10);          // Use default 24 hr average 
wind speed for named MODEL 
            c2.RAINRT = .”000.”PadLeft(10);       // ** Rain rate is zero 
(mm/hour), anyway no cloud/rain (ICLD) 
            c2.GNDALT = “0.”PadLeft(10);       // Target surface (H2) is at sea 
level 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard3() 
        { 
            // Set up Card 3 (mandatory - Line of sight geometry) 
            // To define path (LOS) geometry in this case use PHI, H1 and H2 
(combination 3c in manual) 
            c3.H1 = “0.0000.”PadLeft(10);           // Weapon Height 
            c3.H2 = “  0.0.”PadRight(10);           // Threat Height 
            c3.ANGLE = “ .”PadLeft(10);        // Not used in this case. (Zenith 
angle at H1) 
            c3.RANGE = “1.”PadLeft(10);        // Slant Range 
            c3.BETA = “ .”PadLeft(10);         // Not used in this case. Earth 
centre angle. 
            c3.RO = “ .”PadLeft(10);           // Not used in this case. Radius of 
the Earuth, will default to a reasonable value. 
            c3.LENN = “0.”PadLeft(10);         // Not used in this case. Short 
path/long path switch. 
            c3.PHI = “ .”PadLeft(10);         // degrees. Zenith angle at H2 
(pixel/target) to H1 (satellite camera) 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard3A1() 
        { 
 
            // Set up Card 3A1 (Solar scattering geometry, required for IEMSCT = 
2) 
            c3A1.IPARM = “2.”PadLeft(5);       // Will specify relative solar 
azimuth angle and solar zenith angle below (PARM1 and PARM2) 
            c3A1.IPH = “2.”PadLeft(5);          // Use Mie-generated internal 





            c3A1.IDAY = “0.”PadLeft(5);// Compute day number corresponding to 2 
Nov 2009 (works out as IDAY = 306). 
            c3A1.ISOURC = “0.”PadLeft(5);       // The Sun is the extraterrestrial 
source of scattered radiation 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard3A2() 
        { 
            // Set up Card 3A2 (Solar scattering geometry, also required for 
IEMSCT = 2) 
            c3A2.PARM1 = “45..”PadLeft(10);       // deg. The Sun azimuth is 50 
deg East of LOS azimuth (H2 to H1) 
            c3A2.PARM2 = “60.    .”PadLeft(10);       // deg. Sun zenith angle at 
H2 (target/pixel). 
            c3A2.PARM3 = “.”PadLeft(10);        // Not used in this case. 
            c3A2.PARM4 = “.”PadLeft(10);        // Not used in this case. 
            c3A2.TIME = “.”PadLeft(10);         // Not used in this case. 
            c3A2.PSIPO = “.”PadLeft(10);        // Not used in this case. 
            c3A2.ANGLEM = “.”PadLeft(10);       // Not used in this case. 
            c3A2.G = “.”PadLeft(10);            // Not used in this case. (Henyey-
Greenstein asymmetry parameter) 
 
        } 
          
        public void SetupCard4() 
        { 
 
            // Set up Card 4 (mandatory - spectral range and resolution) 
            c4.V1 = .”3.”PadLeft(10);         // Start of spectral computation 
range in nm (see FLAGS(1)) 
            c4.V2 = .”3500.”PadLeft(10);         // End of spectral computation 
range in nm 
            c4.DV = .”005.”PadLeft(10);         // Spectral increment in nm 
            c4.FWHM = .”010.”PadLeft(10);         // Full Width Half Maximum 
            c4.YFLAG = “T”;      // Not going to generate .plt or .psc files 
            c4.XFLAG = “ “;      // Not going to generate .plt or .psc files 
            c4.DLIMIT = “$.”PadRight(8); 
            c4.FLAGS1 = “M”;   // Use µm for spectral units (FLAGS(1)). 
            c4.FLAGS2 = “R”;   // Use nanometres for spectral units (FLAGS(1)). 
            c4.FLAGS3 = “ “;   // Use nanometres for spectral units (FLAGS(1)). 
            c4.FLAGS4 = “ “;   // Put ALL radiance components in convolved data 
(tp7) 
            c4.FLAGS5 = “ “;   // Use nanometres for spectral units (FLAGS(1)). 
            c4.FLAGS6 = “ “;   // Use nanometres for spectral units (FLAGS(1)). 
            c4.FLAGS7 = “ “;   // Put ALL radiance components in convolved data 
(tp7) 
        } 
 
        public void SetupCard5() 
        { 





            c5.IRPT = “0.”PadLeft(5);         // Stop program, only one sub-case 
in this run 
 
        } 
 
        public void SetParam(string RAINRT, string H1, string H2, string RANGE, 
string V1, string V2) 
        { 
            SetupCard1(); 
            SetupCard1A(); 
            SetupCard1AOption(); 
            SetupCard2(); 
            SetupCard3(); 
            SetupCard3A1(); 
            SetupCard3A2(); 
            SetupCard4(); 
            SetupCard5(); 
 
             
            c2.RAINRT = RAINRT.PadLeft(10); 
            c3.H1 = H1.PadLeft(10); 
            c3.H2 = H2.PadLeft(10); 
            c3.RANGE = RANGE.PadLeft(10); 
            c4.V1 = V1.PadLeft(10); 
            c4.V2 = V2.PadLeft(10); 
             
        } 
 
        public void GenerateInput() 
        { 
            FileInfo fi = new FileInfo(inputfile); 
            StreamWriter sw = fi.CreateText(); 
 
            //SetParam(); 
 
            string Card1 = c1.MODTRN + c1.SPEED + c1.BINARY + c1.LYMOLC + c1.MODEL 
+ c1.T_BEST + c1.ITYPE + c1.IEMSCT + c1.IMULT + c1.M1 + c1.M2 + c1.M3 + c1.M4 
                + c1.M5 + c1.M6 + c1.MDEF + c1.I_RD2C + c1.NOPRNT + c1.TPTEMP + 
c1.SURREF; 
 
            string Card1A = c1A.DIS + c1A.DISAZM + c1A.DISALB + c1A.NSTR + 
c1A.SFWHM + c1A.CO2MX + c1A.H2OSTR + c1A.O3STR + c1A.C_PROF + c1A.LSUNFL + 
c1A.LBMNAM 
                + c1A.LFLTNM + c1A.H2OAER + c1A.CDTDIR + c1A.SOLCON + c1A.CDASTM + 
c1A.NSSALB; 
 
            string Card1AOption = c1AOption.Card1AOptionFName; 
            string Card2 = c2.APLUS + c2.IHAZE + c2.CNOVAM + c2.ISEASN + c2.ARUSS 
+ c2.IVULCN + c2.ICSTL + c2.ICLD + c2.IVSA + c2.VIS + c2.WSS + c2.WHH + c2.RAINRT 
+ c2.GNDALT; 
 
            string Card3 = c3.H1 + c3.H2 + c3.ANGLE + c3.RANGE + c3.BETA + c3.RO + 






            string Card3A1 = c3A1.IPARM + c3A1.IPH + c3A1.IDAY + c3A1.ISOURC; 
 
            string Card3A2 = c3A2.PARM1 + c3A2.PARM2 + c3A2.PARM3 + c3A2.PARM4 + 
c3A2.TIME + c3A2.PSIPO + c3A2.ANGLEM + c3A2.G; 
 
            string Card4 = c4.V1 + c4.V2 + c4.DV + c4.FWHM + c4.YFLAG + c4.XFLAG + 
c4.DLIMIT + c4.FLAGS1 + c4.FLAGS2 + c4.FLAGS3 + c4.FLAGS4 + c4.FLAGS5 + c4.FLAGS6 
+ c4.FLAGS7; 
 
            string Card5 = c5.IRPT; 
 
            sw.WriteLine(Card1); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card1A); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card1AOption); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card2); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card3); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card3A1); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card3A2); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card4); 
            sw.WriteLine(Card5); 
            sw.Close(); 
 
        } 
 
        public void RunExe() 
        { 
            // Prepare the process to run 
            ProcessStartInfo start = new ProcessStartInfo(); 
            // Enter the executable to run, including the complete path 
            start.FileName = exefile; 
            // Do you want to show a console window? 
            start.WindowStyle = ProcessWindowStyle.Hidden; 
            start.CreateNoWindow = true; 
 
            // Run the external process & wait for it to finish 
            using (Process proc = Process.Start(start)) 
            { 
                proc.WaitForExit(20000); 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        public string ReadOutput() 
        { 
            string output = ““; 
 
            try 
            { 
                using (FileStream fs = new FileStream(outputfile, FileMode.Open)) 
                { 






                    { 
                        string line = null; 
                        while ((line = reader.ReadLine()) != null) 
                        { 
                            //Console.WriteLine(line); 
                            if (line.Contains(“AVERAGE TRANSMITTANCE”)) 
                            { 
                                output = line.Split(new char[] { ‘=‘ }, 
StringSplitOptions.RemoveEmptyEntries)[1].Trim() ; 
                            } 
                        } 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
            catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(ex.ToString()); 
            } 
            return output; 
 
        } 
         






















4 0.8 1.27324 100000 1.8015 39.053 
1 0.8 1.27324 100000 11.4818 248.891 
2 0.8 1.27324 100000 4.5481 98.59 
6 0.8 1.27324 100000 1.0481 22.719 
8 0.8 1.27324 100000 0.7136 15.47 
10 0.8 1.27324 100000 0.5297 11.482 
4 0.8 0.5 100000 0.1482 3.214 
4 0.8 0.7 100000 0.3643 7.897 
4 0.8 0.8 100000 0.5205 11.282 
4 0.8 0.88 100000 0.6714 14.554 
4 0.8 1 100000 0.9448 20.48 
4 0.8 1.1 100000 1.2188 26.42 
4 0.8 1.2 100000 1.5378 33.336 
4 0.8 1.3 100000 1.9046 41.285 
4 0.8 1.5 100000 2.7916 60.513 
4 0.8 2 100000 6.0213 130.523 
4 0.1 1.27324 100000 28.9857 628.325 
4 0.2 1.27324 100000 11.4818 248.89 
4 0.3 1.27324 100000 6.6796 144.794 
4 0.4 1.27324 100000 4.5481 98.59 
4 0.5 1.27324 100000 3.3757 73.175 
4 0.6 1.27324 100000 2.6459 57.355 





4 0.8 1.27324 100000 1.8016 39.053 
4 0.9 1.27324 100000 1.5393 33.367 
4 0.95 1.27324 100000 1.432 31.042 
4 0.8 1.27324 10000 39.0532 846.557 
4 0.8 1.27324 20000 15.4696 335.336 
4 0.8 1.27324 30000 8.9996 195.084 
4 0.8 1.27324 40000 6.1278 132.832 
4 0.8 1.27324 50000 4.5481 98.59 
4 0.8 1.27324 60000 3.5649 77.276 
4 0.8 1.27324 70000 2.9014 62.893 
4 0.8 1.27324 80000 2.4273 52.617 
4 0.8 1.27324 90000 2.0739 44.956 
4 0.8 1.27324 150000 1.0481 22.719 
4 0.8 1.27324 200000 0.7136 15.47 
4 0.8 1.27324 300000 0.4152 9 
4 0.8 1.27324 400000 0.2827 6.128 
4 0.8 1.27324 500000 0.2098 4.548 
4 0.8 1.27324 600000 0.1645 3.565 
4 0.8 1.27324 700000 0.1338 2.901 
4 0.8 1.27324 800000 0.112 2.427 
4 0.8 1.27324 900000 0.0957 2.074 
































1.064 0.66 6.5 33 0.89 7500 0.40802 0 2.4481 5800 
1.6 0.66 6.5 33 0.89 7400 0.40717 0 2.443 5800 
1.064 0.66 5 33 0.89 6700 0.31369 0 1.8821 4500 
1.064 0.66 5.5 33 0.89 7000 0.34489 0 2.0694 5000 
1.064 0.66 6 33 0.89 7200 0.37606 0 2.2563 5400 
1.064 0.66 7 33 0.89 7600 0.43823 0 2.6294 6000 
1.064 0.66 7.5 33 0.89 7800 0.46923 0 2.8154 6300 
1.064 0.66 8 33 0.89 7900 0.50018 0 3.0011 6500 
1.064 0.1 6.5 33 0.89 8800 5.28482 4100 31.7089 8200 
1.064 0.2 6.5 33 0.89 9500 3.30804 5700 19.8482 9100 
1.064 0.3 6.5 33 0.89 9400 1.82745 4100 10.9647 8900 
1.064 0.4 6.5 33 0.89 9000 1.08315 700 6.4989 8300 
1.064 0.5 6.5 33 0.89 8500 0.70415 0 4.2249 7500 
1.064 0.6 6.5 33 0.89 7900 0.49183 0 2.951 6500 
1.064 0.7 6.5 33 0.89 7100 0.36225 0 2.1735 5200 





1.064 0.9 6.5 33 0.89 5300 0.21955 0 1.3173 2300 
1.064 1 6.5 33 0.89 4200 0.1779 0 1.0674 600 
1.064 0.66 6.5 10 0.89 1800 0.12339 0 0.7403 * 
1.064 0.66 6.5 20 0.89 5800 0.24677 0 1.4806 3100 
1.064 0.66 6.5 40 0.89 7900 0.49354 0 2.9612 6500 
1.064 0.66 6.5 50 0.89 8300 0.61693 0 3.7016 7200 
1.064 0.66 6.5 60 0.89 8600 0.74031 0 4.4419 7700 
1.064 0.66 6.5 70 0.89 8800 0.8637 0 5.1822 8000 
1.064 0.66 6.5 80 0.89 9000 0.98708 0 5.9225 8200 
1.064 0.66 6.5 90 0.89 9100 1.11047 1000 6.6628 8400 
1.064 0.66 6.5 100 0.89 9200 1.23385 1800 7.4031 8600 
1.064 0.66 6.5 110 0.89 9300 1.35724 2500 8.1434 8700 
1.064 0.66 6.5 120 0.89 9300 1.48062 3100 8.8837 8800 
1.064 0.66 6.5 130 0.89 9400 1.60401 3600 9.624 8900 
1.064 0.66 6.5 140 0.89 9400 1.72739 4100 10.3643 9000 
1.064 0.66 6.5 150 0.89 9500 1.85078 4400 11.1047 9100 
1.064 0.66 6.5 200 0.89 9600 2.4677 5800 14.8062 9300 
1.064 0.66 6.5 300 0.89 9800 3.70155 7200 22.2093 9600 
1.064 0.66 6.5 400 0.89 9800 4.9354 7900 29.6124 9700 
1.064 0.66 6.5 500 0.89 9900 6.16925 8300 37.0155 9800 
1.064 0.66 6.5 33 0.8 8600 0.74031 0 4.4419 7700 





1.064 0.66 6.5 33 0.9 7200 0.37016 0 2.2209 5300 
1.064 0.66 6.5 33 0.95 4400 0.18508 0 1.1105 1000 


































0.3 5 10 0.8 1.6 8600 0 7700 
0.66 8 150 0.8 1.064 9800 7600 9600 
0.3 5 150 0.8 1.6 10000 9100 9900 
0.66 5 150 0.99 1.6 2400 0 0 
0.66 5 10 0.99 1.064 0 0 0 
0.66 5 10 0.8 1.6 4200 0 500 
0.66 5 150 0.8 1.064 9600 6100 9400 
0.3 5 150 0.8 1.064 10000 9200 9900 
0.66 5 10 0.99 1.6 0 0 0 
0.66 5 150 0.99 1.064 2400 0 0 
0.66 8 10 0.8 1.6 6300 0 3900 
0.3 8 150 0.99 1.6 8700 0 7800 
0.3 8 10 0.8 1.064 9100 2100 8600 
0.66 5 10 0.8 1.064 4200 0 600 
0.66 8 150 0.8 1.6 9800 7500 9600 
0.3 5 10 0.99 1.064 0 0 0 
0.66 8 10 0.99 1.064 0 0 0 
0.3 5 150 0.99 1.6 8200 0 7000 
0.3 8 10 0.8 1.6 9000 1600 8300 
0.3 8 150 0.99 1.064 8900 0 8100 
0.3 8 10 0.99 1.6 0 0 0 





0.3 8 10 0.99 1.064 0 0 0 
0.66 8 150 0.8 1.064 9800 7600 9600 
0.66 8 10 0.99 1.6 0 0 0 
0.66 8 150 0.99 1.6 5100 0 2000 
0.3 5 150 0.99 1.064 8300 0 7200 
0.66 8 150 0.99 1.064 5200 0 2000 
0.3 5 10 0.8 1.6 8600 0 7700 
0.66 5 150 0.8 1.6 9600 6100 9400 
0.3 5 10 0.8 1.064 8700 0 7900 







APPENDIX L. GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK 












ATFP 8 FIAC 1 1000 ADS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 ADS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 ADS 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 ADS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 ADS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
FIAC 1 500 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
FIAC 1 500 ADS 








FIAC 1 500 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 ADS 
ATFP 4 Person 1 300 ADS 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 ADS 
ATFP 4 Person 1 300 ADS 
ATFP 4 Person 1 300 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
Dhow 1 250 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
Dhow 1 250 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
Dhow 1 250 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
FIAC 1 500 ADS 
NCO 
19.9 
FIAC 1 500 ADS 
NCO 
19.6 
Dhow 1 250 ADS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 ADS 
AW 1.4 MiG-29 30000 20000 LaWS 
AW 1.5 F-14 1000 30000 LaWS 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 MiG-29 10000 20000 LaWS 
AW 1.4 AS-11 5 7000 LaWS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS 
AW 9.1 F-14 40000 20000 LaWS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS 






ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 LaWS 
ATFP 8 FIAC 1 1000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS 
AW 
1.13 
C-802 5 7000 LaWS 
AW 1.4 AS-11 5 7000 LaWS 
NCO 
19.9 
Dhow 1 500 LaWS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS 
AW 1.5 AS-11 5 1000 LaWS 
AW 1.1 C-802 5 5000 LaWS 
NCO 
19.9 
Dhow 1 500 LaWS 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 LaWS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 LaWS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 LaWS 
AW 
1.12 
AS-11 5 10000 LaWS 






AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS 
AW 1.5 AS-11 5 10000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 LaWS 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 LaWS 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 LaWS 
ATFP 8 FIAC 1 1000 LaWS 
AW 1.6 C-802 5 15000 LaWS 
AW 
1.13 
F-14 2000 20000 LaWS+ 
AW 
1.13 
MiG-29 10000 30000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.5 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 LaWS+ 
AW 9.1 MiG-29 60000 30000 LaWS+ 





1000 15000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.4 MiG-29 30000 20000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.6 F-14 1000 30000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 LaWS+ 
AW 9.4 Cessna 500 15000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.4 F-14 10000 10000 LaWS+ 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.4 MiG-29 30000 20000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.1 AS-11 5 5000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 





ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.1 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.4 Iranian 
UAV 
1000 2000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.1 F-14 1000 10000 LaWS+ 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 LaWS+ 
AW 
1.12 
C-802 5 8000 LaWS+ 
AW 
1.13 
C-802 5 7000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.1 Iranian 
UAV 
100 7000 LaWS+ 
NCO 
19.9 
Dhow 1 500 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.1 C-802 5 5000 LaWS+ 
NCO 
19.9 
FIAC 1 500 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.4 MiG-29 30000 20000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 LaWS+ 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 LaWS+ 
SUW 
2.3 







FAC 1 4000 LaWS+ 
SUW 
2.3 
PC 1 7000 LaWS+ 
SUW 
2.3 
PC 1 7000 LaWS+ 
AW 1.5 C-802 5 15000 LaWS+ 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 15 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MK 15 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MK 15 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MK 15 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MK 15 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MK 15 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 MK 15 
AW 9.3 C-802 5 7000 MK 15 
AW 9.4 Cessna 500 15000 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FIAC 1 700 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 







FIAC 1 700 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
FAC 1 1000 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 MK 15 
SUW 
1.10 
PC 1 1500 MK 15 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 15 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MK 15 
ATFP 
15 












FIAC 1 700 MK 38 Mod 
2 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 38 Mod 
2 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 38 Mod 
2 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 38 Mod 
2 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MK 38 Mod 
2 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 38 Mod 
2 






ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MK 38 Mod 
2 
































































































PC 1 7000 MK 38 Mod 
2 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 MK 54 
AW 9.3 C-802 5 7000 MK 54 
NCO 
19.9 
FIAC 1 500 MK 54 
SUW 
2.3 
FAC 1 4000 MK 54 
SUW 
2.3 
FAC 1 4000 MK 54 
SUW 
2.3 
PC 1 7000 MK 54 
AW 1.1 F-14 1000 10000 MLD 
AW 
1.13 
MiG-29 10000 30000 MLD 
AW 1.4 MiG-29 30000 20000 MLD 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 MLD 
AW 1.1 MiG-29 700 10000 MLD 
AW 1.5 F-14 1000 30000 MLD 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 MLD 
AW 1.6 F-14 1000 30000 MLD 
AW 9.1 F-14 40000 20000 MLD 
AW 9.4 Iranian 
UAV 
250 10000 MLD 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 MLD 
AW 1.6 MiG-29 10000 20000 MLD 
AW 9.4 Iranian 
UAV 
250 10000 MLD 
AW 1.1 F-14 1000 10000 MLD 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MLD 
AW 1.4 C-802 5 3000 MLD 
AW 9.3 C-802 5 7000 MLD 





AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MLD 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MLD 
AW 1.5 F-14 1000 30000 MLD 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MLD 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MLD 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MLD 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MLD 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MLD 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MLD 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MLD 
AW 9.4 Cessna 500 15000 MLD 
AW 
1.13 
F-14 2000 20000 MLD 
AW 1.4 Iranian 
UAV 





1000 15000 MLD 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MLD 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MLD 
AW 9.4 Iranian 
UAV 
250 10000 MLD 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 MLD 
ATFP 8 FIAC 1 1000 MLD 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MLD 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 MLD 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MLD 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 MLD 
ATFP 8 FIAC 1 1000 MLD 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 MLD 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 MLD 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 MLD 
AW 1.4 C-802 5 3000 MLD 






AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MLD 
AW 1.4 F-14 10000 10000 MLD 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 MLD 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 MLD 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 MLD 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 MLD 
AW 1.5 AS-11 5 10000 MLD 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 MLD 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 MLD 
AW 
1.13 
F-14 2000 20000 MLD 
AW 
1.12 
AS-11 5 10000 MLD 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 MLD 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
5 10000 MLD 
AW 1.5 C-802 5 15000 MLD 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 RIM-116 
AW 1.1 C-802 5 5000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.1 F-14 1000 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.1 Iranian 
UAV 
100 7000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.12 
AS-11 5 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.13 
AS-11 5 9000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.13 
C-802 5 7000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 
1.13 
MiG-29 10000 30000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.4 Iranian 
UAV 





AW 1.5 AS-11 5 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.5 MiG-29 10000 20000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.5 C-802 5 16000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.5 F-14 1000 30000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.5 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.6 AS-11 5 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.6 MiG-29 10000 20000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.6 Iranian 
UAV 
500 10000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 9.1 F-14 40000 20000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 9.1 MiG-29 60000 30000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 RIM-66 MR 
SUW 
2.3 
FAC 1 4000 RIM-66 MR 
SUW 
2.3 
PC 1 7000 RIM-66 MR 
AW 1.6 F-14 1000 30000 TLS 
AW 1.6 F-14 1000 30000 TLS 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 TLS 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 TLS 
AW 9.4 Cessna 500 15000 TLS 
AW 1.6 MiG-29 10000 20000 TLS 
AW 9.1 F-14 40000 20000 TLS 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 TLS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 TLS 
AW 1.4 AS-11 5 7000 TLS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 TLS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 TLS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 TLS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 TLS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 TLS 
AW 1.6 F-14 1000 30000 TLS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 TLS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 TLS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 TLS 





AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 TLS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 TLS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 TLS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 TLS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 TLS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 TLS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 TLS 
AW 9.3 AS-11 5 8000 TLS 
AW 1.4 AS-11 5 7000 TLS 
AW 9.3 C-802 5 7000 TLS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 TLS 
AW 1.4 C-802 5 3000 TLS 
AW 1.2 Iranian 
UAV 
500 3000 TLS 
AW 1.4 F-14 10000 10000 TLS 
AW 1.2 AS-11 200 2500 TLS 
AW 1.2 C-802 5 2000 TLS 
ATFP 9 Cessna 500 1500 TLS 
ATFP 9 Iranian 
UAV 
500 1000 TLS 
ATFP 
15 
FIAC 1 700 TLS 
SUW 
2.3 
FAC 1 4000 TLS 












APPENDIX M. MAP AWARE NON-UNIFORM AUTOMATA 
(MANA) SIMULATION RESULTS 
MANA Result for UAV Scenario 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
1 3 7 1 5 
2 4 7 0 5 
3 3 7 0 5 
4 3 7 1 5 
5 4 7 1 5 
6 3 7 0 5 
7 4 7 0 5 
8 4 7 0 5 
9 4 7 1 5 
10 4 7 1 5 
11 3 7 1 5 
12 4 7 0 4 
13 4 7 0 5 
14 3 7 0 5 
15 4 7 1 4 
16 3 7 1 5 
17 4 7 1 5 
18 3 7 0 5 
19 3 7 0 4 
20 4 7 0 5 
21 4 7 0 5 
22 3 7 1 5 
23 3 7 0 5 
24 3 7 1 5 
25 4 7 1 5 
26 4 7 1 5 
27 4 7 0 5 
28 4 7 0 5 
29 4 7 0 5 





Average 3.57  7.00  0.43  4.90  
 
 
MANA Result for Small Boat Scenario 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
1 3 7 0 3 
2 2 7 0 3 
3 3 7 0 3 
4 3 7 0 3 
5 3 7 0 3 
6 2 7 0 3 
7 2 7 0 3 
8 2 7 0 4 
9 3 7 0 3 
10 3 7 0 3 
11 2 7 0 3 
12 3 7 0 3 
13 3 7 0 3 
14 2 7 0 3 
15 3 7 0 3 
16 3 7 0 3 
17 2 7 0 3 
18 2 7 0 3 
19 3 7 0 3 
20 3 7 0 3 
21 3 7 0 3 
22 3 7 0 3 
23 2 7 0 3 
24 3 7 0 3 
25 2 7 0 3 
26 3 7 0 3 
27 3 7 0 3 
28 2 7 0 3 
29 2 7 0 3 
30 2 7 0 3 






MANA Result for Supersonic ASCM Scenario 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
1 0 2 0 0 
2 0 2 0 0 
3 0 2 0 0 
4 0 2 0 0 
5 0 1 0 0 
6 0 2 0 0 
7 0 2 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 
9 0 2 0 0 
10 0 2 0 0 
11 0 2 0 0 
12 0 2 0 0 
13 0 2 0 0 
14 0 2 0 0 
15 0 2 0 0 
16 0 2 0 0 
17 0 2 0 0 
18 0 2 0 0 
19 0 2 0 0 
20 0 2 0 0 
21 0 2 0 0 
22 0 2 0 0 
23 0 2 0 0 
24 0 1 0 0 
25 0 2 0 0 
26 0 2 0 0 
27 0 2 0 0 
28 0 2 0 0 
29 0 2 0 0 
30 0 2 0 0 








MANA Result for Subsonic ASCM Scenario 
  LaWS LaWS+ TLS MLD 
1 1 5 0 2 
2 1 5 0 2 
3 1 5 0 2 
4 2 5 0 2 
5 1 5 0 2 
6 2 5 0 2 
7 1 5 0 2 
8 1 5 0 2 
9 1 5 0 2 
10 1 5 0 2 
11 2 5 0 2 
12 1 5 0 2 
13 2 5 0 2 
14 1 5 0 2 
15 1 5 0 2 
16 1 5 0 2 
17 2 5 0 2 
18 1 5 0 2 
19 1 5 0 2 
20 1 5 0 2 
21 1 5 0 2 
22 1 5 0 2 
23 2 5 0 2 
24 1 5 0 2 
25 2 5 0 2 
26 1 5 0 2 
27 1 5 0 2 
28 1 5 0 2 
29 1 5 0 2 
30 1 5 0 2 








Multiple targets For LaWS 
  Subsonic ASCM UAV Small Boat 
1 1 3 1 
2 1 3 1 
3 1 3 1 
4 1 3 0 
5 1 3 1 
6 1 3 1 
7 1 3 1 
8 1 3 2 
9 1 3 1 
10 1 3 1 
11 1 3 1 
12 1 3 1 
13 1 3 1 
14 1 3 1 
15 1 3 1 
16 1 3 1 
17 1 3 1 
18 1 3 2 
19 1 3 1 
20 1 3 1 
21 1 3 1 
22 1 3 1 
23 1 3 1 
24 1 3 2 
25 1 3 1 
26 1 3 2 
27 1 3 1 
28 1 3 1 
29 1 3 1 
30 1 3 1 








Multiple targets For LaWS+ 
  Subsonic ASCM UAV Small Boat 
1 1 3 5 
2 1 3 5 
3 1 3 5 
4 1 3 5 
5 1 3 5 
6 1 3 5 
7 1 3 5 
8 1 3 5 
9 1 3 5 
10 1 3 5 
11 1 3 5 
12 1 3 5 
13 1 3 5 
14 1 3 5 
15 1 3 5 
16 1 3 5 
17 1 3 5 
18 1 3 5 
19 1 3 5 
20 1 3 5 
21 1 3 5 
22 1 3 5 
23 1 3 5 
24 1 3 5 
25 1 3 5 
26 1 3 5 
27 1 3 5 
28 1 3 5 
29 1 3 5 
30 1 3 5 








Multiple targets MLD 
  Subsonic ASCM UAV Small Boat 
1 1 3 3 
2 1 3 3 
3 1 3 2 
4 1 3 3 
5 1 3 2 
6 1 3 2 
7 1 3 3 
8 1 3 3 
9 1 3 3 
10 1 3 1 
11 1 3 1 
12 1 3 3 
13 1 3 2 
14 1 3 1 
15 1 3 2 
16 1 3 3 
17 1 3 2 
18 1 3 2 
19 1 3 2 
20 1 3 3 
21 1 3 2 
22 1 3 3 
23 1 3 3 
24 1 3 3 
25 1 3 3 
26 1 3 3 
27 1 3 2 
28 1 3 2 
29 1 3 3 
30 1 3 3 








Multiple targets TLS 
  Subsonic ASCM UAV Small Boat 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 
15 0 0 0 
16 0 0 0 
17 0 0 0 
18 0 0 0 
19 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 
21 0 0 0 
22 0 0 0 
23 0 0 0 
24 0 0 0 
25 0 0 0 
26 0 0 0 
27 0 0 0 
28 0 0 0 
29 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ackerman, Spencer. Video: I Got Blasted by the Pentagon’s Pain Ray — Twice. March 
12, 2012. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/03/pain-ray-shot/. Accessed 
April 18, 2013. 
Air Force Research Laboratory. “Active Denial System: Advance Technology Concept.” 
kirtland.af.mil. August 2006. 
http://www.kirtland.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070404–026.pdf. 
Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Airforce-technology.com. MiG-29 Fulcrum Fighter Bomber, Russian Federation. 2012. 
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mig29/. Accessed February 20, 
2013. 
Alexander, John B. Winning the War: Advanced Weapons, Strategies, and Concepts for 
the Post-9/11 World 
http://books.google.com/books?id=KOn9yDkMC4cC&pg=PT22&lpg=PT22&dq
=advanced+tactical+laser+%22microns%22&source=bl&ots=9wUe4lE9t6&sig
=SqEATxmhJcIELUoSltMsqVMBnBA&hl=en&sa=. New York City: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2003. 
Alternatewars.com. Big Book of Warfare and Other Stuff: U.S. Navy Guided Missile 
Launcher Systems. February 15, 2012. 
http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Weapons/U.S._GMLS.htm. Accessed 
April 26, 2013. 
Anderson, Thomas, D. Dolk, and Frank Busalacchi. Network Certification of GINA and 
Development of CONOPS for the GINA Tunnel System. Technical Report, 
Monterey: TRADOC Analysis Center, 2012. 
Ang, Ching Na. “EMPLOYMENT FROM A NAVY SHIP ANALYSIS OF HIGH 
ENERGY LASER WEAPON.” Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2012. 
Angell, Aaron. “The High-Energy LASER: Tomorrow’s Weapon to Improve Force 
Protection.” NDU Press. 2012. http://www.ndu.edu/press/high-energy-laser.html. 
Accessed January 15, 2013. 
antenna-theory.com. Antenna Basics. 2011. http://www.antenna-





BAE Systems. “MK 38 MOD 2 MACHINE GUN SYSTEM.” Technical Data Sheet, 
2011. 
Banner, Julie, and Clinton Winchester. LITHIUM BATTERY SAFETY IN SUPPORT OF 
OPERATIONAL FIELDING OF UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES. 
Publication, UUST 17, 2011. 
Basov, NG, VF Gavrikov, VP Poponin, SA Pozdneev, EA Chinaeva, and VA Shcheglov. 
“Journal of Soveit LASER Research.” Springer.com. September-October 1989. 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF01120335?LI=true. Accessed 
December 20, 2012. 
Benford, James, John Allan Swegle, and Edl Schamliglu. High Power Microwaves. CRC 
Press, 2007. 
Berk, A., G. P. Anderson, P. K. Acharya, and E. P. Shettle. MODTRAN® 5.2.2 USER’S 
MANUAL. Burlington: Spectral Sciences, Inc. and Air Force Research 
Laboratory: Space Vehicles Directorate, 2011. 
BFG Industries, Inc. Fiberglass Cloth. 2004. http://bgf.com/fiberglass_cloth/. Accessed 
April 19, 2013. 
Board of Inspection and Survey. Mission Statement. March 2011. 
http://www.public.navy.mil/fltfor/insurv/Pages/Mission.aspx. Accessed March 
17, 2013. 
Brisbane Times. U.S. Navy zaps boat with laser ray gun. April 12, 2011. 
http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/technology/sci-tech/us-navy-zaps-boat-with-
laser-ray-gun-20110412–1dbie.html. Accessed April 21, 2013. 
Burgess, Richard R. SeaPower. March 19, 2013. 
http://www.seapowermagazine.org/stories/20130319-burke.html. Accessed April 
2013, 14). 
Burrus, Daniel. 20 Game-Changing Technology Trends That Will Create Both Disruption 
and Opportunity. November 14, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-
burrus/20-gamechanging-technology-trends_b_2124924.html. Accessed May 7, 
2013. 
Busalacchi, Frank, interview by Daniel Ciullo, Jeffery deLongpre and Jakub 
Nowakowski. Chief Technology Officer, Big Kahuna Technologies, LLC 





Busalacchi, Frank, David Tinsley, Wesley Skinner, Paul Bressler, and Eric Yarborough. 
Global Information Network Architecture. United States of America Patent U.S. 
2010/0070504 A1. March 18, 2010. 
Cadena, C, and M Selinger. Boeing Media Room. August 13, 2009. 
http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=796. Accessed December 
20, 2012. 
Center for Army Lessons Learned. Active Denial System 2. September 17, 2008. 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=34157. Accessed June 3, 
2013. 
Chernesky, Vincent, interview by Jakub Nowakowski. Deputy Program Manager, PMS 
405 (October 16, 2012. 
Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. 
Cleary, Helen. V-weapons Attack Britain. February 17, 2011. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/ff7_vweapons.shtml. Accessed 
May 20, 2013. 
Cohen, N, JF Bott, MA Kwok, and RL Wilkins. The Status of Rotational Nonequilibrium 
in HF Chemical Lasers. Technical Report 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a169436.pdf, Kirtland AFB: Air Force 
Weapons Laboratory, 1986. 
Collina, Tom Z, and Kelsey Davenport. “Airborne Laser Mothballed.” Arms Control 
Association. March 2012. 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/Airborne_Laser_Mothballed. Accessed 
May 5, 2013. 
Correll, John T. “They Called It Star Wars.” Air Force Magazine. June 2012. 
http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2012/June%202012/0612st
arwars.aspx. Accessed May 7, 2013. 
Corvisier, Andre. A Dicitonary of Military Histroy and the Art of War. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1994. 
CVN 76 RAM Rolling Airframe Missile Shoot.You Tube, 2012. 
Defense Acquisition University. Depot Level Services. March 29, 2011. 





———. DoD Disposal of Military Systems. March 16, 2012. 
https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=1e8209f5–1581–
4987–827a-3ecf299383a3. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
———. “Integrated Product Support Guidebook.” ACQNotes. December 2011. 
http://www.acqnotes.com/Attachments/Integrated%20Product%20Support%20Gu
idebook%20Dec%202011.pdf. Accessed April 15, 2013. 
———. Supply Chain Management. May 12, 2012. 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22412&lang=en-U.S.. Accessed 
March 17, 2013. 
———. Sustaining Engineering. May 21, 2012. 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=514806&lang=en-U.S.. 
Accessed March 16, 2013. 
———. Sustainment. May 12, 2003. 
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18073. Accessed March 16, 
2013. 
———. Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). January 12, 2012. 
https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=20a138ca-a859–
454f-a23a-16a813478566. Accessed May 1, 2013. 
Defense Update. “Active Denial System (ADS).” Defense Update. 2007. 
———. MATRIX Tactical Laser Weapon Demonstrates Counter-Swarm Techniques. 
August 30, 2011. http://defense-
update.com/20110830_mk30mod2_tactical_laser_systems.html. Accessed May 1, 
2013. 
Department of Defense. Active Denial System Frequently Asked Questions. Unkown. 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/pressroom/faq_p2.html. Accessed April 13, 2013. 
———. SBIR/STTR. 2010. http://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/7647. Accessed April 4, 
2013. 
Deveci, Bayram Mert. DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS: INVISIBLE AND 
INVINCIBLE?.Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 
DoD Non-lethal Weapons Program. “Active Denial System Frequently Asked 
Questions.” jnlwp.defense.gov. 2007. 






Dolk, Daniel, Frank Busalacchi, Thomas Anderson, and David Tinsley. “GINA: System 
Interoperability for Enabling Smart Mobile System Services in Network Decision 
Support Systems.” 45th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences. Computer Society Press, 2012. 
Electronics Cooling. Thermal Properties Of Building Materials. February 1, 2008. 
http://www.electronics-cooling.com/2008/02/thermal-properties-of-building-
materials/. Accessed April 16, 2013. 
Encyclopedia Astronautica. Standard-ER. n.d. 
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/staarder.htm. Accessed April 26, 2013. 
Eshel, Tamir. defense-update.com. October 21, 2012. http://defense-
update.com/20121021_ausa-2012-precision-fires.html. Accessed April 27, 2013. 
Expert, SEO & SEM. “Training Effectiveness.” Importance of Training and 
Development. Blog, February 10, 2010. 
Fang, Ruixian, Wei Jiang, Jamil Khan, and Roger Dougal. “Thermal Modeling and 
Simulation of the Chilled Water System for Future All Electric Ship.” Department 
of Mechanical Engineering and Department of Electrical Engineering, University 
of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA, 2011. 
FAS. Federation of American Scientists. December 1, 2010. 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/abl.htm. Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Federal Aviation Administration. Type Certificate Data Sheet No. 3A19. Aircraft Type 
Certificate, Department of Transportation: Federal Aviation Administration, 2007. 
Fischer, Leo, William Jurens, Richard Landgraff, and Nathan Okun. United States of 
America 16”/50 (40.6 cm) Mark 7. November 20, 2006. 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070205233558/http://www.navweaps.com/Weapon
s/WNUS_16–50_mk7.htm. Accessed May 5, 2013. 
Fortin, Jacey. “Active Denial System: Microwave Weapon Safe for Military Use?” 
ibtimes.com. March 12, 2012. http://www.ibtimes.com/active-denial-system-
microwave-weapon-safe-military-use-video-423916. Accessed December 20, 
2012. 
French, A. P. Vibrations and Waves. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 
Gates, Robert. DoD News Briefing With Secretary Gates From The Pentagon. April 6, 
2009. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396. 





Global Security. July 7, 2011. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/atl.htm. Accessed 
December 20, 2012. 
Grill, Eric M TSGT. af.mil. March 21, 2007. 
http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123045745. Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Guoqi, Ni, Gao Benqing, and Junwei Lu. “phillipnute.com.” Research on High Power 
Microwave Weapons. 2005. http://www.philipnute.com/pdfs/v2s6.pdf. Accessed 
November 16, 2012. 
Hambling, David. New Scientist. August 12, 2008. 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn14520-us-boasts-of-laser-weapons-
plausible-deniability.html. Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Hambling, David. Pain Beam to Get Tougher, Smaller, More Powerful. Febuary 6, 2009. 
HandyFacts.com. Handy Facts - Materials. n.d. 
http://www.handyfacts.com/materials.html. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
Harney, Robert C., interview by USN LT Daniel P. Ciullo. Associate Professor, NPS 
Systems Engineering Department (January 2013. 
Harney, Robert C. Combat Systems Volume 1. Monterey, 2004. 
———. Combat Systems Volume 2. Monterey, 2004. 
———. Combat Systems Volume 3. Monterey, 2004. 
———. Combat Systems Volume 6. Monterey, 2011. 
Hub, Naukri. Importance of Training and Development. 2012. 
http://traininganddevelopment.naukrihub.com/importance-of-training.html. 
Accessed May 29, 2013. 
Hughes, Wayne P. Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 
2000. 
Hymes, Ian, Warren Boydell, and Belinda Prescott. Thermal Radiation: Physiological 
and Pathological Effects. Rugby, Warwickshire: Institute of Chemical Engineers, 
1996. 
IHS Jane’s. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: Mk 38/STARC 25/Mk 96/Mk 88 







April 23, 2013. 
———. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: Northrop Grumman (Grumman) F-
14 Tomcat. May 31, 2011. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=+++1337562&Pubabbrev=JAU_. Accessed February 20, 2013. 
———. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: C-801 (CSS-N-4 ‘Sardine’/YJ-1/-8/-
81), C-802 (CSSC-8 ‘Saccade’/YJ-2/-21/-22/-82/-85), and C-803 (YJ-3/-83/-88). 
November 30, 2012. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=+++1316694&Pubabbrev=JSWS. Accessed Februrary 20, 2013. 
———. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: HESA Ababil. September 12, 2011. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=+++1318044&Pubabbrev=JUAV. Accessed February 20, 2013. 
———. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: Kh-58 (AS-11 ‘Kilter’). August 13, 
2012. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=+++1306756&Pubabbrev=JALW. Accessed February 20, 2013. 
———. Defence & Security Intelligence & Analysis: River patrol boat. January 14, 
2010. 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/DisplayPage.aspx?DocType=Reference
&ItemId=+++1356705&Pubabbrev=JFS_. Accessed February 20, 2013. 
Integrated Publishing. SHIPBOARD HAZARDOUS MATERIAL STOWAGE. 2013. 
http://www.tpub.com/ask/22.htm. Accessed April 13, 2013. 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons 
(Protocol IV to the 1980 Convention), 13 October 1995. May 14, 2012. 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/570. Accessed May 8, 2013. 
Jean, Grace V. National Defense. August 2010. 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2010/August/Pages/NavyAimin
gforLaserWeaponsatSea.aspx. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
Jefferson Lab. Lightsources.org. Febraury 1, 2005. 





Keller, John. Military laser weapon research aims at defending U.S. Navy ships at sea. 
June 1, 2009. http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-20/issue-
6/departments/electro-optics-watch/military-laser-weapon-research-aims-at-
defending-us-navy-ships-at-sea.html. Accessed April 13, 2013. 
Koechner, Walter, and Michael Bass. Solid-State Lasers: A Graduate Text. New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 2003. 
Kopp, Carlo. “Air Power.” auairpower.net. May 2008. http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-
DEW-HEL-Analysis.html#mozTocId965273. Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Kuseian, John. Naval Power Systems Technology Roadmap. Public publication, 
Washington, DC: Electric Ships Office, 2013. 
Langford, Gary. “SEA-19B Directed Energy Weapons.” Monterey, September 2012. 
Langford, Gary, interview by Daniel Ciullo. Senior Lecturer, SE Department, Naval 
Postgraduate School Monterey, CA, (March 2013. 
Langford, Gary, interview by Earvin Taylor. Sustainment (April 5, 2013. 
LeVine, Susan. “The Active Denial System: A Revolutionary, Non-lethal Weapon for 
Today’s Battlefield.” ndu.edu. June 2009. 
http://www.ndu.edu/CTNSP/docUploaded/DTP%2065%20Active%20Defense-
%20PO%2060032.pdf. Accessed December 22, 2012. 
Lin, M.C., Umstead, M.E. and Djeu, N. “Chemical Lasers.” Annual Review of Physical 
Chemistry, 1983: 557 - 591. 
Lincoln, Timothy J. Directed Energy Weapons: Do We Have a Game Plan? Monograph, 
Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military United States Army, 2004. 
Lockridge, Rick. “Laser-Equipped 747 Designed to Blast Ballistic Missiles.” Global 
Security. January 19, 2001. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/010119-cnn.htm. Accessed May 2, 
2013. 
Lundquist, Edward H. http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/. April 23, 2013. 
http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/laser-weapon-system-law/. 
Accessed May 1, 2013. 
Lux, Jim. Making Laval at Home. February 23, 2000. 





Mahoney, Capt. Dennis , USN (ret), James Munro, Edward Wagner, and Joe Lazzari. 
“Advanced Shipboard Energy Storage System.” 2010. 
Marks, Paul. Drone-wrecking laser gun to sail on U.S. warship. April 12, 2013. 
Martinez, Luis. Navy’s New Laser Weapon Blasts Bad Guys From Air, Sea. April 8, 
2013. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/navys-laser-weapon-weapon-tomorrow-
now-reality/story?id=18908406#.UYGGRbWyC9F. Accessed May 1, 2013. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Specific heat of steel, fiberglass, wood. 2009. 
/http://cadlab6.mit.edu/2.009.wiki/anchor/index.php?title=Specific_heat_of_steel
%2C_fiberglass%2C_wood. Accessed April 19, 2013. 
MATWEB.com. MATWEB: Material Property Data. n.d. 
http://www.matweb.com/search/DataSheet.aspx?MatGUID=399f2dcfb1774f15a2
7c55978e2714f8. Accessed April 16, 2013. 
McGrath, Bryan. Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems (DEEWS) Serial 3: 
China. June 2, 2012. 
———. Directed Energy and Electric Weapons Systems (Serial 1). April 25, 2012. 
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/04/directed-energy-and-electric-
weapons.html. Accessed May 25, 2013. 
McIntosh, Gregory C. MANA (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata) Version 4 User 
Manual. New Zealand Defence Technology Agency , 2007. 
McIntosh, Gregory C. MANA-V (Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata - Vector) 
Supplementary Manual. Technical Note, New Zealand Defence Technology 
Agency , 2009. 
McKenney, Janice E. The Organizational History of the Field Artillery 1775–2003. 
Washington, D.D. : Center of Military History, 2007. 
Mcree, Donald I. “Soviet and Eartern European Research on Biological Effects of 
Microwave Radiation.” Proceedings of the IEEE, January 1980: 84–91. 
MDANews. mda.mil. February 11, 2010. http://www.mda.mil/news/10news0002.html. 
Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Merida, Elizabeth. Boeing. March 2012. http://www.boeing.com/defense-





Merritt, Paul. Beam Control for Laser Systems. Directed Energy Professional Society, 
2011. 
Microsoft. Runtime Callable Wrapper. 2013. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/8bwh56xe.aspx. Accessed April 21, 2013. 
Miller, Shawn. “NATO NAVAL ARMAMENTS GROUP.” NATO. June 4, 2009. 
http://www.nato.int/structur/AC/141/pdf/S-B/Raytheon.pdf. Accessed April 12, 
2013. 
Miller, Shawn, and George Svitak. NATO NAVAL ARMAMENTS GROUP Workshop on 
Counter Piracy Equipment and Technologies. Prod. Raytheon Company. June 4, 
2009. 
MIT 2.009ers. Archimedes Death Ray: Idea Feasibility Testing. October 2005. 
http://web.mit.edu/2.009/www/experiments/deathray/10_ArchimedesResult.html. 
Accessed May 8, 2013. 
Morrison, Peter. “High-Power Microwave Directed Energy Program.” onr.navy.mil. 
August 2008. http://www.onr.navy.mil/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/High-Power-
Microwave-Energy-Weapons.aspx. Accessed November 14, 2012. 
Narcisse, De Leon C. “AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE, AIR 
UNIVERSITY.” AIR FORCE WEATHER (AFW) PREPARATIONS TO 
SUPPORT DIRECTED ENERGY (DE) WEAPONS ACROSS THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD).April 1, 2007. 
http://dtlweb.au.af.mil///exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9
kM18xL2FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS80Mzc0Mg==.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2013. 
National Institute of Standards & Technology. “NIST.gov.” Generic Fiberglass.pdf. n.d. 
http://ws680.nist.gov/bees/ProductListFiles/Generic%20Fiberglass.pdf. Accessed 
April 19, 2013. 
National Institute of Standards & Technology. Planning Report 02–3 The Economic 
Impacts of Inadequate Infrastructure for Software Testing. Durham: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2002. 
National Research Council. Free Electron Lasers and Other Advanced Sources of Light: 
Scientific Research Opportunities. Washington, DC: The National Academies 
Press, 1994. 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis. “Electronics Standard Factors Handbook.” EMD Ships 





———. “NCCA.” Joint Inflation Calculator. February 2013. 
https://www.ncca.navy.mil/tools/JIC_FY14_Ver5_Excel2007_Final.xlsm. 
Accessed April 26, 2013. 
Naval Open Source Intelligence: BAE Systems Completes Successful Test of Mk 38 
Tactical LASER System Concept. 8 31, 2011. 
http://nosint.blogspot.com/2011/08/bae-systems-completes-successful-test.html. 
Accessed 4 15, 2013. 
Naval Sea Systems Command. Naval Sea Systems: Strategic Business Plan. Washington, 
DC, 2009. 
Naval Supply Services Command. NAVSUP Weapon Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS). 
July 1, 2011. https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup/ourteam/navsupwss. Accessed 
March 17, 2013. 
Naval-technology.com. Dokdo Class Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH). 2012. 
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/dodko-class/. Accessed April 26, 
2013. 
Navweaps.com. United States of America: 20 mm Phalanx Close-in Weapon System 
(CIWS).June 16, 2010. http://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Phalanx.htm. 
Accessed April 26, 2013. 
———. United States of America: 25 mm/87 (1”) Mark 38 Machine Gun System. 
November 8, 2006. 
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_25mm_mk38.htm. Accessed April 
26, 2013. 
———. United States of America: 5”/62 (12.7 cm) Mark 45 Mod 4. September 26, 2011. 
http://navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_5–62_mk45.htm. Accessed April 2013, 
26). 
Needham, Joseph. Science & Civilisation in China. Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
news.com.au. United States Navy to send prototype laser-gun on USS Ponce warship to 
Persian Gulf. April 9, 2013. http://www.news.com.au/technology/sci-tech/united-
states-navy-to-send-prototype-laser-gun-on-ship-to-persian-gulf/story-fn5fsgyc-
1226615482023. Accessed April 30, 2013. 
North, Gary. “My Preferred Weapon of Mass Destruction.” lewrockwell.com. April 26, 





Northrop Grumman.Maritime Laser Weapon System. 2012. 
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/SolidStateHighEnergyLaserSyste
ms/Documents/Datasheet_MLWS.pdf. Accessed April 26, 2013. 
Northrop Grumman. Defence Talk. April 11, 2011. http://www.defencetalk.com/navy-
northrop-accomplish-goals-for-at-sea-demonstration-of-maritime-laser-33397/. 
Accessed April 2013, 13). 
———. http://www.as.northropgrumman.com. 2012. 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/maritime_laser/index.html. 
Accessed December 28, 2012. 
Oestergaard, Joakim Kasper. About Standard Missile. December 20, 2012. 
http://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/Standard-Missile.html. Accessed May 2, 
2013. 
Office of Naval Research. Total Ownership Cost Focus Area. 2009. 
http://www.onr.navy.mil/About-ONR/science-technology-strategic-plan/Total-
Ownership-Cost.aspx. Accessed April 13, 2013. 
Ophir-Spiricon. “Laser Power and Energy Measurement Laser Beam Analysis.” 2010. 
Optics.org. Marine laser destroys target boat in at-sea tests. April 11, 2011. 
http://optics.org/news/2/4/15. Accessed May 2, 2013. 
O’Rourke, Ronald. Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 2013. 
O’Rourke, Ronald. Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 2011. 
O’Rourke, Ronald. Navy Shipboard LASERs for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: 
Background and Issues for Congress. CRS Report for Congress, Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012. 
Payne, Craig. Principles of Naval Weapon Systems, 2nd Ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute 
Press, 2012. 






Photonics, IPG. “IPG Photonics.” 2012. 
http://www.ipgphotonics.com/Collateral/Documents/English-
U.S./HP_Brochure.pdf. Accessed April 10, 2013. 
Pike, John. Global Security. July 21, 2011. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/mthel.htm. Accessed December 20, 
2012. 
Pimentel, JVV Kasper and GC. “HCl Chemical Laser.” Applied Physics Letter, 1965: 
352. 
Potts, JR. Military Factory: USS Freedom (LCS-1) Littoral Combat Ship. May 9, 2013. 
http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=USS-Freedom-LCS1. 
Accessed May 29, 2013. 
Reed, John. BAE Putting Lasers on Mk 38 Naval Gun. July 25, 2011. 
http://defensetech.org/2011/07/25/bae-putting-lasers-on-mk-38-naval-gun/. 
Accessed April 20, 2013. 
Reilly, Jill. U.S. military unveil latest weapon ... a ray beam that makes the enemy feel 
‘quite hot’. March 11, 2012. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2113529/U-
S-military-unveil-latest-weapon--A-ray-beam-makes-enemy-feel-quite-hot.html. 
Accessed April 9, 2013. 
Robinson, Edward. Solid State Active Denial Technology Demonstrator Program. 
Febuary 1, 2012. 
Salisbury, David F. Stanford Report. May 5, 1999. 
http://news.stanford.edu/news/1999/may5/schawlowobit-55.html. Accessed May 
21, 2013. 
Schmit, Matthew, and Jerry LCDR Hicks. “EMS Ships.” Electronics Standard Factors 
Handbood Part II. September 22, 1999. 
Scott, Richard. “Fighting the FIAC Threat.” Defense Helicopter, January/Febuary 2011. 
Selinger, Marc. Lasers on the high seas. 11 28, 2011. 
http://www.boeing.com/Features/2011/11/bds_tls_11_28_11.html. Accessed 4 15, 
2013. 
Sherman, Robert. Federation of American Scientists. March 21, 1998. 






Sirak, Michael C. “TRW Abandoning Tactical High Energy Laser Effort, DoD Officials 
Say.” Cryptome. May 27, 1999. http://cryptome.org/jya/thel-dump.htm. Accessed 
May 2, 2013. 
Sohm, Stephen, Pradip Kar, Kami Burr, and Amir Chaboki. “MK38 Tactical Laser 
System.” 2012. 
Spectral Sciences, Inc. About Modtran. 2012. http://modtran5.com/about/index.html. 
Accessed April 18, 2013. 
Sprangle, Phillip. Laser Weapons for Naval Applications. March 22, 2012. 
Stanmech Technologies, Inc. Thermal Properties of Materials. n.d. 
http://www.stanmech.com/thermal-properities-of-materials. Accessed April 14, 
2013. 
Staton, Robin, and Robert Pawlak. Laser Weapon System (LAWS) Adjunct to the Close-In 
Weapon System. Unclassified, Dahlgren: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren 
Division,Corporate, 2012. 
Superstars of Science. 2011. http://superstarsofscience.com/scientist/john-c-polanyi. 
Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Svelto, Orazio. Principles of LASERS (5th ed.). 2010. 
Taylor, Dan. “Navy Testing Developmental Laser Against Small Surface Vessels.” Inside 
the Navy, June 7, 2010. 
Tesla Invents Peace Ray. 2011. http://www.tfcbooks.com/tesla/1934–07–10.htm. 
Accessed May 8, 2013. 
Tibbitts, Barry. “Surface Ship Combat System Design Integration.” LPD17 Design 
Exercises. August 1998. 
Tressler, Dennis. “Wired.com.” 2010. 
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/05/LaWS-
Background.pdf. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
U.S. Department of Defense. Defense.gov: Contracts. April 28, 2005. 
http://www.defense.gov/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=2998. Accessed April 
26, 2013. 





United States Navy. Fact File: Standard Missile. October 19, 2012. 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1200&ct=2. 
Accessed April 26, 2013. 
———. United States Navy Fact: File MK 45 5-Inch Gun 54/62 Caliber Guns. October 
19, 2012. 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=575&ct=2. 
Accessed May 3, 2013. 
University of Iowa. Laser Disposal Guidelines. 2013. http://ehs.research.uiowa.edu/viii-
laser-disposal-guidelines. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
———. Laser Safety Hazards. 2013. http://ehs.research.uiowa.edu/ii-laser-safety-
hazards. Accessed April 14, 2013. 
University of Maryland. Laser Safety Plan. College Park, 2012. 
Vandroff, Mark. “DDG 51 Program.” Powerpoint Slides presented to Surface Navy 
Association, Program Manager, DDG 51 Shipbuilding Program, CPT, USN, 
2013. 
WAG-AERO. Corrugated Skins, Lower Flap 12”x 84–3/4.” 2013. 
http://store.wagaero.com/product_info.php?products_id=12319. Accessed April 
27, 2013. 
Wallace, John. Laser Focus Wolrd. September 2, 2009. 
http://www.laserfocusworld.com/articles/2009/09/boeings-advanced-tactical-
laser-defeats-ground-target-in-flight-test.html. Accessed December 20, 2012. 
Warner, Brent. Cryogenics and Fluids Branch. September 9, 2004. 
http://istd.gsfc.nasa.gov/cryo/introduction/liquid_helium.html. Accessed April 13, 
2013. 
Weinberger, Sharon. “High-Power Microwave Weapon Systems Start to Look Like 
Deadend.” scientificamerican.org. September 12, 2012. 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=high-power-microwave-
weapons-start-to-look-like-dead-end&page=2. Accessed November 8, 2012. 
———. Pain Ray Test Subjects Exposed to ‘Unconscionable Risks’. October 14, 2008. 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/10/pain-ray-accide/. Accessed April 21, 
2013. 
Williams, Thomas. “A Very Brief Introduction to Microwaves.” wa1mba.com. April 8, 





Williams, Tomeka S., and Ellen Barber. “Defense Acquisition University.” Cost 
Estimating Methodology. February 2011. https://acc.dau.mil/adl/en-
U.S./30373/file/61352/B4_CE_Methodologies_-_Feb%2011_V3.pdf. Accessed 
May 1, 2013. 
www.rafael.co.il. www.rafael.co.il. 2013. 
http://www.rafael.co.il/marketing/SIP_STORAGE/FILES/6/956.pdf. Accessed 
May 21, 2013. 
www.seaforces.org. Mk-38 machine gun system MGS. 2013. 
http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-38-machine-gun-system.htm. 
Accessed May 21, 2013. 









INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
